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Abstract 
 
The criminalisation of seafarers has been observed as a growing phenomenon for more than 
thirty years, presenting a picture of increasing liability upon the Master even though their 
responsibilities remain essentially unchanged in generations of maritime law. Over the same 
period, the structure of the maritime environment in which they work has changed 
dramatically, as evidenced by the complex evolution of Fleet Ownership and Management 
and the resultant challenges in identifying the party liable in a potential action. 
Paradoxically, the person least able to influence such changes has been the Master, who has 
seen the key features of their traditional relationship with the ship operator blurring, as the 
structure of maritime operations has evolved with the demands of social and economic 
change. The effect of these changes has left the Master with diminishing management 
LQIOXHQFHZLWKRXWORVLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\7KH\UHPDLQ0DVWHU8QGHU*RGEXWZLWKRXW*RG¶V
DXWKRULW\RYHUWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHVKLS¶VDIIDLUV 
 
Faced with an increasing amount of criminal prosecutions globally in recent decades, the 
shipping industry has met the phenomenon with growing dismay, the downstream 
consequence of which has raised questions challenging the proportionality and, indeed, the 
fairness, of criminal accountability, in what is perceived by the maritime community to be a 
disharmonised system worldwide.  
 
The purpose of this work is to examine the many facets of the mischief with which the 
phenomenon confronts the Master in their professional conduct, both in terms of Flag State 
and Port State obligations. But the purpose goes further than that, for upon this foundation 
we can then synthesise options for a solution.   
 
Ultimately, this thesis is all about the perception of justice in a globalised maritime 
community in the twenty first century ± but the real challenge is to rationalise a new 
approach to criminalisation, which would meet the interests of justice both for the Master 
and the State. In the harsh reality of intractable disputes in the twenty first century, that new 
approach might mean a compromise, which may not be ideal for the Master or for the State, 
but would be something which both can live with.  
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Section One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Justice or Criminalisation? 
 
Moral standards regulate right and wrong conduct, which underpin the concept of Justice. 
This must, itself, be defined, in order to present a persuasive argument for the ethics which 
IORZIURPLW-RKQ6WXDUW0LOOILUVWSXEOLVKHGKLVVHPLQDOZRUNµUtilitarianism¶LQ61; his 
definition of Justice has not subsequently been improved:  
 
Justice is a name for certain moral classes of moral rules, which concern the 
essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute 
obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life.1 
  
The Mischief, which broods at the very heart of the question, demands an understanding of 
just how the concept of criminal justice has evolved in the accountability of the Master. 
Such accountability logically should be defined by a single principle against which we 
judge all actions. Given the 0DVWHU¶V responsibility for the vessel and the safety of life 
under the laws of the Flag State, in balance with (sometimes in conflict with) the 
commercial responsibility to their  employer, subject to the duty to observe the laws of the 
Port and Coastal States into whose jurisdiction the vessel sails, the possibility fades for a 
definition of a single principle of criminal justice, that can be applied consistently across the 
many jurisdictions into which the Master may get into trouble. It is the evolutionary process 
of criminal accountability across these jurisdictions, defined and applied by moral rules that 
differ according to the normative ethics of changing societies, which has forged the process 
which the global maritime community identifies as the phenomenon of criminalisation. 
Nowhere better was this characterized than in the case of the trial of Captain Chawla of the 
Hebei Spirit; upon his conviction, International Transport Workers Federation maritime 
coordinator Stephen Cotton DUWLFXODWHGWKHLQGXVWU\¶VRXWUDJHLQDFRPPHQWWR/OR\G¶V/LVW 
 
7KLV LV QRW MXVWLFH ,W¶V QRW HYHQ VRPHWKLQJ FORVH :KDW ZH KDYH VHHQ WRGD\ LV
scapegoating, criminalisation and a refusal to consider the wider body of 
evidence that calls into question the propriety of the court. This decision is 
LQFRPSUHKHQVLEO\YLQGLFWLYHDQGZLOOLPSDFWRQDOOSURIHVVLRQDOPDULQHUV«2 
                         
1
 Mill, JS,1863, Utilitarianism, Parker, Son & Bourn, London, p 87 
2
 /OR\G¶V/LVW'HFHPEHU,QIRUPDSOF/RQGRQ 
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The Primary and Secondary Research Questions  
   
Professor Edgar Gold is Adjunct Professor at the T.C. Beirne School of Law, the University 
of Queensland, and a member of the Governing Board of the IMO-International Maritime 
Law Institute. In 2004 he delivered a paper to The Maritime Law Association of Australia 
DQG1HZ=HDODQG¶Vst  $QQXDO&RQIHUHQFHµ1DYLJDWLQJWKH6HDRI&KDQJH¶RQWKH subject 
RIµ7KH3URWHFWLRQRI0DVWHUVDQG6HDIDUHUVIURP&ULPLQDOL]DWLRQ(PHUJLQJ3UREOHPVIRU
WKH 6KLSSLQJ ,QGXVWU\¶ Professor Gold introduced the process of criminalisation 3 as a 
problem which had been emerging for the shipping industry for some time. An absolute 
obligation necessarily must be capable of definition by a single principle ± anything less 
and it would not be absolute - and, by any logical argument, if the phenomenon has 
emerged without the guidance of a single principle, then there must be a conflict between 
Justice and criminalisation. By any compelling argument founded on the principle stated by 
John Stuart Mill, this would amount to a failure of criminal justice. The primary research 
question therefore must examine the character of the 0DVWHU¶Vcriminalisation.  
 
The focus on the core feature of the phenomenon, which defines our primary research 
question, reveals two assumptions, forming the secondary research questions, which must 
be tested in the context of the Master: 
 
1. Has the Master undergone a process of criminalisation? 
2. Has this been an emerging problem for some time? 
 
These questions naturally define the issues which characterise the research methodology. 
                         
3
 Gold, Professor E, The Protection of Masters and Seafarers from Criminalization: Emerging Problems for 
the Shipping Industry, Centre for Maritime Law, University of Queensland, Brisbane Prepared for the 31st 
$QQXDO&RQIHUHQFHµ1DYLJDWLQJWKH6HDRI&KDQJH¶7KH0DULWLPH/DZ$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDDQG1HZ
Zealand Adelaide, South Australia 29 September ± 1 October 2004  
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1.2 Action Research: Challenging the World View 
 
(i) The Research Methodology 
 
The task of addressing the research questions demands an understanding of the evolution of 
WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ ODZ 0LFKDORZVNL¶V JHQHUDOLVHG FRQFHSW RI FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ
can be applied to offer a definition in context as the process by which WKH 0DVWHU¶V
behaviour or conduct is transformed from what civil law would call something more than an 
error of judgment, into a criminal offence4.   
 
,W WKHUHIRUH IROORZV WKDW *ROG¶V REVHUYDWLRQ LV GHSHQGHQW XSRQ WKH 0DVWHU¶V U{OH KDYLQJ
been subjected to a process by which they are held criminally accountable for their acts or 
omissions, in circumstances in which they were not previously accountable. A cautious 
FRPPHQWDWRUPLJKWHUUWRZDUGVXQGHUVWDWHPHQWDQGREVHUYHWKDW*ROG¶VSRVLWLRQLVVKDUHG
as the SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH PDULWLPH LQGXVWU\ EXW WKH LQGXVWU\¶V RSLQLRQ KDV HYROYHG IDU
beyond perception, into conviction ± the dangerous state in which a person does not need to 
question their belief, because they know they are right. The underpinning evidence for this 
state of affairs will be all too readily apparent in the global response to the Hebei Spirit 
case, discussed below. 
 
The key to a successful methodology in this work addresses the issue from the position of 
authority which is derived from a historLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHWKHUHIRUHWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQLQ
law will be charted from the period when external influences can historically be identified 
as first clearly having an impact on the Master. This can conveniently be placed in the 
sixteenth century, with the voyages that demanded accountability for the investment made 
in ships and cargoes ± clearly, with origins in the law of contract. 
 
This starting point delivers a benefit at an early stage in the project, at which the critical 
analysis of primary and secondary sources permits a re-HYDOXDWLRQ RI KRZ WKH 0DVWHU¶V
authority evolved to its contemporary status in law. This re-evaluation by itself leads to 
unexpected conclusions on the historical foundation for the current law, for the evidence 
indicates that they were not by any means the authoritarian figure envisaged by the phrase 
                         
4
 Michalowski, R, 1985, Order, Law and Crime: An Introduction to Criminology,  Random House, New 
York, p6: the process by which behaviors [sic] and individuals are transformed into crime and criminals  
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µ0DVWHU8QGHU*RG¶DQGWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\HYHQH[SHFWHGWREHFRQVXOWHGRQDSSURSULDWH
action in moments of peril. Further investigation reveals WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V
position from the sixteenth century to that which subsisted in the mid-nineteenth century, 
which was achieved through research of contemporary archives as well as through case law 
and, largely from the nineteenth century, statute law. This establishes the evidential 
underpinning for a fundamental re-DSSUDLVDORIWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKH0DVWHU¶VH[SRVXUHWR
criminal liability, presenting findings which challenge commentaries in published literature 
that the criminalisation of the Master has been a recently-emerging phenomenon.  
 
While analysing the evolution of statutory regulation, closer examination of the sources 
further establishes the foundation of the contractual relationship between the Master and the 
shipowner, which underpinned the concepts of responsibility and shared liability in criminal 
proceedings - two vital factors which have a dynamic effect on the changes in the Master-
Owner relationship which took place in the last thirty \HDUV 7KH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH 6KLS¶V
Master prior to the rapid evolution of ship management, is illustrated very well by case 
studies drawn from primary source material in the form of interviews with reliably-
informed and highly experienced retired Masters and compares with studies of recent cases 
in criminal law worldwide. Having established the facts of this change, the rationale for the 
distance put by the owner between them becomes apparent ± as the implementation of the 
Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 illustrates with some clarity. The effect, whether 
intended or not, puts the fear of isolation and vulnerability in the heart of the Master. Within 
their home jurisdiction this is bad enough but, the methodology places key focus on the 
application of international law and, in particular, the relationship between Port State and 
Flag 6WDWHLQWKHLUDSSURDFKWRUHVROYLQJGLVSXWHVDULVLQJRXWRIWKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\ 
 
Case studies perform an important function in the methodology, enabling a complete 
understanding to be achieved of evolving case law and statutes, both on the part of Port 
State and Flag State. Both reported and unreported cases, along with journal articles, papers 
and reports delivered in recent years, from the United States and countries worldwide as 
well as the UK contribute to the task of rationalising conclusions from case studies. 
 
This material serves to underpin the analysis of the changes in the social and political 
maritime environment, leading to conclusions drawn from elements of normative ethics and 
jurisprudence, which are revealed to have a dynamic on the subject but only emerge, and 
take substance and form, with the development of the work. The research methodology 
exposes flaws in a theory, derived from commentaries reviewed, that the evolution in 
criminalisation was partly caused by a growing rejection by many states of the provisions of 
 9 
UNCLOS5; it was not a rejection but an interpretation of UNCLOS which resulted from this 
work, to identify just what effect the international community of sovereign states has had on 
the criminalisation of the Master. 
 
 
 
 
                         
5
 See Art 97: Penal jurisdiction in matters of collision or any other incident of navigation 
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(ii) Analysing the Mischief: Key Issues in the Literature Review  
 
The Social Idea of Fairness 
 
Essential as they are to the work, the answers to the research questions are dependent upon 
the philosophy of the criminalisation process. 'HQQLV %DNHU¶V RSinion6 must command 
respect that conduct should only be criminalised when it is fair to do so, but the 
persuasiveness of this is dependent upon the definition of what is fair. John Rawls7 argues 
that fairness demands equal liberty for all individuals, as a principle of justice which must 
be satisfied before other political interests are satisfied. Many commentators have wrestled 
ZLWK 5DZOV¶V ZRUN EXW LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKLV UHVHDUFK KLV WKHRU\ SUHVHQWV D FRPSHOOLQJ
argument that puts justice to the individual above political governance of society as a 
whole. This demands that priority be given to moral conduct which must be observed by 
individuals towards each other in society, and that violations of basic rights cannot be 
justified by arguing that such violations may produce economic or social advantages. If 
Masters are to be burdened with criminal accountability beyond that accorded to any other 
private citizen, then good objective reasons are necessary for this moral conduct. This is 
where the characteristics of a crime become so important, in order to justify objectively 
VRFLHW\¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKHFULPHLQTXHVWLRQDVEHLQJDPRUDOZURQJ 
 
In his paper on criminalisation, Professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee succinctly summarises 
the characteristics of a crime in the context of the Master8 with sharp focus on the mens rea, 
required in most serious crimes, which society views as being moral wrongs in which the 
key element of intention or recklessness must be proved, according to the criminal burden, 
beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish a guilty mind according to the crime defined 
in law will lead to an acquittal. Professor Mukherjee draws the distinction between such 
serious crimes and those which are less serious, which only require proof of the actus reus. 
These offences, known today as strict liability offences, were originally promulgated in the 
nineteenth century in order to provide health and safety regulations in the work place. Once 
challenged with such an offence, it is for the Defendant to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that he discharged his duties with due diligence; if the case is proved against 
                         
6
 Baker, J, 2007, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, (2007) 11(3) New Criminal Law 
Review 371 
7
 Rawls, J, 1971, A Theory of Justice, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambrdige Ma, 
p162 
8
 0XNKHUMHH3&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQDQG8QIDLU7UHDWPHQW7KHVHDIDUHU¶V3HUVSHFWLYH-RXUQDORI
International Maritime Law, Vol 12, 325-336 
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him, then this will give rise to liability to pay a penalty, without the trappings of a criminal 
offence to which blame was attached, such as a case involving criminal negligence. 
  
Applying this in context, it is the globalisation of society which has driven the evolution of 
international law, bringing its normative ethics to conventions that make strict liability 
offences of pollution. In this way, Article 211 of UNCLOS obliges Flag States to make 
laws designed to prevent and control pollution from their ships, while Port and Coastal 
States may make laws ± specifically under their sovereign system ± to prevent and control 
pollution from any ships in their jurisdiction.   
 
The international community agreed that environmental protection had to be a priority; 
Treaty obligations must be applied under the legal system of a State and, thus, Port and 
Coastal State laws would conveniently make strict liability offences of pollution laws. It 
was always intended that liability be strict, not absolute and, so, Regulation 11(b) of Annex 
1 of MARPOL gives the Accused a Due Diligence defence to such a prosecution. As an 
additional safeguard, Article 230 of UNCLOS provides for monetary penalties only for a 
pollution offence, except in the case of a wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial 
VHD ,Q RUGHU WKDW WKH VHDIDUHU¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV EH UHVSHFWHG $UWLFOH   UHPLQGV WKH
Courts that, dXULQJ DQ\ VXFK SURVHFXWLRQ WKH 'HIHQGDQW¶V ULJKWV WR D IDLU WULDO PXVW EH
respected. 
 
The justification is clear: global society understands the need to make Regulations which 
protect the environment from pollution and, thus, a violation of those regulations cannot go 
unpunished. But if the offence does not share the characteristics of a crime, that is, mens 
rea, then the sanction must be appropriate to that.  
 
It is the normative ethics of the society of the enforcing state which determines how (to 
paraphrase WS Gilbert) the punishment should fit the crime. In so many of the case studies 
in this work, though, the punishment visited upon the Master is disproportionate, 
evidencing justification for alarm in the emerging criminalisation of the Master as the 
individual responsible, even though they may not have the mens rea for blame. 
 
In understanding the mischief, it is essential to analyse how the normative ethics of society 
have influenced the current law, in which Masters find themselves subject to what the 
maritime community perceives to be a growing phenomenon of criminalisation, notably in 
relation to Port State jurisdiction but, in fact, the mischief is identified as spreading far 
beyond, and discredits ± shames, even ± the most revered of judicial systems. This may be 
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illustrated starkly by a review of the cases of Captain Schröder9 and Adomako10, when 
considered in the light of the wisdom of Mr Justice Holmes in the Northern Securities 
case11.  
 
To summarise, critical analysis of the literature empowers the work with an understanding 
first of how the position of the Master has evolved and, secondly, evaluates exactly whether 
the perception of a criminalisation phenomenon is justified, according to the normative 
ethics of a global maritime community which has articulated the perception. If the 
perception of a phenomenon can be justified in a critical literature review, then the mischief 
is revealed, and gives validity to the academic labour of finding a solution to cure the 
mischief. Whether a solution meets the demands of the normative ethics of the sovereign 
jurisdiction, may depend on just how compelling the sovereign jurisdiction finds the 
argument. 
 
 
The Normative Ethics of Justice 
 
If some moral wrong is condemned by society as criminal, it must threaten, in some way, 
the security or well-being of that society and, as Sir Carlton Allen has it, it is not safe to 
leave it redressable only by compensation of the party injured.12 
 
Society has entrusted to Parliament the function of defining and controlling just what 
society holds to be a moral wrong; that, itself, is enforced by a power which is maintained 
quite separately from Parliament and vested in the Courts, which Lord Simons described in 
Shaw v DPP13 as a residual power to conserve not only the safety and order but also the 
moral welfare of the state. 
 
The normative ethics underpinning concepts of Justice bear a heavy burden in regulating 
two crucial constituent parts of the moral welfare of the state: liability and sentencing. The 
fairness of criminal justice systems naturally rely on checks and balances and on the good 
                         
9
 United States of America v Wolfgang Schröder [2007] United States District Court, Alabama Southern 
District (currently unreported) 
10
 R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 
11
 Northern Securities Co v United States 193 US 197 (1904). See below. 
12
 Allen, C K, 1931, Legal Duties and other Essays in Jurisprudence, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, p233-
234 
13
 Shaw v DPP [1962] 2 All ER 446 
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conscience of legislators and interpreters14 WRPDLQWDLQVRFLHW\¶VPRUDOVWDQGDUGVLQOLDELOLW\
and sentencing. ,QKLVSDSHUµ6RFLDOLVVXHVRI/DZDQG2UGHU
 Bauman attaches a very high 
value to the effect which social and political trends have in moderating the humanity and 
reasonableness in punitive justice15, so that a great deal depends upon proportionality, both 
in liability and sentencing, with the consequence of punishment telling on society as much 
as on the convicted person. When this is applied to the moderation of justice in a Port State, 
LWVUHOHYDQFHWRWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQLVFRPSHOOLQJ 
 
The normative ethics of Justice as a set of moral rules, therefore, depend heavily on the 
PRGHUDWLRQRIVRFLHW\¶VPRUDOVWDQGDUGV5HVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGLQWKLVSURMHFWLQGLFDWHVWKDW
IRUJHQHUDWLRQVRYHUWKHODVW\HDUVWKHFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\RIWKH6KLS¶V0DVWHUZDV
comfortably moderated by a society which embraced them as constituting a special case by 
reason of their overriding duty to maintain order and discipline, with an unassailable 
responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the ship herself, and the transnational nature of 
their profession. 
 
These factors form the foundatioQRIWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQLQODZ+RZWKLVHYROYHGZLOOEH
discussed more fully below. 
 
The Risk Society 
 
Society, naturally, evolves in response to internal change and external stimuli and, with it, 
the concept of a risk which might threaten the security of that society, has evolved. Indeed, 
(ULFVRQDQG&DUULHUHKDYHGHILQHGWKLVLQWHUPVRIZKDWWKH\ODEHODµULVNVRFLHW\¶LQZKLFK
society has become more concerned with public safety than with economic inequality16. It 
will be argued that this concept of risk management by domestic societies in sovereign 
states characterises the approach which the high contracting parties adopt in formulating 
transnational law, which is the source of maritime law that bonds flag states and port states 
to each other ± rather, should bond them. How they respond to evolving concepts that shape 
the criminalisation of the Master will play a crucial part in the foundation of this work. 
 
The approach taken to legislation by a risk society presents a clear tension which has a 
                         
14
 Hudson, B, 2003, Justice in the Risk Society, Sage, London, Chapter 7  
15
 Bauman, Z, 2000, Social issues of Law and Order, British Journal of Criminology, Oxford Journals, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 40 205-221 
16
 Ericson, R and K Carriere, 1994, The Fragmentation of Criminology, in D Nelken (ed), The Futures of 
Criminology, Sage, London, p89 
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dynamic on the definition of a moral wrong in the context of normative ethics. The 
underlying causes of this tension may be identified in terms of a concern, inter alia, for the 
safety of the individual, for the environment and for the state17. Such conflicting issues in 
this tension compel the risk society to practise the Judgment of Solomon, and trade off the 
merits of ethical arguments which may place the individual and the state on a collision 
course. For the judgment to demonstrate that it has met the fundamental philosophical 
demands of Justice, the risk society has to make decisions which must strike a balance 
between the regulation of criminal activity by the restraint of punishment, and the respect 
and maintenance of limits on such punishment. Inevitably the clash comes when the 
judgment must confront the seemingly intractable problem of rationalising and justifying 
the argument for deciding what human rights should be suspended in the interests of the 
sovereign state in question. Put in context, this challenges society to convey a compelling 
decision to make the Master accountable for wrongs which the risk society perceives it to 
have suffered ± VLPSO\ EHFDXVHRI WKH IDFW RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH
presence of any characteristics of a crime.  Such cases are commonly categorised as hard 
cases, and sometimes as great cases. In this context, the dictum of Mr Justice Holmes 
(dissenting) in the American case of Northern Securities v United States deserves a 
verbatim quotation: 
 
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not 
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because 
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the 
feelings and distorts the judgment18.    
 
While this explains the rationale of the risk society for the criminalisation of the Master, it 
does not render the rationale safe, because of the lack of evidence to support the logical 
conclusion of the inherent argument, central to the Judgment  of Solomon, that the 
GLVWULEXWLRQ DQG FRQWURO RI ULVNV ZLOO UHVWRUH D EDODQFH GLFWDWHG E\ VRFLHW\¶V FRQVFLHQFH
without such evidence, one is left to draw the conclusion that the balance in favour of the 
0DVWHU¶VKXPDQULJKWVWRMXVWLFHDQGIDLUQHVVZRXOGsimply be eroded. 
 
 
 
                         
17
 Hudson, B, 2003, Justice in the Risk Society, Sage, London, p203ff 
18
 Northern Securities Co v United States 193 US 197, 400-401 (1904) 
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(iii) The Mischief 
 
It is important in this work to offer a solution which restores the ethical application of the 
FULPLQDO ODZ WR WKH 6KLS¶V 0DVWHU RQ D WUDQVQDWLRQDO EDVLV ,Q WKLV VHQVH WKH HWKLFV
underpinning the position of the Master must be applied broadly and, very often, must be 
applied subjectively to the Master, not objectively as society might more comfortably 
SUHIHUWKHHYLGHQFHIRUZKLFKLVRQO\WRRDSSDUHQWLQWKHHYROXWLRQRIWKHFULPHRIµFULPLQDO
QHJOLJHQFH¶ :KHQ Whe society of a Port State reflects on the ethics which determine the 
0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LW PD\ QRW EH OLPLWHG WR MXGJLQJ ZKHWKHU WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFWV DUH
morally right or wrong. Nardin and Mapel distinguish some ethical judgments, as being 
moral in the restricted sense that they involve the application of principles of what society 
holds to be proper or improper conduct, surely to be determined by a subjective test upon 
WKH0DVWHU¶VPHQVUHDE\FRPSDULVRQZLWKMXGJPHQWVZKLFKDUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKDFWVZKich 
are permitted or condemned according to the features which characterise those acts, in other 
words, the circumstances alone which may not demand a guilty mind.19 Such judgments in 
the criminal law may vary dramatically according to the values and interests of the Port 
State and suffer intractable conflict with those of the Flag State which clothed the Master 
with their authority in the first place. In this context, the trend in recent years, of requiring 
mere strict liability for offences carrying increasingly severe penalties, touches a sensitive 
nerve for the criminalisation of the Master.    
 
There is a prima facie persuasive argument in submitting that the solution would be to 
implement globally a common ethical system based on the rights theory, that is, the theory 
WKDW WKH ULJKW RI RQH SHUVRQ LPSRVHV D GXW\ RQ DQRWKHU 'HVSLWH WKH 8.¶V ODWH
implementation of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, compelling arguments 
might be adduced to support the pre-eminence of the English Legal System as the torch-
bearer of justice in human rights. The English system can be defined as being based on 
Common Law, having evolved from spontaneously observed rules and practices, shaped 
and formalised by decisions made by judges pronouncing the law in relation to the 
particular facts before them. Strong evidence underpinning this can be found in the Rules of 
Natural Justice, which were largely unwritten rules defining the assumptions of justice that 
can be relied on in the English system. These rules formed the foundation for Article 6 of 
the 1950 Convention, requiring that, whether the proceedings be civil, compensating the 
loser, or criminal, punishing the offender, everybody, whether the Accused or the Accuser, 
                         
19
 Nardin T and D Mapel (eds), 1992, Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p 326 
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is entitled to a fair hearing in which they can defend themselves, in full view of the public 
eye, within a reasonable time, before an independent and impartial tribunal which has been 
established and managed by Statute, that is, by the Will of the People. 
 
The English Legal System embraced and enforced the terms of the Convention by the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which happily codified a number of ethical duties, including 
Article 7 (No Punishment Without Law) ± although this was not the first codification of the 
right under English law (that belonged to Magna Carta), so that, taken as a whole, an 
argument may be made for applying the English criminal process (as opposed to constituent 
laws) worldwide in order to determine the criminal liability of the Master. 
 
This, however, would defy a major ethical issue: In 1918 President Woodrow Wilson of the 
United States addressed a joint session of Congress in which he declared the inalienable 
right of people to choose freely the politics by which they are governed, and to follow the 
social development as they choose. It necessarily follows they must be free to shape their 
own culture, which means making their own laws and, if it so happens, be free to make their 
own mistakes.20 7KDW¶VGHPRFUDF\IRU\RX 
 
In consequence, it would offend the most basic ethical values of the transnational forum to 
tender a solution which conflicts with the rights of sovereign states to determine their own 
judicial process; that is, the system which tries the Accused for liability under their chosen 
system. Indeed, there are irreconcilable differences between the adversarial system, led by 
English law, and the inquisitorial system of most European Continental states who would 
support their system with the compelling authority of Cicero and, later, Imperial Rome21. 
The task of determining which is the preferred system is hardly one which ethically can be 
imposed upon a sovereign state against its will. This was undoubtedly the guiding principle 
which led the International Maritime Organisation to tread carefully when drafting its 
Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers: 
 
7KHVHJXLGHOLQHVGRQRWVHHNWRLQWHUIHUHZLWKDQ\VWDWH¶VGRPHVWLFFULPLQDORU
civil law processes nor the full enjoyment of the basic rights of seafarers, 
including those provided by international human rights instruments, and the 
VHDIDUHU¶VULJKWVWRKXPDQHWUHDWPHQWDWDOOWLPHV22 
 
                         
20
 http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points 
21
 See, eg, Powell J and J Paterson, 2004, Cicero The Advocate, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp61-78 
22
 Resolution LEG.3(91) adopted on 27 April 2006 
 17 
By the same inalienable freedom of choice, there is nothing to stop a sovereign state from 
exercising the equal freedom of picking and choosing which legal principles and processes 
it admires in other jurisdictions. While English criminal law involves patterns and processes 
which are dependent upon the adversarial system, principles of English civil law have been 
embraced globally, perhaps the most notable example being the re-statement of liability in 
negligence held obiter in a case in which the villain of the piece was a dead snail lurking in 
a bottle of ginger beer23.  Paradoxically, the two galaxies of criminal and civil law clash 
where they meet this very case, which gave birth to the concept of criminal negligence, and 
fundamental to the golden thread running through this work that the emergent 
criminalisation phenomenon, at the centre of the primary research question, is fatally flawed 
by its reliance upon criminal negligence in finding a conviction against the Master that 
conveniently suits the normative ethics of Port and Coastal States. 
 
This momentary introduction to the issue of criminal negligence in fact belies the 
importance of the concept to the criminalisation problem; while, at this early stage, it is a 
mere well-spring, it will gather pace and flow throughout the work as the golden thread 
which defines the mischief.    
 
 
                         
23
 Donoghue (or McAlister) v Stevenson [1932] All ER Rep 1; [1932] AC 562 
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(iv) The Elephant in the Corner: Sovereignty  
 
In a very competent summary of Korean Environmental Law, Hong Sik Cho clarified the 
KLVWRULFDOEDFNJURXQGZKLFKH[SODLQVWKHUDWLRQDOHRI6RXWK.RUHD¶VODZRQHQYLURQPHQWDO
SURWHFWLRQ DQG LWV HQIRUFHPHQW +H REVHUYHG WKDW WKH HQDFWPHQW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V ILUVW
national environmental law, the Pollution Prevention Act, took place in 1963, the year in 
which Korea's initial five-year economic plan was initiated by then President Park Chung 
+HH .RUHD¶V SKHQRPHQDO UDWH RI HFRQRPLF JURZWK ZDV DFFHOHUDWLQJ E\ PRUH WKDQ  SHU
cent every year, which was more than double that enjoyed by most others. Hong Sik Cho 
REVHUYHG WKDW.RUHDQSHRSOH WKRXJKWHYHU\WKLQJKDG WREHGRQH µIDVWHU DQG IDVWHU¶ EXW LW
was achieved at a terrible cost, for the downstream consequence of this massive 
industrialisation expansion resulted in a rapid and worU\LQJGHWHULRUDWLRQRI WKHFRXQWU\¶V
QDWXUDOHQYLURQPHQWZKLFKLQODWHU\HDUVZDVGXEEHGDµSRLVRQSURVSHULW\¶ZKLFKOHGWRD
reassessment of the need for environmental protection in the national consciousness. Hong 
Sik Cho may have surprised even himself when he discovered that political activists who 
had devoted themselves to the democracy movement in the 1970s and 1980s became 
environmental activists themselves, when the state of their environment became so 
seriously apparent24. As a result, a structured movement of Non-Governmental 
2UJDQLVDWLRQVRU1*2¶VGHYHORSHG WRFKDPSLRQHQYLURQPHQWDOFDXVHV LQD WUHQGZKLFK
has won the support of the body of the Korean people, because they have awoken to the 
environmental catastrophe which they had nearly brought upon themselves with their 
industrial expansion. The effect which such concerns have upon the normative ethics of 
society provides a compelling rationale for criminalisation ± if not justification. 
 
Against this background, we should consider the case of the Hebei Spirit. At about 07.30 
local time on the 7th 'HFHPEHU  QHDU 6RXWK .RUHD¶V 3RUW RI 'DHVDQ D FUDQH EDUJH
owned by Samsung Heavy Industries, that had been involved in a towage operation in 
which a tug had lost control after the line parted in heavy seas, collided with the Hebei 
Spirit, carrying 260,000 tonnes of crude oil.   
 
Although no casualties were reported, the collision punctured three of the five tanks aboard 
the Hebei Spirit and resulted in the leaking of some 10,800 tonnes of crude. 
 
7KH VSLOO RFFXUUHG QHDU RQH RI 6RXWK .RUHD¶V PRVW EHDXWLIXO DQG SRSXODU EHDFKHV
                         
24
 Hong Sik Cho; Environmental Law, Vol. 29, 1999 
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contaminating one of Asia's largest wetland areas. It was disastrous for wildlife because 
these areas were relied upon by migratory birds as well as resident wildfowl and marine 
life. As a national maritime park, with a host of fish farms, the region provided the living 
for hundreds of Korean families.  Now these resources were annihilated, under the glare of 
WKHZRUOG¶VPHGLDZKLFKFRPSRXQGHGWKHKXPLOLDWLRQRIWKHSHRSOHand their government. 
 
The South Korean government declared a state of disaster in the region, with a clean-up 
cost estimated at US$330 million, involving 30 aircraft and 327 vessels. News cameras 
carried highly emotive pictures of hundreds of thousands of volunteers and celebrities 
including popular Korean actress Park Jin Hee helping to clean up the beaches in the 
campaign. According to the South Chungcheong provincial government, 33 days after the 
casualty, the number of volunteers topped the one million mark. The government called an 
emergency meeting of ministers involved and Prime Minister Han Duck-Soo called for a 
major campaign to minimise damage, while, with just 10 days to go before the Presidential 
elections, the candidates in this comparatively young democracy hastened to the area in 
order to show sympathy for those who had lost their livelihoods. The political consequences 
of inaction would rapidly manifest themselves at the ballot box.  Sympathy was not enough: 
the Will of the People demanded the accountability of an Accused, and the Master was that 
person. 
 
South Korean criminal procedure shares features both of the adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems, having been founded on a merger of American and German criminal procedures. It 
was not until February 2008 that a limited system of jury trials was adopted for criminal 
cases and environmental cases, and all questions of law and fact are determined by judges. 
 
On reflection, it was, perhaps, unsurprising that normative ethics of South Korean society 
demanded that the State should react with criminal prosecutions against those whom it 
believes to be accountable. Naturally, the evidence must first be examined in order to 
establish the facts of the case which, no doubt, would establish a solid foundation upon 
which to prosecute the Accused. But the trial of the Master of the Hebei Spirit, Captain 
Jasprit Chawla, an Indian national, pre-dated the casualty report dramatically. In a press 
VWDWHPHQW UHOHDVHG E\ WKH 3URVHFXWRU¶V 2IILFH LQ -DQXDU\   DIWer the indictments had 
been signed, it was announced that the decision had been taken to prosecute Captain 
Chawla as well as his first officer of the Hebei Spirit and the skippers of the barge and two 
tug boats that towed it, all for failure to exercise due caution: 
 
Captain Chawla (of Hebei Spirit) overlooked the possibility of collision and 
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carelessly assumed that the tug boat fleet would safely pass by a distance of 
about 280 metres (918 ft). 
 
The South Korean criminal legal system distinguishes between serious offences and less 
serious offences, and crimes of a violent nature are distinguished from property-related 
crimes. There was no element of dishonesty in the case against Captain Chawla, mitigating 
the seriousness of the case against him even further. In the event, the Trial Judgment, in 
June 2008, cleared Captain Chawla and his chief mate of all charges, although the skippers 
of the tugs were jailed for marine pollution offences ± one of whom was also convicted of a 
serious offence of dishonesty, for falsifying navigation records. 
 
Then, within a week, the State Prosecutors lodged an appeal, which would require a re-
hearing of the case against Captain Chawla and his chief mate. It was now abundantly clear 
WKDW WKH 6WDWH¶V &HQWUDO 0DULWLPH 6DIHW\ 7ULEunal would have to deliver its final 
adjudication well in advance of the appeal hearing. As it happened, it took just under a year 
for that to happen25. Responsible Examiner Jong Eui Kim concluded that the collision was 
caused when the crane barge ensemble lost its towing ability in bad weather, yet still 
continued to navigate without taking any safety measures, such as warning the other vessels 
nearby or performing emergency anchoring. Despite the fact that the Hebei Spirit was 
anchored in an area frequented by navigating vessels, it was found that her command 
management was negligent in performing its duty and was idle in handling the situation, 
whereby it failed to take early and active preventative measures. In addition, it was averred, 
the fact that the WDQNHU¶VPDLQHQJLQHZDVQRWRSHUDEOHDPRXQWHGWRQHJOLJHQFHLQHQJLQH
readiness, in a situation where there was a risk of collision, resulting in the failure to take 
SUHYHQWDWLYHPHDVXUHV7KHH[DPLQHUFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHFDXVHRI6RXWK.RUHD¶VZRUVW-ever 
SROOXWLRQHYHQWZDVWKHFUDQH¶VMLESXQFWXULQJWKHFDUJRWDQNVRIWKH+HEHL6SLULWUHVXOWLQJ
in the cargo spilling into the sea. The report followed with a conclusion that the pollution 
event had been exacerbated due to  
 
inappropriate emergency measures taken by Hebei Spirit after the collision 
occurred, which increased the speed at which the oil spilt. 
 
+RZHYHUDUJXHGIODZOHVVO\RURWKHUZLVHWKH7ULEXQDO¶VDGMXGLFDWLRQZDVILQDOO\VLJQHGRQ
the 4th December 2008 ± just six days short of the date set for the appeal hearing, on the 10th 
                         
25
 Central Maritime Safety Tribunal, Decision Junghaeshim No. 2008-26, Marine pollution caused by the 
FROOLVLRQRI³6DPVXQJ1R´EDUJHWRZHGE\WXJERDWV³6DPVXQJ7-´DQG³6DPKR7-´DQG09
³+HEHL6SLULW´RLOWDQNHUNotice of Decision on December 4, 2008  
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December, when the Court reversed the decision of the lower Court and convicted Captain 
Chawla, who was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, not for the physical spill, but on 
two charges alleging property-related offences of criminal damage ± damage to his own 
ship, that is. $V UHJDUGV KLV DFWXDO PLVFRQGXFW WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW &DSWDLQ &KDZOD¶V
criminal accountability rested on a number of key mistakes, although only limited fault 
attached to his acts or omissions before the crane barge actually hit the vessel.  Before the 
collision, he should have gone full astern to drag anchor to prevent the collision with the 
drifting crane barge. Then after the collision he should not have pumped inert gas into the 
cargo holds, which had the effect of increasing the spillage when the explosive risk was 
low. Additionally, he should have shifted ballast in order to create a sufficient list to take 
the cargo away from the hole in the damaged hull, which would have prevented the oil spill.  
 
-XVW DV SHUWLQHQWO\ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKLV ZRUN /OR\G¶V /LVW UHSRUWHG WKH UHVSRQVH RI
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7UDQVSRUW :RUNHUV¶ )HGHUDWLRQ PDULWLPH FRRUGLQDWRU 6WHSKHQ &RWWRQ ZKR
rather articulated the vituperative opinion of the global maritime community that the 
&RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ EHWUD\HG LWV UDWLRQDOH XSRQ WKH FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH 0DVWHU UDWKHU WKDQ
upon any notion of justice, with the effect that the impression of vindictiveness would have 
a prejudicial effect on master mariners worldwide. They were harsh words indeed and, 
while the emotive opinion of Mr Cotton may have lacked a compelling foundation in law, it 
DUWLFXODWHG WKH LQGXVWU\¶V RXWUDJH WKDW WKH GHFLVLRQ KDG EHHQ XQIDLU ± iniquitous, that is, 
according to the normative ethics of peoples who were not South Korean. Where the 
strength of this outrage fails, is in the fact that the applicable law was that determined by the 
ethics of South Korean society; it is very pertinent that Agence France-Presse reported that, 
about  a hundred residents of the area affected by the spill clapped outside court after the 
judges issued their Judgment. One said laconically, 
 
We are satisfied with the verdict26. 
 
The Defendants promptly appealed but, in April 2009, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeals in relation to the charges of pollution, although it accepted the appeal in relation to 
the somewhat bizarre charge of the wilful destruction of the Hebei Spirit, for which they 
had received prison sentences. This decision upholding the pollution convictions was 
reached iQWKH WHHWKRIDVWRUPRISURWHVWZRUOGZLGHIURPVXSSRUWHUVRI WKHµ+HEHL7ZR¶
and continues to rumble through the skies of the maritime world. Its real value now, 
however, is to illustrate the difficulty encountered in a globalised society, which perceives 
                         
26
 See AFP newswire report, Court jails tanker officers over S Korea's worst oil spill, 10 December  2008; 
http: //WWW.afp/article/ALeqM5i762frrt2NK0zY7cuE7p6WxxRJiw 
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that a decision, however inviolate in the law of the relevant jurisdiction, nevertheless 
offends the normative ethics of that globalised society ± and the most vulnerable individual 
in that society is the one who is most exposed to the hazards of the domestic jurisdiction of 
a Port State: the Master. 
 
It may be argued that the decision of the Korean Supreme Court presented a miscarriage of 
Justice. In fact it may not be justice, but it is the law, and it is this tension between justice 
and fairness which has brought the topic of criminalisation to the top of the maritime 
agenda. The position in law underlines the tension between Port and Coastal States on one 
side and Flag States on the other, focusing on the interpretation by Coastal States of their 
soveUHLJQ DXWKRULW\ WR HQIRUFH WKHLU VRFLHW\¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI D PRUDO
wrong and how that must interface with their international obligations to Convention 
partners such as Flag States. The Court in any democracy, after all, is bound by the 
constitutional parameters of its powers, which have been accorded to it by the State, that is, 
by its own People in a democratic system. If the State loses confidence in the international 
process to serve the People in that democratic system, then, in their conviction, domestic 
law, rather than their international obligations, should prevail, rather than the other way 
around. It is as a result of this logical argument, that international consensus on pollution 
control in territorial waters has been eroded. 
 
This was the key issue in a ELWWHU DUJXPHQW LQ 1RYHPEHU  KRVWHG E\ /OR\G¶V /LVW
between Robert Wallis and Jeff Park of London marine solicitors Hill Dickinson, on one 
VLGHDQG%RE%LVKRSRI96KLSV6KLSPDQDJHPHQWZKRKDGFKDPSLRQHG&DSWDLQ&KDZOD¶V
cause from the beginning, on the other. The position explained by the lawyers warned 
shipowners of the priorities of Port State jurisdictions, which served to support their own 
society, whose sovereign rights to the administration of justice may find them in conflict 
with Flag State interests and a resultant breakdown in international consensus ± with the 
shipowner stuck in between27. The response from Bob Bishop, Chief Executive of V Ships 
Shipmanagement, published on the 9th November, re-stated the implacable view of the 
                         
27
 /OR\G¶V/LVW,QIRUPDSOF/RQGRQ, 02.11.09:  
«Owners should reflect on the often complex legal processes that can apply following a 
pollution incident and on the recent approach of the Korean courts, which is of great significance 
for trading tankers, whether under way or at anchor seeking shelter, awaiting orders, or simply 
before a FDOOWREHUWK«(YHQLQDVWDWHZKHUH0DUSROKDVEHHQDGRSWHGQDWLRQDOODZVFDQDOVR
apply, by, for example, Unclos Art.211 (4), such that coastal states can legislate to prevent 
pollution in their territorial seas. There is continuing debate on the interaction between national 
laws and Marpol provisions, raising controversial issues that were considered in the lead-up to the 
(86KLS6RXUFH3ROOXWLRQ'LUHFWLYH«JLYHQSURJUHVVLYHO\LQFUHDVLQJZRUOGZLGH
environmental concerns and commensurate empowerment via conventions and domestic 
legislation, as shown by the Hebei Spirit and other cases, coastal states will prosecute tanker 
Owners, operators and crew if they cause or contribute to oil pollution. 
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shipowner, sadly serving to shoot the messenger rather than reflect on the point that they 
had been making28. Such polemic serves to demonstrate the outrage which this case 
HQJHQGHUHG LQ WKH ZRUOG¶V PDULWLPH FRPPXQLW\ ± but this view is a non-legal opinion. 
:KLOH 9 6KLSV¶ OHWWHU GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH IDFW WKDW WKH LQGXVWU\ VLPSO\ KDV QRW JUDVSHG WKH
point about the jurisdiction rights of sovereign states, it has great relevance in the wider 
context because of that core feature which characterises criminalisation ± that is, the 
opinion of the society which the law seeks to regulate. And that opinion will evolve as 
society evolves; which brings us to the keystone in this research, the evolution of the 
0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\ 
                         
28/OR\G¶V/LVW,QIRUPDSOF/RQGRQ  
Evidently the two lawyers neither followed the case for the 550 days it was a top news story, nor 
DJUHHGZLWKDOOWKHZRUOG¶VPDMRUVKLSSLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVLQFRQGHPQLQJWKH
judgments of the Korean Courts of Appeal and questioning the competence of the Korea Maritime 
Safety Tribunal stating that its findings were technically flawed and therefore drew unjust 
conclusion. 
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Section Two: On The Origin Of Species 
 
2.1 The Master and the Flag State 
 
 
(i) The Evolution of the Master Under God 
 
Overview 
 
In order to scrutinise the key issues underlying the research questions - Has the Master 
undergone a process of criminalisation? And has this been an emerging problem for some 
time? ± we need to understand the modern-day position of the Master before making a 
judgment, which demands an understanding of how we have reached the position in current 
law. Historical research establishes the foundation of the 0DVWHU¶VU{OHDQGWKHLUDXWKRULW\
within that rôle, in the context of their responsibility as an organ of the Flag State, and as 
the representative, servant or agent of the shipowner. The evolution of the rôle is studied to 
reveal the conclusion that, in IDFW WKH ODZ UHJXODWLQJ WKH 0DVWHU¶V UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV WR WKH
Flag State and to the Owner has not shifted greatly today from the position in the nineteenth 
century, shedding light on the secondary research questions. From this position of 
knowledge we can now investigate two key factors: risk management by the Flag State and 
the loss of the Master-Owner relationship. 
 
Antiquity 
 
There was no doubt about it, Sir Francis Drake was Master Under God. In 1577, he 
famously sailed from England to circumnavigate the globe. Such adventures were in their 
infancy, defining a new era in maritime trade which was moving away from coastal trading 
to deep sea merchant ventures, requiring the Master to prRWHFW WKH LQYHVWRU¶V LQWHUHVWV LQ
risks for rewards which, in the sixteenth century, were so uncertain that only the Crown 
really had the means to justify such risk on a cost-benefit analysis. With his diminutive 
*ROGHQ +LQG DV IODJVKLS 'UDNH¶V small fleet successfully crossed the Atlantic but the 
venture then was plagued by vicissitudes from the time of his arrival in the River Plate 
estuary in South America, when he was forced to abandon two of the ships. The three 
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remaining ships continued southward until, in August 1578, they left the Atlantic Ocean 
and entered the Straits of Magellan at the southern tip of South America. After sixteen days 
the three ships sailed into the Pacific Ocean to be confronted with a series of violent storms 
which lasted for more than 50 days. With only his flagship left, which had been blown 
badly off course, a depleted crew to man her, and laughably inaccurate charts, Drake had 
nobody else with whom to consult; he could not share the burden of responsibility for the 
success or doom of the venture but had to decide, by his own judgment, how best to protect 
WKH YR\DJH¶V FRPPHUFLDO SURVSHFWV LQ EDODQFH ZLWK WKH VDIHW\ RI ZKDW OLIH UHPDLQHG RQ
board the ship.  
 
Incredibly, the same basic principle underlying ship management subsists today; it defines 
the nature of merchant shipping, and can be well-illustrated by the attention which is being 
devoted today, to the construction and development of the latest generation of ice-
strengthened crude carriers and dry bulk ships capable of navigating in the High Arctic, to 
exploit the opportunities presented by global warming, which have combined to make the 
extraction and transport of crude oil and minerals not just possible but economically 
feasible29. An analysis of the historical background is critical to the task of understanding 
the criminalisation phenomenon, by identifying the differences which have evolved in the 
0DVWHU¶VU{OHRYHUWKHODVWIRXUDQGDKDOIFHQWXULHV7KLVU{OHKDVODUJHO\HEEHGDQGIORZHG
with the influences of communication between the Master and the investors, and the 
willingness to accept legal risk by those paid by the investors to manage their ships. The 
key factors emerging from this analysis will give clarity to the picture of the Master-Owner 
relationship today and, from this point, it will be possible to explore a possible solution in 
the contract which regulates that relationship. 
 
'UDNH UHWXUQHG KRPH WR D KHUR¶V ZHOFRPH DFFUHGLWHG DV WKH ILUVW (QJOLVKPDQ WR
circumnavigate the world30 but, more relevantly for the maritime world, the voyage amply 
demonstrated the demands placed on a Master a long way from home; he was not only 
SODFHGLQWKHSRVLWLRQRIGHFLGLQJWKHKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\RIWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\EXWDOVRKDG
WRPDNHGHFLVLRQVZKLFKPD[LPLVHGWKHSDWURQ¶V reward, without being able to seek advice 
RU WDNH LQVWUXFWLRQV:LWKRXW LW EHLQJ DUWLFXODWHG KH LOOXVWUDWHG WKH LGHD RI KLVSULQFLSDO¶V
agent. The venture was certainly worth it for Drake, whose financial reward for the voyage 
would equate approximately to £3 billion today.  
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There was no Royal Navy of dedicated warships to protect the merchantmen, so they had to 
fend for themselves; unsurprisingly, therefore, the combined functions of commercial 
service and armed action meant that, during the Elizabethan era, most of the expeditions by 
individuals such as Drake sailed under instructions from the Crown and, as their agents, 
could do pretty much anything they pleased in order to achieve their objectives. They were, 
truly, Masters Under God, who pioneered deep-sea shipping. If things went well, the likes 
of Drake were rewarded beyond their wildest dreams. If the engagement were a failure, 
though, the Master  was on his own, feeling the draught from all manner of ill winds, from 
enemy action to acts of God, with potentially severe consequences for his long-term 
personal future if he were lucky enough to make it home. Either way, he was hardly on so 
much as a nodding acquaintance with any rules of law regulating the relationship between 
the Master and the Flag State, save where it was in the interests of the Flag State to make a 
rule, such as privateering, with its associated letters of marque. 
 
With the discovery of ocean routes by which Colonial possessions could be cost-effective, 
private investment became viable, encouraging merchant venturers to commission vessels 
which would enable them to embark on the key function which defines the initial step in the 
trade cycle of getting the goods to the market place, and they required the Crown merely to 
provide armed protection against ships of other nations and pirates ± hence the growth of 
the Royal Navy. 
 
As trading routes and colonies were established and the Royal Navy showed itself capable 
of protecting the vessels from pirates and enemy states, merchant venturers,  ever keen to 
expand their commercial horizons, extended the boundaries of international trade ± but, of 
course, the risks were greater. Small groups of merchants who, hitherto, had traded in single 
commodities around the coasts of the British Isles and Northern Europe did not have the 
resources to finance expeditions to the new found lands across the oceans. But, together 
they might be able to, so the small groups began to band themselves into larger 
associations, and the economics of business management were founded which still hold 
JRRGWRGD\7KHELJGLIIHUHQFHLVWKDWWRGD\WKHZRUOGIURZQVRQWKHZRUGµ0RQRSRO\¶± 
in these late Middle Ages the merchant venturers worked towards the very creation of trade 
monopolies, to achieve market power in a particular part of the world, and they would resort 
to using force if necessary to protect that monopoly. In effect, they gave their Masters wide 
powers of defence in order to protect their investment. No better example can be shown in 
this dawn of the deep sea Master than that of the Honourable East India Company, which 
was incorporated by the royal charter of Queen Elizabeth I on the 31st December, 1600 with 
215 shareholders and a share capital of £72,000, a staggering figure which today would 
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equate to £36 billion. Naturally, the Master would have to pay close attention to the 
profitability of the voyage for such an investment. The first voyages were undertaken by 
individual shareholders who took all the risk but also the profit. These ventures were 
referred to as separate voyages, but from 1612 all sailings were made on behalf of the 
company.  
 
Masters in this era were usually appointed to their commands by the Owners of the vessels 
in question or, less frequently, by their charterers. Many Masters were, themselves, Owners 
or part-Owners of the ships in which they sailed, and some commanded one vessel and had 
shares in others. Others were hired for a single voyage, and some served in the same trade 
under different Owners or in different ships belonging to the same owner. A fair number 
were in long and regular employment with some particular owner, sometimes in the same 
vessel.31 
 
7KH)RXQGDWLRQRIWKH0DVWHU¶V$XWKRULW\ 
 
In an age in which human life was not accorded top priority in the affairs of man, the 
MastHU¶V SRZHUV DQG DXWKRULW\ KDG WR XQGHUSLQ KLV UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH ILQDQFLDO
investment which the stakeholders had risked in the voyage; hence, with no perceived 
evidence of any prompting by the law of the day, business practice demanded that he take 
unfettered responsibility for the safety and well-being of his ship and her gear and, once he 
had signed the bill of lading, for her cargo as well32. Any shortcoming could cost him dear. 
In 1541, Judgment was given against two Masters in a civil claim which would be 
identifiable today as negligence, for the consequences of stranding their vessels; they were 
ordered to pay damages in compensation, as a Defendant would today, but there was no 
HOHPHQWRIFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUWKHLUµQHJOLJHQFH¶$GPLWWHGO\the Court barred them 
from future command33, which has parallels with current lDZ E\ ZKLFK WKH 0DVWHU¶V
Certificate can be suspended or revoked for serious negligence34, but this is not to be 
regarded as a punishment but, rather, a device for abating the risk of a repetition of the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLQFRPSHWHQFHZKHQFORWKHGZLWKWKHDXWKRULW\RIWKH0DVWHU 
 
While the commanders of the ships of the Royal Navy gazed enviously at the far superior 
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and more expensive ships built for the East India Company, the Company dealt harshly 
with those Masters who failed to protect its investment and case files subsist evidencing its 
wide disciplinary powers over Masters in the early seventeenth century for surrendering to, 
or fleeing from, enemies, indigenous or European, in Asian waters. It similarly disciplined 
slackness, poor seamanship or navigation, and cowardice in the face of danger. It held that 
its commanders could be dismissed at its pleasure, or at the instance of its agents, factors or 
even seamen35. This does not convey an image of the Master as being accountable only to 
God. The powers were entirely contractual, however, in the understanding of a contract 
being an agreement whose terms regulate the relationship between the parties, and would be 
readily identifiable today with the rights and obligations in the relationship of employer-
HPSOR\HHZLWKRXWWRGD\¶VVWDWXWRU\UHJXODWLRQ 
 
$WWKHRXWVHWRIWKLV%UDYH1HZ:RUOGWKH0DVWHU¶VDXWKRULW\ZDVIDUIURPFOHDUDWOHDVWLQ
WKHH\HVRIWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\,QGHHGLn moments of peril and in matters of importance 
crews expected that, like their medieval predecessors, they would be consulted as to what 
should be done, and were reluctant to see their standing and influence in the decision-
making process eroded36. Nevertheless, as longer voyages became more common and ships 
were out of contact with their home ports for greater periods of time than hitherto, the 
0DVWHU¶VDXWKRULW\KDG WREHVWUHQJWKHQHG LQRUGHU WRDVVXUHKLP WKHPDQDJHPHQWFRQWURO
which would protect the vHQWXUHUV¶LQYHVWPHQW$VHDUO\DVDVHDPDQFRXOGFODLPDV
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUKLVDFWLRQVDQRUGHUIURPWKH0DVWHU« 
 
 whose bidding the company were not to gainsay37.  
 
By 1635, the Masters of East Indiamen had been clothed with incredible disciplinary 
powers, with authority to imprison and impose capital punishment for mutiny or individual 
criminal acts, after courts martial38. This, however, evidences a new source of authority, 
quite different to that of the shipowner, for such powers were conferred by the Flag State, 
who were anxious to ensure that the Master was given all the necessary authority to enable 
him to maintain order and discipline on board the ship; the ship was becoming, beyond all 
doubt, a little bit of sovereign territory of the Flag State, whose laws and rights must be 
upheld. 
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By the turn of the eighteenth century, a hundred years of solid growth in private investment 
in far-flung colonial adventures had laid the foundation for a complete maritime transport 
industry to service the demand of those ventures; but it was axiomatic that the investors be 
persuaded that their money was in safe hands ± or at least, as safe as possible under the 
circumstances of risk. With no established communication, and few trustworthy 
businessmen in the far-flung loading ports where cargoes had to be negotiated, the venturers 
had to place their trust in somebody to protect their interests while the vessel was in distant 
parts, and the Master was the most reliable man on the spot. If his ship were arrested he had 
to secure her release. If supplies ran out or essential equipment lost or broken, he had to 
arrange for their replacement, and raise the necessary funds if need be39. Besides, the 
Master often had a financial stake in the adventure himself. Slowly, but with undeniable 
ORJLF WKH 0DVWHU¶V FRQWUDFWXDO UHODWLRQVKLS ZDV GHYHORSLQJ LQWR SDUWQHU HPSOR\HH DQG
agent. 
 
,WZDVWKHUHIRUHRQD0DVWHU¶VFKDUDFWHUFRPSHWHQFHDQGMXGJPHQWWKDWWKHHQWLUHVXFFHVV
of a venture might well depend. When put in the context of an age in which commercial 
risks were faced with virtually no supporting communication, the loss of a Master in whom 
the investors had confidence, would naturally have led to a maritime opportunity being 
turned down, with the downstream consequence, even, of ships being laid up or sold.  With 
nobody else there to assist, such confidence depended heavily upon the ability of the Master 
WRPDQDJHWKHULVNLQSURWHFWLQJWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQYHVWPHQWDQGEULQJKLVVKLSVDIHO\WR
the port of discharge and the successful conclusion of her voyage.  
 
In the twenty-first cHQWXU\ WKH LQYHVWRU¶V ULVN DQDO\VLV GHSHQGV FRQVLGHUDEO\ XSRQ WKH
technical specification of the vessel, to minimise the danger of loss or damage; but the 
design of a merchant ship in the eighteenth century was a study in trial and error, making it 
necessary to repose all their confidence in the Master in order to avoid a loss. Just one case 
VWXG\E\ZD\RI LOOXVWUDWLRQFDQEHGUDZQ IURPD FRQWHPSRUDU\ µVDOHV FDWDORJXH¶RI VKLS
designs produced by a Swedish naval architect, improbably named Fredrick Chapman, in 
176840. Describing merely basic dimensions, there is hardly a word on technical design or 
engineering issues in construction. The Master had to conduct his business in great waters 
without aQ\WHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWZKDWHYHUVDYHWKHQDYDODUFKLWHFW¶VYHU\HPSLULFDOH\HIRUD
design feature ± it had succeeded before and, so, was presumably safe to follow. For all the 
envy cast at the eighteenth century East Indiamen, there was nothing but the rule of thumb 
VWDQGLQJEHWZHHQWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\DQG'DY\-RQHV¶VORFNHU 
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The builders had to give thought to the demands made upon a modern ship in this 
increasingly prosperous era of maritime commerce. Accordingly, while the technical issues 
of stability and safety were hardly addressed at all, factors such as the cargo type, route to 
be travelled, necessity of speed, and special characteristics or hazards of the expected ports 
of call, all had to be considered, with the emphasis on commercial demands, equipping the 
Master with the best possible vessel that would maximise the return on the voyage, both for 
the shipowner and the cargo owner41. The downstream consequence, of course, was 
increasing pressure on the Master, upon whom investors relied at all levels of maritime 
commerce, for the logical reason that such reliance demanded that the Master discharge 
their Standard of Duty, requiring a subjective examination of the facts as to how the Master 
looked after their property. The evidence underpinning the MaVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQW
on seaworthiness, therefore, was entirely unequipped to support a notion of criminal 
liability ± requiring an objective examination of the facts - except in the most blatant 
circumstances imaginable.  
 
The Development of a Framework of Law  
 
3DUOLDPHQW ZDV DFXWHO\ DZDUH RI WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI PDULWLPH FRPPHUFH WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V
prosperity, at a time when the confidence of merchant venturers needed underpinning ± and 
the law satisfied that need, not with any notion of criminal accountability but with a 
structure for marine insurance, which transferred the financial risk to underwriters. The 
Lord Chief Justice of the day, Lord Mansfield, laid this foundation in a series of test cases 
which defined the rights and obligations in the stressful venture in which the shipowner, the 
cargo-owner and their insurers all trusted in the utmost good faith to make a profitable 
living out of the carriage of goods by sea42. His success can be measured by the fact that the 
London insurance market acquired a reputation upon which traders world-wide relied, and 
which is the cornerstone of London's position in the maritime world today, forming the 
basis for the UK's pre-eminence in maritime law and arbitration, which continues to keep 
pace with evolution, as we see with the Arbitration Act 1996 and the cases reported in the 
Lloyd's Law Reports. It is a remarkable fact that three quarters of maritime litigation 
conducted in London - in the High Court of Justice (notably in the Admiralty Court), by 
Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Mediation) - originates outside the UK. In 
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about half of the cases commenced in the Commercial Court, there is no link to the UK at 
all save that the parties chose London as the jurisdiction for resolving their dispute43. 
 
Parliament was uneasy about the evolution of maritime law based solely on judicial 
precedents; hard cases can influence the body of law, but inevitably, judicial opinions can 
be revisited by judges in subsequent cases and put the law into different words according to 
their understanding. This demonstrated the need for Parliament to take control of the law by 
precise words in statutory form44 for the safety of maritime trade, with statutory regulation 
of the ships to which the State had allocated its flag. This was a crucial element in the 
SLFWXUHRIWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQ+LVLQODZLVWKHXOWLPDWHDXWKRULW\IRUWKDWYHVVHODQGKH
is responsible to the Flag State for compliance with its maritime regulations. It is a question 
of control, so that the Flag State allocates its protection to the vessel, but regulates the 
Master who must be certified as having attained the standards which it demands. As this 
concept of Flag State control matured in the latter part of the eighteenth century, it is 
noticeable thaWWKHGLVFKDUJHRIWKH0DVWHU¶VGXW\ZDVLQWHUSUHWHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHZRUGRI
statute ± QRW D VLQJOH LQVWDQFH RI FULPLQDO FXOSDELOLW\ IRU µFULPLQDO QHJOLJHQFH¶ KDV EHHQ
identified.  
 
It was now that the State first asserted this control and the Master Under God found himself 
accountable for statutory standards of ship safety. The Registry Act 1786 provided for the 
regulation of construction and Ownership of every decked vessel of 15 tons and over. Such 
vessels were required to carry a certificate showing full details of measurement, tonnage, 
DJHRZQHU¶VQDPHDQGRWKHUSDUWLFXODUV7KHQDPHRIWKHYHVVHOWRJHWKHUZLWKKHUSRUWRI
registry, had to be painted on the stern. The other step was the setting up of a new Board of 
Trade, which was now by an Order in Council made into a permanent committee.45 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ WRGD\¶V VXFFHVVRU WR WKH %RDUG RI 7UDGH LV WKH 0DULWLPH DQG &RDVWJXDUG
$JHQF\µ0&$¶ZKRVHIXQFWLRQVDUHEURDGO\WKHVDPH± only the development of science 
and technology has raised the standards which the MCA must enforce.  
 
The Registry Act was passed just a heartbeat before the Napoleonic Wars and, by the end of 
their hostilities, Britain's exports had increased by nearly 300 per cent, consisting largely of 
cotton and iron products, as well as wool. British merchant venturers in the nineteenth 
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century had learned the art of international trade, at a time when the wars had conveniently 
disabled foreign competition. With victory at Waterloo in 1815, though, that would change 
and Continental customers gradually developed their own industries, reducing the demand 
for British goods and putting a lot of British workers out of a job - a dangerous problem in a 
post-war climate in which there were large numbers of unemployed soldiers and sailors. By 
the early years of the 1820's, the country was in heavy debt, with high prices and a 
depreciated currency. What is more, high taxation - the promise that income tax would only 
be a temporary, war-time measure proved to be hollow - was fuelling political unrest, which 
the Government predicted would escalate with the current worry of overpopulation in large 
towns throughout the Kingdom. So, in 1824, the Government announced that it would give 
grants to aid emigration, which prompted thousands of people to make new lives for 
themselves in South Africa and the New World. 
 
Growing Pains: Maritime Commerce in the Nineteenth Century  
 
Such an incentive offered all sorts of opportunities for maritime commerce and the market 
leaders would have to exploit all the latest technology, which made their operation 
financially competitive and, thus, responding to an increasing investment demand that 
required more reliance still upon the professional skill and judgment of the Master to 
protect the higher risk. It was, therefore, the commercial risk management function that 
IRFXVHG WKH LQYHVWRUV¶ UHOLDQFH RQ WKH 0DVWHU ZKR EHFDPH WKH IXOFUXP IRU WKH ULVN
management function, and a response plan if the Master let them down; in other words, the 
investment demand relied heavily on the FRQFHSW RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V GXW\ RI FDUH ZKLFK LI
broken, would lead to compensation to those investors.  
 
At this time Mr William Hall, a shipowner who had vessels trading between London and 
Hull, formed a partnership with Mr Thomas Brocklebank, a wealthy timber merchant 
trading from Greenwich, who had built his own wooden paddle steamer, the 56 ton Eagle, 
in 1820, wooing Londoners on Thames excursions to Margate and Ramsgate. She was a 
mere leisure tool ± a toy ± but a sound experimental platform for a much more serious 
concept in commercial transport. These two men were the founders and the driving force 
behind an association with nine others who agreed to form a company to develop steam 
navigation as a commercial enterprise, with plans to trade worldwide. In fact, their 
operations would centre on the short sea routes to Germany, Belgium, France and the 
Mediterranean ± but they made such a success of this that their company earned itself the 
 33 
GLVWLQFWLRQRIRQHRIWKHYHU\FRUQHUVWRQHVRI/RQGRQ¶VWUDGLQJSURVperity46.  
 
There is a fact about business, that Risk and Reward are very subjective. Their perception ± 
even definition ± will vary from business to business ± and from individual to individual. 
The reason for this is that the values gauged in Risk and Reward depend upon the individual 
or business, and each has different dynamics with their own opportunities and tensions.  
 
For the businessperson, risk management is the absolute key to the justification of 
involvement in the firm, with the objective to reduce to an acceptable level the different 
risks related to the tasks which have to be managed within that firm. That was what the 
partners in the business now had to consider.  
 
It was a fact of life, that each partner in the business had unlimited personal liability for all 
the debts of the business, so their personal assets were put at risk. Charles Dickens was an 
intimate witness to nineteenth century justice on debt47, by which a debtor who was unable 
to settle his liabilities from his personal assets coulGEHVHQWHQFHGWRWKHGHEWRUV¶SULVRQ± 
and there he would stay until his debts were paid off. How convenient, therefore, to be able 
to repose confidence in the Master to bring that risk within a tolerance that made it 
worthwhile; and to cement their confidence, the individual in whom they were placing their 
WUXVWKDGEHHQDFFUHGLWHGE\ WKH)ODJ6WDWH%\ WKHVDPH WRNHQ WKH0DVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDO
obligations had matured into two very clear strands: his Flag State responsibilities on the 
one hand, in which he was regulated and controlled on pain of criminal accountability, and, 
on the other, his contractual duties, which would stand heavily against him if he broke his 
duty of care to the Owners.  
 
Nineteenth century London was an incredibly litigious place, and the mighty business 
founded by Hall and Brocklebank would participate in more, even, than most businesses48; 
yet, critically, there is not a shred of HYLGHQFH WKDW FRQWHPSRUDU\ VRFLHW\¶VHWKLFVKDG WKH
slightest inclination to identify a coefficient within the two strands of criminal and civil 
liability WKDW PLJKW IRUP WKH EDVLV RI PRGHUQ VRFLHW\¶V FRQFHSW RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V µFULPLQDO
QHJOLJHQFH¶ 
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Admitting a certain concern for the necessity of complying with the Registry Act it was, 
undoubtedly, the financial risk which was uppermost in the minds of Mr Hall and his 
partners. After all, the new steamship technology in which they were investing was in its 
very infancy but, in comparative terms, was discouragingly expensive to the cautious 
investor and, however glowingly they articulated their vision, the task of balancing risk 
against opportunity still resulted in a vision of daunting personal exposure. 
 
What they needed, was a business medium which had its own independent legal personality, 
but which they could manage and control, so that they would achieve their objectives with 
the money of all who wanted to invest but they would not be exposed to any risk other than 
the financial sum which they had staked in it. 
 
They were not alone. By the time that Hall DQG%URFNOHEDQN¶V ILUPZHUH VKRZLQJ WKDW D
success could be made of this business, the uplift in endeavour throughout the country was 
creating a demand for this business medium on an unprecedented scale.  A charter granted 
by the monarch or by Act of Parliament could confer this personality on what became 
known as the body corporate, which was described by Stewart Kyd as having the character 
of a collection of individuals who had united to form a body with specific commercial 
purposes. Although it was an artificial, not a living thing, this body would be clothed with 
legal personality, so that it could enter into commercial arrangements just as a private 
individual could and, therefore, was capable of suing or being sued in those commercial 
arrangements49. 
 
In essence, the Company would operate in precisely the same way as a company does 
today, issuing shares to people who agree to pay for them as a means of investment; these 
people become Members of the Company, with various rights according to the shares they 
hold. All that Hall and his friends had to do, was to persuade those investors that the bottom 
line of the risk was acceptable, that is, that their business would, at the very least, trade -  
even survive - long enough to pay back its liabilities, that its income stream was secure and 
that the economy could support it as a going concern. Of course, the inducement, on the top 
line of a higher yield than they would get elsewhere, would be the deciding factor for them. 
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This company, affectionately known as the Navvies, would become a household name after 
its incorporation on the 11th June 1824 as the General Steam Navigation Company50. The 
corporate investment in such an operation demanded confidence in the individual in whose 
hands the investors placed their risk of £2 million, a staggering sum for commercial 
investment in 1824. Indeed, as the shareholders identified opportunities for higher returns, it 
became important to service the increased risks which accompanied those opportunities. 
The revolutionary but highly expensive leap by businesspeople into steamship technology 
had the (possibly unexpected) effect of changing forever the life of the seaman, for the 
standard of duty now demanded of seafarers as a result of the increased risk by the investors 
had made ancient history of the recent past. Before the advent of the industrial age, when it 
was almost understood that a ship's crew would come on board all hopelessly drunk, and 
would have to be kicked and drenched with cold water before they would stir themselves to 
work the vessel out of port, whole days would pass before anything like discipline could be 
established by the Master.  After all, if desertions or death forced a Master to take on hands 
in a foreign port, all he could get were the lowest dregs of humanity. No wonder that the 
Master of the vessel in the case of Stilk v Myrick promised extra wages to those of his crew 
who had not deserted in Cronstadt, if they would work the ship back to London51. 
 
The development of the new steamship, though, with the increasing shareholding value and 
equivalent investment risk on the decision-makers, demanded a new type of crewman with 
which the Master could discharge his obligations: now the seafarer had to be sober and 
efficient when he came on board, able to perform the much higher standards of work 
required in a steamship. For officers, examinations became much more demanding, because 
the larger ships brought greater responsibilities and technical knowledge, just as they also 
meant better conditions. The profession of seafarer had come of age and it is axiomatic that 
WKHGHPDQGVFXWERWKZD\VVRWKDWWKHµQHZ¶VHDIDUHUPXVWEHFORWKHGZLWKULJKWVLQFOXGLQJ
fair treatment, which meet the level of their obligations. 
 
The profitability of the venture necessarily presents the driving force behind maritime 
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steam navigation; that the formation of a Company can alone bring it to the fullest state of 
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commerce; if there be no profit in it, then no cause would exist for the employment of a 
vessel or her Master in the first place. Over the centuries since Drake chanced upon success 
in a commercial venture, nothing KDGFKDQJHGLQWKH0DVWHU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHOwners; 
WKH\KHOGWKDWSRVLWLRQDVWKH2ZQHU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHHQVXULQJQRWRQO\WKHVDIHW\RIOLIHDW
sea and the prosecution of the voyage in accordance with their professional talents, but also 
the maxiPXPUHWXUQRQWKHLQYHVWRUV¶ULVN 
 
The illustration of General Steam as a case study can now be put in the context of the Flag 
6WDWH ZKLFK KDG WR UHJXODWH LWV RSHUDWLRQ EHFDXVH ZLWK WKH 6WDWH¶V LQYHVWPHQW LQ KHU
burgeoning Empire, it was also necessary that Great Britain take some control over the 
shipping that made the Empire viable. The process by which English law controlled and 
regulated the safe construction and, later, the management of loading and navigation, had 
another facet, in that such controO EURXJKW DOO PDQQHU RI RSHUDWLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH 6WDWH¶V
power. Essentially, when Britain allocated her flag in accepting the registration of that ship, 
not only did the Master have to comply with the English maritime regulations but also had 
to ensure that English law prevailed within the ship. Indeed, English statutory regulation 
became so draconian that, according to William Schaw Lindsay, author of Navigation Laws, 
each of the 11 navigation regulations in place in 1852 had their own interpretation on any 
given question, giving rise to daunting and convoluted arguments in litigation ± and this did 
not take into account arguments at Common Law52.  
 
Thus, in the case of Dowell v The General Steam Navigation Company, which was heard in 
WKH &RXUW RI 4XHHQ¶V %HQFK on the 1st June 185553, the Court felt compelled to express 
great compassion when we think of the fate RIWKH&ODLPDQW¶VYHVVHODQGKHUFUHZEXWWKH
&RXUW¶VWRUWXRXVWDVNZDVWRXQUDYHOD*RUGLDQNQRWRIOHJLVODWLRQZKLFKKDGJURZQLQWRD
fearful tangle in recent years, resulting in confusion and the decision necessarily had to be 
removed from concepts of compassion for those who had lost their lives. The Claimant, 
RZQHURIDVDLOLQJFROOLHUDOOHJHGWKDW*HQHUDO6WHDP¶VVKLSFROOLGHGZLWKWKHLUVwith great 
force and violence, ran foul of, and struck and came upon and against, the ship: whereby 
the ship was run down and wholly lost to Plaintiffs. But it was not as easy as that. An 
Admiralty Regulation of the day provided that all sailing vessels, on approaching, or being 
approached by any other vessel at night, had to show a bright light, in such a position as can 
be best seen by such vessel or vessels, and in sufficient time to avoid collision. The jury 
heard evidence that the collier had exhibited a light, but had withdrawn it two or three 
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minutes before the collision, and was not visible to the steamer, until she was within two or 
three of the collier's lengths off; but the Claimant contended that, if the steamer had been 
managed with ordinary care and skill, the accident would not have happened. The Claimant, 
discontent with a verdict for the Defendant appealed and, accordingly, Lord Campbell, the 
Chief Justice, considered the Judgment of the Court in the referral. It was not for the Judge 
to trespass upon the function of the jury, however, and he had to confine his attentions to a 
comparison of statutory provisions whose interpretation may have led to some 
inconsistency and a resulting miscarriage of justice.  
 
The Judge concluded that the jury found that the Master of the collier did not properly 
observe the regulation of the Admiralty made under the authority of Statute, imposing a 
duty on sailing vessels approaching, or being approached by any other vessel, to show a 
bright light, in such a position as can be best seen by such vessel or vessels, and in 
sufficient time to avoid collision. But then the Judge had to wrestle with inconsistencies in 
judicial approaches, in that, according to Admiralty Court rules, if both vessels were at fault 
the loss was equally divided: but in a Court of Common Law the Claimant had no remedy if 
his negligence in any degree contributed to the accident. The further complication arose as 
to whether the Defendant by the exercise of ordinary care and skill might have avoided the 
accident, notwithstanding the negligence of the Claimant, as in the popularly quoted donkey 
case of Davies v Mann54. But then the judge concluded that all doubt could be removed by 
Statute law which provided that if, in any case of a collision between two vessels, the 
evidence established that fault lay because of the failure of a ship to show the lights 
UHTXLUHGXQGHUWKHODZVRIWKHµ/RUGVRIWKH$GPLUDOW\¶DVWKH&RXUWUHVSHFWIXOO\KDGLWWKH
owner of the offending vessel could not recover any damages whatsoever for any damages 
sustained, no matter the navigational enormities of the other vessel. Blame was not a matter 
to be apportioned; therefore the conclusion must necessarily follow that even gross 
negligence by the Master of the steamer in the case would have to be exonerated.  
 
At a time when there was a growing tide of ill-feeling between the nascent steamship 
companies and the multitudes still dependent upon the sailing ship, who were fast losing 
their trade to the steamer and now apparently the law could not help them in this fatal 
casualty, such inconsistencies in the law were bewildering. But the feature which shouts so 
clearly in this case, is that the Court never for an instant dwelt upon a notion that the Master 
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might be criminally negligent.  
 
The Flag State had to impose some order upon the chaos which flowed from the conflicting 
laws of the day. Accordingly, the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 sought to address the ills 
visited upon maritime casualties by such confusion, firstly, by codifying and harmonising 
the myriad legislation then in force; secondly, by regulating ship operations through just 
RQH*RYHUQPHQWDJHQF\WKH%RDUGRI7UDGH,QDGGLWLRQWKHHYROXWLRQRIVHDIDUHUV¶ULJKWV
had culminated in the 1854 Act with a provision under Section 149 making it unlawful for 
the Master to proceed to sea, even on a short sea voyage, without first opening a written 
agreement with each of the seamen, whose terms concentrated heavily on defining the terms 
for their wages but, also, specifying the nature and duration of the voyage, the number of 
the crew and the capacity in which each would serve, the time when the agreement would 
commence, the provision of food and fresh water; and regulation of conduct and discipline. 
That being said, responsibility still had to be reposed in one individual for the observance of 
this and all Flag State laws on board the ship and that person was the Master. 
 
 
Twentieth Century Legacy 
 
It was this regulation of shipping by Victorian authority which established the firmest of 
grips on the safety of life at sea, culminating in the mighty codification of maritime laws in 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, with 45 sections alone on safety. The Master had become 
the handmaiden of the Flag State and, in any conflict between the interests of the Owners 
and those of the Flag State, the Flag State would prevail. They were, unquestionably, 
Master Under God and accountable for their professional judgment which, yet, remained 
unassailable. Save for the direst excesses of recklessness, a finding of culpability in 
negligence was still far removed from criminal accountability, as the case of the Molesey 
illustrates. 
 
Captain George Huntley had been at sea since 1906, had held a Master's certificate since 
1914, and had been in the service of the Owners since 1918. He was, by any standards, an 
experienced Master and the Britain Steamship Company, managed by Watts Watts & Co, 
had a strong reputation for reliability in maritime commerce. In July, 1929, he took over 
command of the Molesey at Norfolk, Virginia 55 so was well used to the ship when, in 
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November, he sailed from the Mersey for the Bristol Channel where she was to dry dock 
before being handed over to new Owners. During the evening of the 24th November, 
Captain Huntley received a weather warning from Seaforth:  
 
Gale warning-Southerly gale extending to all coasts reaching force 9 locally-
intense depression off south west Ireland moving north east56. 
 
 He did not take any action, however, which turned out to be a dreadful mistake. On the 
following day, the increased force of the gale was so treacherous that the Master sought 
vainly to bring the vessel under control and keep her off the shore. But it was too late and, 
at 1.50 pm he sent to the Owners' office at Cardiff the message:  
 
Ashore on Wolf Stack Point require immediate assistance vessel breaking up57. 
 
The vessel ran aground forty minutes later on the south-east corner of Mid Island, in Jack 
Sound, Pembrokeshire. Seven seamen lost their lives although the Inquiry found that  
 
Nothing could have been done to save them, or any of them58. 
 
The Inquiry found that Captain Huntley contributed to the casualty and the loss of life by 
attempting to pass between The Smalls and the mainland through a channel where the tides 
run with great strength, in a vessel of low speed and light draught, with doubtful weather 
conditions prevailing ± pertinent indications of serious negligence. Most pertinently, 
WKRXJK WKH&RXUW VSHFXODWHGRQ LVVXHV WKDWZHQW WR WKH FRUHRI WKH0DVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDO
judgment: 
 
This action may have been due to excess of zeal and a desire to make Cardiff on 
the following morning's tide, which hope the master had expressed by radio to 
the Owners; otherwise it is difficult to understand his reason for taking what was 
obviously a great risk. The Court considers that he was not in the circumstances 
justified in taking this risk and that he made an error of judgment in taking it and 
thereby jeopardising the safety of his ship59. 
 
The conclusions of the Board of Trade Inquiry left the Crown with no cause to attach any 
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criminal accountability to such negligent conduct, however; indeed, the Inquiry qualified its 
findings by highly commending the conduct of the Master after the ship struck and while 
awaiting rescue by the lifeboat. As the twentieth century was closing, social attitudes were 
LQIOXHQFLQJ D SURFHVV RI FKDQJH WRZDUGV WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\
which became suddenly visible in the wake of the Marchioness disaster in August 1989. 
The MAIB report60 made a number of findings, the principal one being that the collision 
occurred because neither vessel observed the other until it was too late. Further factors, inter 
alia, involved design defects which seriously restricted visibility from the wheelhouse of 
each vessel, both vessels were using the same, middle part of the fairway and the centre 
arches of the bridges across the river, and clear instructions were not given to the forward 
look-out of the Bowbelle. That being said, the report clearly concluded that there was no 
wilful misconduct in either vessel contributing to the collision, the foundering or the loss of 
life but, that some fault lay with those in direct charge of the two vessels at the time and 
with those responsible for both the perpetration and the acceptance of their faulty design.  
 
Publication of the report had been delayed in order to accord a fair trial to the Master of the 
Bowbelle, Captain Henderson, for failing to ensure a proper lookout and thereby causing 
damage to another ship and death or personal injury contrary to section 27 Merchant 
Shipping Act 197061; but the first jury failed to reach a verdict, as did the second, and a 
verdict of Not Guilty was duly entered on the charge when the Crown Prosecution Service 
abandoned the case.62  Subsequently, the MCA conducted a statutory inquiry into Captain 
+HQGHUVRQ¶VILWQHVVWRFRQWLQXHWRKROGD&HUWLILFDWHRI&RPSHWHQF\EXWWKLVWRRNSODFHLQ
2001, long after the incident, and the MCA properly had to confine itself to considering his 
current fitness and that the agency had accepted that events which occurred in 1986 have no 
practical relevance on his current fitness. In his March 2001 report63, Lord Justice Clarke 
did not recommend any disciplinary action against Captain Henderson on the grounds of the 
length of WLPHWKDWKDGHODSVHGDQGRQKXPDQULJKWVJURXQGV,QFRQFOXVLRQWKH0DVWHU¶V
statutory accountability under the Merchant Shipping Act had been tried and tested, and he 
had been cleared; his accountability for the death of the victims on the grounds of criminal 
negligence had not been tested. But this time, it had come close, and the public response to 
WKH3URVHFXWLRQ¶VIDLOXUHZDVSUHGLFWDEO\XQIDYRXUDEOHFKRRVLQJWRLJQRUHWKHOHJDOLVVXHV
and relying, instead, on the ethics which drove the opinion upon which the public response 
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was based64. 
 
The risk of such a calamity has apparently always been outweighed by the enormous benefit 
of reposing confidence in one person for the safety of life at sea, and current law has 
confirmed their unassailable position. The Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) 
Regulations 2002 (as amended)65 prohibits anybody, whether the Company or any other 
person WKH5HJXODWLRQ¶VRZQZRUGV IURP WUHVSDVVLQJRQ WKH0DVWHU¶VXOWLPDWHSRZHU WR
use his own judgment when taking any action, or even making a decision, in the safe 
navigation of the ship. As if that needed reinforcement, International Law has addressed the 
0DVWHU¶VDXWKRULW\WKURXJKWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6DIHW\0DQDJHPHQW&RGHLQ3DUWWKH
Code requires the Owners¶ VKRre-EDVHG PDQDJHPHQW V\VWHP WR VXSSRUW WKH 0DVWHU¶V
responsibility and authority with clearly defined and documented Standing Orders 
implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy, motivating the crew in the 
observation of that policy, issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple 
manner, verifying that specified requirements are observed, and reviewing the safety 
management system and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based management. 
 
In addition, the ISM Code obliges the Company to ensure that the safety management 
system operating on board the ship contains a clear statement that the Master has the 
overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and 
pollution prevention; all they may ask of the Company is its assistance as may be necessary. 
 
,WLVWKHUHIRUHDSSDUHQWWKDWWKH0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHPDLQVODUJHO\XQFKDQJHGIRUWKH\
must account for their acts or omissions arising by reason of their authority, and the old 
Common Law rules have been codified in the wake of international law giving consensus to 
the positions adopted by Flag States and Port and Coastal States. So what has changed? If 
QRW WKH0DVWHU¶V U{OH WKHQ LWPXVWEH WKH ODZWKDW LPSDFWVXSRQWKH0DVWHU¶V U{OH which 
GHILQHVWKHPDQDJHPHQWULVNLQKHUHQWLQWKH0DVWHU¶VIXQFWLRQ,IWKH3RUW6WDWHGHYHORSVD
new concept in the law which defines that management risk, then the Master must be able to 
respond to that. The problem arises in that the risk can be the slave to what society in the 
Port State believes to be a moral wrong and, if society embraces a notion which betrays a 
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fatal flaw in its philosophy, the Master finds themselves having to respond to a 
phenomenon which cannot be defended fairly but cannot be ignored either. Such a 
SKHQRPHQRQKDVHPHUJHGLQWKHVKDSHRIµFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFH¶ 
 43 
(ii) Risk Management by Flag State 
  
Overview 
 
The increasing sophistication of global maritime operations coincided with the development 
of international law regulating the relationship between States. The obligations owed 
between Convention States essentially hinge upon the nature of a ship as being a physical 
part of the sovereignty of the Flag State; thus, the ship is entitled to the protection which 
any part of a State has from intervention or injury by another State. By the same token, the 
Flag State must be accountable for harm inflicted by the ship upon another State. In all 
respects, the Flag State must be able to manage the risks, which it does by delegating 
responsibility ± and accountability ± to the individual in whom it has reposed its confidence 
by the accreditation of Master.   
 
In addition, as a sovereign part of the Flag State, the rights and obligations conferred by the 
laws of the Flag State must be managed within the vessel, which naturally falls to the task 
of the Master. As a result, the Master must accept criminal accountability to the State which 
put him in that position of responsibility in the first place. 
 
 
The Flag State and UNCLOS 
 
The international response to the Israeli interception of the Turkish-flag Mavi Marmara, a 
vessel forming part of an aid convoy to Gaza in May 2010, underpins the importance which 
WKH ZRUOG FRPPXQLW\ DWWDFKHV WR WKH VRYHUHLJQW\ RI WKH )ODJ 6WDWH 7XUNH\¶V )RUHLJQ
MinisWHU$KPHW'DYXWR÷OXVSRNHDWDQHPHUJHQF\PHHWLQJRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRQWKH
31st May, reminding the delegates ± and of course the entire world ± that freedom of 
navigation was one of the oldest forms of international law; no vessel could be stopped or 
boarded without the consent of the Master or their Flag State.  Delegates from around the 
world, many with no axe to grind against Israel, were vituperative in their censure for the 
reckless disregard of international law and its consequences in this case, while Richard 
)DON WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV¶ 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU RQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV LQ WKH
occupied Palestinian Territory, said  
 
Israel is guilty of shocking behaviour by using deadly weapons against unarmed 
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civilians on ships that were situated in the high seas where freedom of 
navigation exists, according to the law of the seas66.  
 
The high seas are open to all States, as expressly provided under Article 87 of the United 
1DWLRQV&RQYHQWLRQRQ WKH/DZRI WKH6HD µUNCLOS¶, which creates nothing new, but 
serves to perpetuate this ancient international law and, as Lord Bingham emphasises67, the 
State must comply with its obligations under international law as a fundamental pillar of the 
rule of law by which it judges, and will be judged by others. 
 
Even setting aside the underlying reasons for the scale of the condemnation which, 
undoubtedly, owed much to the loss of human life which followed the interception, this 
incident illustrates very graphically just how seriously the United Nations community takes 
the obligations which international law places on States to respect the sovereignty of the 
Flag State. As Article 91 of UNCLOS has it, ships have the nationality of the State whose 
flag they are entitled to fly. Therefore, an act against that ship is an act against her State68.  
 
The ship has emerged into modern international law as a sovereign piece of territory of the 
Flag State. It is this which offers the promise of protection to the Master and the Owners; 
after all, a ship on her own has little protection from a predator but, if protected by the 
power of a Navy and a strong state behind it, the predator might be discouraged from 
making rash decisions. It was ever so; this very practical interpretation of maritime rights 
gave force to the concept of freedom of navigation of the high seas, a convention which had 
matured centuries before the Israeli raid on the Gaza convoy, with the need to protect fleets 
from predatory assaults from other Flag States competing for possession of the valuable 
cargoes. The concept remains largely undiminished with the passage of time: once the 
vessel has progressed beyond territorial waters, she must be entitled to enjoy the freedom of 
the seas, a principle which had really established itself only in the seventeenth century, 
essentially limiting national rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea 
surrounding a nation's coastline, approximately the range of a cannon-shot, of three nautical 
miles. As all Flag States had vested interests in protecting their own shipping, any 
infringement of the doctrine tended to bring about universal condemnation and outrage by 
maritime states. Consequently, the high drama of this work, in terms of legal responsibility, 
falls upon the stage in which the Flag State is the prominent figure. 
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Thus, the convention of freedom of navigation was and remains critical to all maritime 
nations ± indeed, it is important to non-maritime nations as well, for the interruption of a 
FDUJR¶VMRXUQH\IURPVHOOHUWREX\HUFRXOGEULQJFRQILGHQFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHWRDQHQG
This was as true in 1861 as it had been in Elizabethan times and, however much statesmen 
carped that British merchants wouOG KDSSLO\ VHH WKHLU VKLSV¶ VDLOV VFRUFKHG LI WKH\ VDZD
profit in sailing to Hell, a Government which ignored the interests of such king-makers 
stood little chance of filling the Treasury, and less chance still of keeping their seats at the 
next Elections. So, when the War between the States broke out in the USA in 1861, the 
%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWPDGHVXUHWKDWWKHLUPHUFKDQWV¶LQWHUHVWVZHUHJLYHQWRSSULRULW\ZKLOH
steering that strict neutrality which was pivotal to its diplomatic policy to tread a careful 
line in the Civil War ± which introduces the case study of the Trent as, perhaps, the most 
dangerous incident to flare up between the United Kingdom and the United States in the last 
two hundred years69. 
 
The Case of the Trent 
 
The steamer Trent was registered in the UK and owned by the Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company; Southampton was her home port, as well as being home for most of the crew of 
British subjects. In accordance with customary international convention ± as then, unwritten 
- her Master was accountable to the Flag State to ensure that the safety of life at sea was 
observed and that passengers and crew were protected by English law as surely as if they 
were on English soil. Additional to such obligations, the Master was entitled to the 
protection of the State which had allocated its flag to the ship. On board the ship were two 
commissioners of the Government of the Confederacy, who were bound for England. But, 
all the while, Captain Charles Wilkes of the Union Navy, commanding the sloop-of-war 
San Jacinto, carrying thirteen guns, was cruising nearby, lying in wait to capture the 
commissioners and win a famous victory. The interception was described by Commander 
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Williams, the Agent for Mails aboard the Trent, who reported subsequently to the 
Government, that the Trent left Havana at 8.00 am on the 7th November, bound for 
Southampton; when, shortly after noon on the 8th a vessel, which he described as a steamer 
with the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colours, thus failing to reveal her 
StDWH¶V LGHQWLW\ DV IULHQG RU IRH ZDV REVHUYHG DKHDG KRYH-to. The Master of the Trent 
LPPHGLDWHO\ KRLVWHG WKH 8.¶V PHUFKDQW IODJ WKH UHG HQVLJQ DW WKH SHDN EXW WKH RWKHU
vessel did not respond with her flag; indeed, she did not respond at all, until, approaching 
the Trent, she fired a  shot from her pivot-JXQDFURVVWKH7UHQW¶VERZVDQGWKHQUDQXSWKH
United States (North) flag. There was now very little doubt about her intention. Upwards of 
sixty armed marines boarded this neutral vessel, their bayonets fixed, in such flagrant 
disregard of the laws applying to Sovereign States as to constitute an act of war. The 
Confederate passengers were forcibly taken out of the ship, and then a further demand was 
made that the Master of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but as he 
expressed his determination not to go unless forcibly compelled, the commander of the 
boarding party backed down. 
 
In Washington, the Union Government realised the possible consequences that the incident 
could lead to - and their fears were not misplaced. On the 30th November, the British 
Foreign Secretary Earl Russell sent an urgent instruction to the Admiralty, putting Vice-
Admiral Milne on a war footing, while eleven thousand troops were immediately sent to 
reinforce the Canadian border and an embargo was slammed on all goods bound for the 
Northern States, including supplies of saltpetre, a vital ingredient of gunpowder. 
Washington was given seven days to liberate the commissioners and apologise. President 
Lincoln promptly realised that the act had been not only illegal but the possible trigger for 
%ULWDLQ¶V HQPLW\ PDNLQJ WKHP DQ XQZHOFRPH DOO\ IRU WKH &RQIHGHUDF\ +LV 6HFUHWDU\ RI
State, William Seward, for once had to concede defeat. On the 26th December 1861, Seward 
sent to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Washington, a very long and elaborate 
dissertation on the questions of international law involved. But, in conclusion, he admitted 
that: 
 
what has happened has been simply inadvertence... and for this error the British 
government has the right to expect the same reparation that we as an 
independent state should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly 
nation on a similar case... The four persons in question are now held in military 
custody at Fort Warren in the state of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully 
OLEHUDWHG<RXU/RUGVKLSZLOOSOHDVHLQGLFDWH«DWLPHDQGSODFHIRUUHFHLYLQJ
them. 
 47 
 
0RVWFULWLFDOO\IRUWKHPDULWLPHLQWHUHVWVRI%ULWDLQWKH0DVWHU¶VSURWHVWVKDGEHHQXSKHOG
he remained accountable to the Flag State for upholding its laws and, indeed, its 
sovereignty, and no other power could compromise his position of unfettered authority on 
the High Seas.  
 
The really interesting bit about the Trent affair, is that the problems in terms of international 
maritime law have not gone away but persist in haunting us, as we can identify all too 
FOHDUO\LQWKHUHFHQWFDVHRIWKH2G\VVH\7KHIDFWVZHUHUHSRUWHGWKXVLQ/OR\G¶V/LVWRQWKH
13th July 200770: 
 
The Spanish Civil Guard has intercepted a boat operated by a US company amid 
a row over treasure from a shipwreck. The guard had been ordered by a Spanish 
judge to seize the vessel as soon as it left the British colony of Gibraltar. 
Gibraltar officials and Odyssey Marine Exploration, which owns the ship, said 
Spain had boarded the ship illegally as it was in international waters. A lawyer 
for Odyssey, Allen von Spiegelfeld, told Reuters news agency that Spain had not 
sought permission to board Ocean Alert from officials in Panama, where it is 
registered. 
  
"The Owners of the vessel have contacted the Panamanian maritime authorities 
protesting the seizure on international waters," Mr von Spiegelfeld said. 
 
These studies serve to anchor the theory to the foundation stone of the problem in context. 
The answer to the obvious question, as to why the State should need to make the Master 
culpable at all, is in its risk management of a potential situation involving a vessel to which 
it has allocated its sovereign right of protection. Such rights necessarily tow in their wake 
obligations, which demand an individual to carry them out; it is a factor in risk management 
for the Flag State and its relationship with the Port State.  
 
 
 
 
 
                         
70
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Flag State Control ± )RXQGDWLRQRIWKH0DVWHU¶V$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 
 
7KH0DVWHU¶VDXWKority, indeed, their accountability, therefore, is derived primarily from the 
laws of the Flag State. The very fact that the Master assented to the process of certification 
by the authority of the Flag State makes out an unassailable argument that they have 
voluntarily subjected themselves to all the laws of the Flag State ± they cannot pick and 
choose which ones they want to observe. This is an example of the social contract, by which 
the State maintains order, for the social contract implies that the Master gives up absolute 
freedom to the Flag State authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the 
rule of law, that is, a set of rules by which the Master is governed no matter where the ship 
may be71.  
 
7KH)ODJ6WDWH¶VRZQUHVSRQVLELOLW\Ior management of its legal rights and obligations is a 
prime factor in this. 7KH6WDWH¶VRYHUDOOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVGHILQHGLQWKHWHUPVRI81&/26
for the implementation and enforcement of those international maritime regulations to 
which it has committed itself, in respect of all ships to which it has allocated the right to fly 
its flag. The potential consequences on the Flag State for management failure has demanded 
some accountability; the question is, how the State renders that into blame. It may be that 
the Master must be held liable as a result of that; in which case the question to be raised is, 
how that is consistent with fairness, or equity. 
 
By the same token of equity, Flag State responsibility also demands management of risk to 
the rights and obligations of the ship herself, to which the flag has been allocated. The very 
fact of that allocation brings the vessel within the protection of that State and, necessarily, 
DOOWKH6WDWH¶VODZVE\ZKLFKLWFRQWUROVLWVVXEMHFWV:KHQDGGUHVVLQJWKHKXPDQ rights of 
individuals to go about their lawful business it would naturally be preferable to have such 
laws codified by statute but, in a Common Law system, common law rights and obligations 
have been defined in Judgments and, by their evolution, the Master has some guidance for 
divining their accountability. 
 
This issue is so important to the subject because the Master has many responsibilities, for 
which they will remain accountable no matter what tasks they delegate in order to discharge 
those responsibilities. Their overriding duty, though, is to maintain order and discipline on 
board - the age old Rule of Law of the Flag State. In 1851, the Chief Clerk of the Thames 
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Police Court wrote a useful digest of the key statutes which the Master had to observe72 in 
discharging his management duties under Flag State law, focusing on The Navigation Act 
1849, The Mercantile Marine Act 1850, The General Merchant Seamen's Act 1844, The 
Seamen's Protection Act 1845 and, the 1851 Act passed to amend the Mercantile Marine 
Act 1850.  The bewildering plethora of legislation, which would lead to its codification in 
the 1854 Merchant Shipping Act, cloaked the Master with authority over all mariners on 
board the ship, whose duty it was to obey his lawful commands for the safe navigation of 
the ship. In case of disobedience or disorderly conduct, the Master was empowered to 
correct them in a reasonable manner ± but the author then cautioned that a hasty or 
intemperate blow given by the Master could not be justified:  
 
There are doubtless many provoking acts and many causes of excitement which, 
in the heat of the moment, sometimes throw masters off their guard, and all such 
circumstances of provocation or extenuation are taken into consideration by the 
proper tribunals of the country, in the administration of the law and the 
distribution of punishment; but the law itself is too watchful over the safety of all 
to allow the slightest violence to be done to the person of any, except in self-
defence, or for the maintenance of discipline to ensure the safety of the ship and 
the lives of the persons on board...73. 
 
It will be readily perceived that English law was evolving to give a level of protection to 
seafarers which the normative ethics of contemporary society demanded. It was for the 
Master to observe and enforce the law on behalf of the Flag State; the Master, after all, had 
been found fit to be a Master under English law, and now was accountable to the same 
authority that had put them in that position, for the maintenance of its laws. The 1854 Act 
provided special protection for the rights of the seafarer and put the Master in control of 
them all. A full generation before compulsory education was first implemented74, seafarers 
had the protection of a written contract, so that the Masters of those General Steam ships 
featured in case reports now had to observe Section 149, which obliged the Master to enter 
into an agreement with every seaman whom he carries to sea from any port in the United 
Kingdom as one of his crew.     
 
It mattered not that the seafarer signing the agreement could not read it ± his rights were 
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protected and could be enforced by the Court. The Crew Agreement had to specify the 
nature and duration of the intended voyage; the number of crew and the tasks which each 
would be required to undertake; the time each would be on board; and heavy focus was 
made on the wages to be paid. The Act also protected the crew from Masters who ignored 
their most basic health and comfort, stating that not less than three of the crew might join to 
complain of the badness, unfitness or deficiency of the water or provisions, and thereupon 
an examination may be made thereof, and the Master must on notice provide proper 
provisions and water.  
 
The Crew Agreement also contained regulations on the sHDIDUHU¶VFRQGXFWEUHDFKRIZKLFK
ZRXOGEHDGGUHVVHGE\WKH0DVWHU¶VPDQDJHPHQWSRZHUVWRPDLQWDLQRUGHUDQGGLVFLSOLQH
Those powers, however, still had to be carried out in accordance with Flag State law and the 
same principle has not been compromised with the passage of time. As a clear illustration, a 
case reported in 1953 can surely have few equals in its field75. Mr Hook had originally 
MRLQHGWKH&XQDUG6WHDP6KLS&RPSDQ\LQLQWKHµKRWHO¶GHSDUWPHQWFDWHULQJIRUWKH
QHHGVRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VSDVVengers on Transatlantic voyages, and during his career he had 
earned an unblemished character. Accordingly, when the express liner RMS Queen 
Elizabeth sailed from Southampton for New York on the 24th June 1950, Hook was 
employed aboard as a steward in the First Class passenger lounge.  Among the passengers 
was Dr Greenberg, his wife and two children, including 10 year old Linda. On the evening 
after the ship sailed, the Master, Captain Cove, instructed the Staff Captain to investigate a 
complaint by Dr Greenberg concerning an allegation by Linda that an indecent assault had 
been committed against her in the lounge that evening. She identified Hook, and Dr 
Greenberg was about to strike him when the Staff Captain intervened and told the Chief 
Steward that Hook was to work in the pantry for the rest of the voyage, away from the 
passengers. That was not good enough for Dr Greenberg, though, who demanded that Hook 
be put under lock and key and that if he were not, he would inform the parents of other 
children among the passengers of the facts. He also threatened that, on arrival in New York, 
he would have Hook arrested and prosecuted, with all the publicity that could be mustered 
against the Company.  
 
Mr Hook denied the accusation; indeed there was no evidence in FRUURERUDWLRQRI/LQGD¶V
story and a statement signed by Dr Greenberg purporting to be her account of the incident 
was inconsistent with the account which she gave in the presence of the Staff Captain. But 
the Master ordered the steward to be kept under restraint in the isolation hospital for the 
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remainder of the voyage and until the First Class passengers had disembarked at New York. 
 
On the 6th July, after the Queen Elizabeth docked at Southampton, Mr Hook was discharged 
under the crew agreement and, on the 7th November, was dismissed under his permanent 
contract. Of his claims for compensation for false imprisonment, breach of contract and 
wrongful dismissal, the Company paid into Court the full sums in respect of the second and 
third claims, but defended the claim of false imprisonment, which thus was the defining 
issue in the case. 
 
False imprisonment is a common law tort under English law, which involves the unlawful 
confinement of an individual against their will by another individual in such a manner as to 
violate the confined individual's right to be free from restraint of movement ± what today 
FRPHVZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VKXPDQULJKWV as well as defining a particular 
tort76. The use of physical force presents compelling evidence, but force is not essential. 
With this in mind, Captain Cove argued manfully that he confined the Plaintiff in 
compliance with his duty to maintain order and discipline, ensuring no harm came to his 
VKLSRUKHUSDVVHQJHUVSUHVHUYLQJRUGHUDPRQJWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQy and, indeed, protecting 
WKHVWHZDUGIURPWKHWKUHDWHQLQJDWWLWXGHRI'U*UHHQEHUJ7RWKLVH[WHQWWKHUHIRUH+RRN¶V
confinement was lawful, the Defence argued. Slade, J, cited Aldworth v Stewart77, in which 
Baron Channell, summing up to the jury, had sought to clarify the defining features which 
FKDUDFWHUL]HWKH0DVWHU¶VDXWKRULW\$KDVW\RULQWHPSHUDWHEORZVDLG&KDQQHOl, could not 
be justified; in effect, the Master would be committing the criminal offence of an assault, 
IRUQRQHRIWKH6WDWH¶VODZVDre suspended just because that bit of its sovereignty is floating 
and not fixed on dry land. It was, and remains, Necessity which clothes the Master with the 
authority of the Flag State, in order to carry out his overriding duty, to maintain order and 
discipline over the crew ± even, in certain circumstances, over the passengers too. But this 
authority is limited to that necessity, and must remain confined to his overriding duty; even 
in carrying out that duty, the Master must respect and maintain all the laws of the Flag 
State, and a claim of false imprisonment is as enforceable on board a ship as it is on dry 
land, under English law. 
 
The Judge further drew on the case of The Lima78, in which the Court had held obiter how 
Parliament and the Courts which intHUSUHW3DUOLDPHQW¶V:LOOKDYHDOZD\VYDOXHGKLJKO\WKDW
class of person categorized as the British mariner and, accordingly, have rushed to 
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encourage and protect them in their careers. That being said, the Judge cautioned, the 
Master must be able to repose confidence in his authority so that he can discharge his 
overriding duty to maintain order and discipline on the ship, which is essential to the safety 
of navigation and, in the immortal culture of Victorian society, the great commercial 
interests of the country79.80  
 
,QILQGLQJ-XGJPHQWIRUWKH&ODLPDQW6ODGH-LGHQWLILHGWKHNH\IHDWXUHVLQ0U+RRN¶VFDVH
with those clearly forming the foundations in Aldworth and The Lima, and held that he was 
satisfied that the Defendants did not order his detention because they believed that it was 
necessary for any purposes of maintaining order and discipline, but they did it to placate Dr 
Greenberg, and, by placating Dr Greenberg, to avoid what the Master had described as 
µXQZHOFRPHSXEOLFLW\¶ 
 
The very topical issue RIGHIHQFHDJDLQVWSLUDF\SXWV WKH0DVWHU¶VFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\
under Flag State law in strict focus. Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as any illegal 
acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship and directed on the high seas against another ship or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. It necessarily follows from the 
definition that the piracy must take place outside the sovereign jurisdiction of a State. If 
ZLWKLQ WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RI D 6WDWH WKHQ WKDW 6WDWH¶V RZQ ODZV ZLOO SUHYDLO VXFK DV IRU
example, armed robbery). 
 
How then is the Master to maintain the safety of his ship and crew in accordance with his 
Flag State obligations? The solution on the face of it is to defend her with such reasonable 
force as Flag State laws permit. If the Master uses excessive force under Flag State law and 
a pirate is killed on board his ship, then the defence of self-defence would fail if he were to 
be tried for murder. As Master of the vessel, with responsibility and, therefore, 
accountability under Flag State law, he would be exposed to criminal liability if defence 
measures were used which might not be protected under the law.  
 
Whatever Flag State laws SHUPLWRUUHVWULFWKDVOLWWOHEHDULQJLIWKHVKLSLVLQDQRWKHU6WDWH¶V
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WHUULWRULDOZDWHUV,IWKHYHVVHO¶VSULYDWHDUP\RIDUPHGJXDUGVLQIULQJHGWKHODZVRIDQ\3RUW
6WDWH ZKLFK WKH\ YLVLWHG WKHQ WKH ORFDO MXULVGLFWLRQ¶V ODZV ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ EH HQIRUFed, 
bringing to account the shipowner as well as the Flag State, for both of whom, of course, 
the Master is representative ± and the first target for criminal accountability.  
 
In the long-running and bitter history of piracy attributable to the failure of 6RPDOLD¶V
jurisdictional control over its people, shipowners are losing patience with the constraints 
imposed upon them by the current law, and are turning increasingly to the use of privately-
contracted armed guards on board their ships, thus taking the law into their own hands to 
defend themselves against a threat which they perceive to be incapable of control by the 
rule of law. The IMO has become so alarmed by this trend that, in May 2011 it published 
guidance to Member Governments on this practice, urging them to inform their shipowners 
of the risks involved81. The circular doubtless was written with a view to urge extreme 
caution upon shipowners in using privately contracted armed security personnel and if it 
were intended to discourage the practice, will probably succeed beyond its wildest dreams.  
 
7KHJXLGDQFHHPSKDVLVHV WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI WKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQDVEHLQJFHQWUDO WR WKH
shipboard management rôle in maintaining Flag State law on board the vessel, the sovereign 
territory over which other States have no prima facie right in which to intervene ± unless, of 
course, their laws have been broken and, very possibly, their nationals have been killed. In 
either case, the Master may optimistically take some comfort in their human rights of being 
able to defend themselves and, indeed, they may be acquitted at the eventual trial. But, they 
would have to go through that accountability process in the first place and, in the meantime, 
may be held in custody in some foreign jurisdiction whose accommodation for Defendants 
awaiting trial is inconsistent with what a Master may feel entitled to expect. And then, they 
may still be found Guilty at the trial. No criminal defence can ever be certain.     
 
7RVXPPDULVH WKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR WKH)ODJ6WDWH is born of necessity, in order 
that the Flag State can maintain management control. The Master has consented to such 
accountability by virtue of their acceptance of the rôle, and by their seeking accreditation 
with that Flag State in the first place. By contrast, the position in which the Master has 
found themselves accountable under Port and Coastal State jurisdiction has proved a key 
factor in the analysis of criminalisation. Such analysis, though, can reveal confusion as well 
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as clarity - for which the case of Compulsory Pilotage provides an excellent study. 
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(iii) The Clash of Authority: Compulsory Pilotage 
 
Overview 
 
Compulsory pilotage was implemented by Port State laws as a result of commercial 
pressure on navigation in confined waters. The question to be addressed, however, is just 
what effect this has upon the Master, whose accountability rests upon their responsibility 
IRU WKH VDIHW\ RI WKH YHVVHO¶V RSHUDWLRQ &RQILQHG DV LW LV WR 3RUW 6WDWH ZDWHUV DQ
H[DPLQDWLRQRI WKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\ in compulsory pilotage provides a strong case 
study to analyse just what has been the cause and effect of the clash of authority between 
the Master Under God, representative of the Flag State, and the Compulsory Pilot, clothed 
with the authority of the Port State. Its value to this work informs us on how the Master is 
confronted with criminal accountability in the context of Port State jurisdiction which has 
HURGHGWKH0DVWHU¶VFRQWURORIQDYLJDWLRQEXWQRWWKHLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\ 
 
Rights and Responsibilities 
 
,QWHUQDWLRQDOODZKDVUHLQIRUFHGWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQRIVXSUHPDF\LQUHODWLRQWRWKHVKLS
The Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) Regulations 200282 implement  Chapter V of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 2002, giving the Master 
the unassailable power to use their professional judgment in the navigation of their ship, and 
the protection of the marine environment. Whatever instructions, for example, the charterer 
might deliver for proceeding to an unsafe port, the Master has the right to refuse to enter. If, 
of course, they do proceed, then they must give a good account of their professional 
judgment, and they remain Master Under God throughout, even with a pilot on board in a 
compulsory pilotage area83. In this context, the case of the Star B presents a cautionary tale, 
in which the Arbitrators found that there was evidence to support the Owners¶FRQWHQWLRQ
that at the (unsafe) port nominated, there were deficiencies in the entrance buoys, the range 
markers, the charts, the navigation guides and with the pilot sufficient to render the port 
unsafe at the time in question ± But, there was also sufficient evidence to support the 
FKDUWHUHUV¶DUJXPHQW WKDW WKHJURXQGLQJFRXOGKDYHEHHQDYHUWHGE\ WKH H[HUFLVHRIJRRG
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seamanship and the negligence of the Master and or Pilot was so serious as to sever the 
FDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHFKDUWHUHU¶VLQVWUXFWLRQDQGWKHGDPDJHWRWKHYHVVHO 
 
At first sight, this would tend to qualify the assertion of Professor Gold when he reviews 
WRGD\¶V FDVH ODZ DQG GUDZV WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW VKLSPDVWHUV WRGD\ VHHP WR KDYH PDQ\
responsibilities but few, if any, rights84. In order to analyse this observation in more depth, 
the question must first be addressed, as to where the line is drawn between rights and 
responsibilities. While Part 5 of the ISM Code and the sovereign law of the Flag State 
clarify the Master's responsibility for the safety of the vessel and the protection of the 
environment, the Flag State particularly gives them legal rights and authority in the 
management process of the ship which has been allocated their flag, which, as we have 
seen, are held unassailably. If, in the course of exercising those rights and authority, the 
Master breaks the law, they will be accountable to the State concerned. The phenomenon of 
criminalisation has been held to blame for such accountability - which is where the 
phenomenon of the growth of Human Rights would, in theory at least, come to their rescue. 
 
Evidence may be adduced from recent authorities that the distinction between rights and 
responsibilities has been blurred in a particular area of law, which has evolved in response 
to the demands of compulsory pilotage. It will be seen, however, that this is by no means a 
recent phenomenon. 
 
Compulsory pilotage was implemented by Port State laws as a result of commercial 
pressure. Its origins in some jurisdictions can be traced back centuries85, but that pressure 
forced its introduction into English Statute Law in the early years of the nineteenth century, 
as a means by which the Port State could manage the risk to life and property presented by 
WKHPDVVLYHJURZWKLQ%ULWDLQ¶VEUDYHQHZPDULWLPHFRPPHUFHZKLFKKDGEHHQKHOSHGVR
ably by the Napoleonic Wars. The developing laws of ship construction would be of little 
help to an expensive new merchant frigate whose back was broken on dangerous rocks and 
her cargo lost, simply because her Master did not possess knowledge of the local waters, 
and the power-mongers in the new era of post-war economic regeneration, the investors, the 
traders, the exporters and the insurers, persuaded Parliament to mitigate the losses of 
navigating in dangerous waters as the ships arrived or sailed from port. The solution was 
seen in the knowledge and skills of a pilot experienced in the particular waters of a locality; 
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such expertise was identified as a crucial asset by the Port State in the risk management 
process and, as a result, the Pilotage Act 1812 introduced the concept by statute.  
 
The question to be addressed, however, was just what effect this would have had on the 
Master, whose task management functions had been eroded by the Pilot taking the 
navigation away from him. As a result, if the Pilot were negligent and damage was suffered 
because of his fault, to what extent was the Master culpable and, most pertinently, how 
would the shipowner be held liable, even if he were blameless? After all, the essence of a 
contract is founded on the concept of a Bargain and, if the Master had no choice but to hand 
over navigation to the negligent pilot, then it could hardly have been a contractual 
relationship which gave rise to liability on the part of the shipowner. Parliament thought so 
too and, as a result, Section 30 of the 1812 Act duly provided for a defence on these 
grounds. With the burgeoning of the British merchant fleet in the ensuing decades, this 
defence was carefully preserved by Part 5 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, which 
applied Compulsory Pilotage to home-trade passenger ships between any place in the 
United Kingdom and the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man, and within the limits of any 
district for which Pilots were licensed, unless the Master or Mate possessed a Pilotage 
Certificate within the district. It was this part of the 1854 Act which illustrates so 
graphically the law and procedure which applied to our next case study. Section 378 
required all vessels coming up the Channel to London, to take a pilot on board at 
Dungeness, and to put him in charge of the ship. 
 
The Foundation of Common Sense: Two Nineteenth Century Case Studies 
  
From Dungeness to London Bridge was, by Section 370, constituted the Trinity House 
Pilotage district, and no single pilot could be licensed to conduct ships both above and 
below Gravesend. Although the requirement was compulsory, the consequence upon the 
Owner of compulsory pilotage was treated by Section 388, which emphatically provided 
that neither the Master nor the owner of any ship would be accountable for any loss or 
damage whatever claimed by any third party as a result of the fault or incapacity of any 
qualified pilot acting in charge of such ship within any compulsory pilotage area. 
 
In the case of General Steam v British and Colonial86, the Defendants' vessel, coming up 
the Channel to London, took a pilot on board at Dungeness. Before reaching Gravesend, 
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while the vessel was still under the control of the pilot, she came into collision with the 
Claimants' vessel, through the pilot's negligence. 
 
The Claimants sued the Defendants for injury caused by a collision. The Defendants argued 
that their vessel was under the management of a pilot, in pursuance of the provisions of the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and that the accident was due to his negligence, for which 
they were not responsible. 
 
The Court expressed sound reasoning in applying the statutory defence limiting liability of 
the Master or owner in a casualty event which took place in a compulsory pilotage area. 
Whether or not they were in such an area, the pilot was compulsorily on board, and the 
Defendants were not liable for his acts, for the relation of Master and Servant was never 
constituted between them and him. That relation exists only where the Master has a power 
of choosing his own servants, as is ordinarily the case with a crew; and this power of choice 
is the reason given for the liability of a Master for the acts of his crew. The Court applied 
the well-established doctrine to draw the conclusion that the pilot cannot be considered as 
the servant of the owner, for the Master can, at best, only choose him out of a selected class, 
and the best case scenario is rare for, as a rule, he cannot even do this, but must take the 
pilot who is offered by the pilotage authority87 - hardly the key features defining freedom of 
choice in the contractual bargain to which the Master and the owner will be held 
accountable. 
 
It also held, that the Defendants having been compelled by Section 378 to put the pilot in 
charge of the ship and, being compelled to pay him the full rate for navigating the ship from 
Dungeness to Gravesend, the relation of master and servant was never constituted between 
them and thus the owner could not be held to be vicariously liable. 
 
Fate revisited the law of pilotage upon General Steam with indecent haste in a case against 
London and Edinburgh Shipping88, against whom General Steam were defending a claim 
for damages in which London and Edinburgh Shipping alleged that the collision involving 
WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH YHVVHOV KDG EHHQFDXVHG E\ WKH QHJOLJHQFH RI *HQHUDO 6WHDP¶V VKLS7KH
Statement of Defence alleged, under the first head, that the Claimants' vessel was at fault 
for neglecting to have the regulation light; secondly, that the collision was not caused by the 
negligence of those in charge of the Defendants' vessel, but was, so far as they were 
                         
87
 Indeed, how the pilotage authority selects a pilot for a given task is up to them; whether or not it is by 
roster or otherwise is no business of the Master. 
88
 General Steam Navigation Company v London and Edinburgh Shipping Company [1877] 2 Ex D 467 
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concerned, an inevitable accident; thirdly, that if the collision was caused by the negligent 
navigation of the Defendants' vessel, it was solely the fault of the pilot who was acting in 
charge of the Defendants' vessel under circumstances and within a district such as to render 
the employment of a duly qualified pilot compulsory by law. At the trial before Kelly, CB, 
at Guildhall, the Defendants abandoned the first two grounds of defence, and relied on the 
third, upon which Judgment was made in their favour, on the ground that in the position in 
which the Defendants' ship was, the employment of a pilot was compulsory by law. 
 
The Modern Law 
 
The nineteenth century view taken of the liabilities between the parties was changed by the 
Pilotage Act 1913, expressly overriding any conflicting provision in primary or secondary 
legislation, and providing that the Owner and Master of a vessel navigating in a compulsory 
navigation area shall be answerable for any loss or damage caused by the navigation of the 
vessel or by any fault of the navigation of the vessel in the same manner as he would if 
pilotage were not compulsory. This has been taken forward into current law by Section 16 
of the Pilotage Act 1987, which provides that the fact that a ship is being navigated in a 
compulsory pilotage area shall not affect any liability of the Owner or Master of the ship for 
any loss or damage caused by the ship or by the manner in which it is navigated.  It may be 
DUJXHG WKDW WKLV DFWXDOO\ UHOD[HV WKH 0DVWHU¶V DQG RZQHU¶V OLDELOLW\ VRPHZKDW as it rows 
EDFNIURPWKHVWHUQHUZRUGLQJRIWKH$FWSURYLGLQJWKDWWKH2ZQHUDQG0DVWHUµVKDOO
EH DQVZHUDEOH IRU DQ\ ORVV¶ ,W VWDUNO\ HPSKDVLVHV WKH GHSDUWXUH IURP WKH SULQFLSOHV RI
liability illustrated by the General Steam cases of the nineteenth century and puts the Master 
and his shipowner at risk. 
  
Section 15(1) of the 1987 Act certainly perpetuates the requirement that a ship which is 
being navigated in a compulsory navigation area shall be under the pilotage of an authorised 
pilot unless the Master or Mate possesses a pilotage exemption certificate in respect of that 
area and ship. If any ship fails to comply with this provision, subject only to an offer having 
been made by an authorised pilot to take charge of the ship, the Master shall be guilty of an 
offence. There does not even appear the provision of a defence of otherwise having lawful 
authority or excuse. 
 
However unsatisfactory this may appear at first sight, in terms of the rationale of the 
0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKLVPDNHVSHUIHFWVHnse. As the Master remains in command at all 
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times, so their personal accountability for safe navigation continues regardless of the pilot 
aboard. If they discharge their obligations, well and good; but if they do not justify their 
conduct in the case of a negligent Pilot, they will be held liable for the consequences.  
3DUOLDPHQW FOHDUO\ LQWHQGHG WR XQGHUSLQ WKH 0DVWHU¶V DXWKRULW\ DQG LQ WKH GHEDWH LQ WKH
House of Lords on Pilotage in June 1986, Lord Strathcona said: 
 
It seems odd to legislate in great detail as to who should command a ship at sea 
and then apparently abandon all control once the ship comes into a pilotage 
area89. 
 
Within three years this argument would be tested. In the case of the Esso Bernicia90, Lord 
Jauncey underlined the importance of associating good law with common sense ± a feature 
which is critically important to the business of maritime trade, whose governing law can be 
immensely complex but still has to be safely navigated daily by shipboard and shoreside 
managers alike91. Lord Jauncey drew the sensible conclusion of English law that the Master, 
like any individual who has a personal duty of care such as that envisaged in Donoghue v 
Stevenson, cannot walk away from their responsibility under that duty simply by delegating 
the performance of the task to somebody else, and it does not matter how the somebody else 
has been put there ± whether an employee under a contract of service, or an independent 
contractor (such as a voluntary pilot), or whether the engagement has been imposed by a 
Statute (such as a compulsory pilot under the Pilotage Act 1987). Lord Jauncey thus drew 
the argument to its logical conclusion that this principle must also bind the shipowner, who 
is under a duty to operate his ship with reasonable care, and cannot walk away from that 
responsibility by delegating the handling of the ship to someone else, no matter whether it 
be their Master under a contract of service, or to a pilot who has not been put there by any 
voluntary bargain but has control of the navigation of the vessel. Thus, while the pilot has 
command and control of the navigation of the ship in compulsory waters, the Master will 
still have the responsibility for the safety of the ship and observe their contractual 
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 HL Deb 25 June 1986 vol 477 cc377-407 
90
 Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Hall Russell & Company Ltd [1989] 1 Ll R. 8 
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 Such common sense was recently famously re-stated in Owners of cargo lately laden on board the ship 
RUYHVVHOµ6WDUVLQ¶DQGRWKHUVYOwners DQGRUGHPLVHFKDUWHUHUVRIWKHVKLSRUYHVVHOµ6WDUVLQ¶; Homburg 
Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd HL [2003] UKHL 12 [2003] 2 WLR 711, [2004] 1 AC 715, [2003] 1 
CLC 921, 2003 AMC 913, [2003] 1 LlR 571, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 625, [2003] 2 All ER 785, [2003] 1 
LLR 571: Commercial people would expect the identity of the carrier to be revealed in the material on the 
front of the Bill of Lading. The Attestation Clause in this case had been specifically written into the front 
of the Bill of Lading. It should clearly prevail over a standard printed term; after all, it is their Bargain. It is 
suggested that this casts an unfavourable shadow over the decision in the case of the Owners of the cargo 
lately laden on board the ship David Agmashenebeli v Owners of the David Agmashenebeli [2002] EWHC 
104 (Admiralty): it surely does not matter how much the cargo is damaged and thus how the Bill of Lading 
is claused, the Letter of Credit is still not going to be honoured, for the bank is not going to play fast and 
ORRVHZLWKLWVFOLHQWV¶PRQH\ZKHWKHUWKHFDUJRKDVEHHQGDPDJHGSHUFHQW 10 per cent or 50 per cent.    
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obligations to their employer, the shipowner, with whom the duty ultimately rests92. 
 
The Case of the Sea Empress 
 
One of the most serious pollution casualties in recent times serves to underpin the rationale 
for the relationship between the Master and the Pilot. The Liberian-registered tanker Sea 
Empress was less than three years old when she loaded her cargo of Forties light crude oil at 
Hound Point, in the Firth of Forth and sailed from there for Milford Haven on 13 February 
1996. Two days later, under the navigation of the compulsory pilot, the bows had passed the 
Middle Channel Rocks Light on approach to Milford Haven when there was a shuddering 
vibration, followed by a sound from the deck below of liquid being forced under pressure, 
accompanied by a strong smell of oil. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch concluded 
in its report that the immediate cause of the grounding was pilot error, namely his failure to 
take appropriate and effective action to keep the vessel in the deepest part of the Channel. 
But the Pilot and the Master had not discussed and agreed a pilotage passage plan, as a 
consequence of which neither the Master nor the Chief Officer knew what the Pilot's 
intentions were. Moreover, the Master failed to follow the standing orders of his Managers 
with respect to pilotage matters and, when it became clear to the Master that the Pilot was 
hazarding the vessel, the Master wrongly kept quiet. Although the MAIB's reports are not 
prepared with a view to establish the liability of a party in litigation, the facts which it finds 
certainly are of value in such matters. For such reasons, the MAIB found fault with the 
0DVWHUDQGFULWLFDOFRQFOXVLRQVLQWKH0$,%¶VUHSRUWFDQOHDGWRFRQVHTXHQFHVLQFLYLODQG
criminal proceedings93. 
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 Paradoxically, this concurrently offers salvation to the shipowner under the nautical fault defence of the 
Hague-9LVE\5XOHVLQWKHHYHQWRIGDPDJHGFDUJRWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQLQQDYLJDWLRQPXVWSUHYDLO
supporting the Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) Regulations 2002 (amended by SI 2011 No 
2978; see footnote page 41) and thus the employer in this instance cannot be resSRQVLEOHIRULWVHPSOR\HH¶V
negligence over whom it has no control. See Tasman Orient Line CV v New Zealand China Clays Ltd and 
Others [2010] 2 Ll R 13. Worryingly for the shipowner, the Rotterdam Rules have abandoned this defence. 
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 The report of the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents into the grounding and subsequent salvage of the 
tanker SEA EMPRESS at Milford Haven between 15 and 21 February 1996, HMSO 
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Lessons to be Learned 
 
The Sea Empress case illustrates the essential feature subsisting in maritime law that the 
Master's authority remains unfettered. They retain the power to take the navigation out of 
the hands of the pilot if the pilot demonstrates manifest incompetence or hazards the vessel 
or other vessels persons or property for any reason. But if they do so, they cannot proceed 
an inch without the authority of the harbour authority, Section 15(3) expressly providing 
that, if the Master navigates his ship in a compulsory pilotage area without notifying the 
competent harbour authority94, he will commit an offence. The downstream consequence, of 
course, goes beyond criminal liability, for the Master will have put himself potentially in a 
classic negligence situation. And that could result in a charge of criminal negligence. 
  
If the pilot is incompetent and must be dismissed, or if he becomes incapacitated, then the 
Master must advise VTS of the facts and seek directions. They after all will be the ones who 
will have the knowledge of the appropriate place of safety and, in any event, must have in 
place contingency plans for dealing with ships that cannot respond due to Pilot incapacity or 
QDYLJDWLRQGHIHFWRQWKHVKLS,WPXVWDOVREHERUQHLQPLQGWKDWWKH0DVWHU¶VGHFLVLRQRID
place of safety may not take into account the hazards presented to third parties in the 
circumstances of the particular case and in any event could lead to all sorts of insurance 
problems.95 
 
That being said, the harbour authority has to balance the availability of resources, with 
commercial considerations of cost, often making it necessary to provide the pilotage service 
by a vessel traffic manager ashore. In a study which balances the arguments compellingly 
regarding shore-based pilotage, Karl Bruno and Margareta Lützhüft96 point out the dangers 
RIµVKRUHSLORWDJH¶7KHSLORWPD\KDYHDOOPDQQHURIHOHFWURQLFLQVWUXPHQWVWRDVVLVWKLP
but that is all he has, to give him speed, rate of turn, course and position. With this, he must 
give instructions to the crew on the bridge and, of course, the tugs. The bridge team may 
well not know the pilot ± to them he is a remote voice which makes it difficult for all the 
parties involved, from the pilot to the bridge team and the tugs, to work to the model of safe 
navigation envisaged by the 1987 Act. The consequence is that, given any situation or 
emerging situation, the pilot is limited to the information that can be received on a computer 
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 Unless a pilot is not offered; see s15(2) Pilotage Act 1987 
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 :KLOHWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQWRDFWUHPDLQVXQIHWWHUHGKHPXVWVWLOOUHSRUWWR976DQ\ZD\LQ
accordance with the Merchant Shipping (Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Reporting Requirements) 
Regulations 2004 on the reporting of incidents at sea and the incapacity of a Pilot would meet the 
definition of an incident in section 12(2)(b) 
96
 Bruno, K and M Lutzhoft, 2009, The Journal of Navigation, 62, 427-437, the Royal Institute of 
Navigation, London 
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screen and from the radio communication with a bridge team, whose facial expressions and 
demeanour of incomprehension he is unable to detect. 
 
0HDQZKLOHWKH0DVWHUUHPDLQVDFFRXQWDEOHZKLFKVHUYHVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKH0DVWHU¶VQHHG
to respond to situations in which he is exposed to liability as a result of statutory provision 
that makes pilotage compulsory ± except where no pilot is available, making it necessary to 
control vessel traffic movements remotely and, thus, offering the Master a service 
equivalent to that of the air traffic controller. While it is apparent that vessel traffic 
management has an important part WRSOD\LQVDIHW\FRQWURO WKH0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR
discharge their duty of care remains unassailable, even though the person upon whom they 
rely ± the vessel traffic controller - is performing the pilotage function simply with the use 
of electronic aids. This problem is warmly acknowledged by the UK Pilotage service itself. 
John Clandillon-Baker FNI described the scenario compellingly when he asked the 
rhetorical question, as to how the demands of maritime safety can possibly be served in the 
situation in which the Master, now coming into their port of discharge, exhausted by hours 
on watch glued to radar and bridge management on the approach, while trying not to think 
about all the unfinished paperwork that has accumulated in the meantime and still has to be 
completed, finds that he has to carry out his own pilotage on the bridge, assisted only by a 
remote voice over the VHF, who has prefaced their communication  with a clause politely 
declining any liability for advice given.97 
 
:KLOHWKH0DVWHU¶VPDQagement control of the safe navigation of the vessel has clearly been 
eroded by compulsory pilotage, he unquestionably remains accountable ± he would have to 
EH RI FRXUVH IRU LQ KLP UHSRVHV WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V FRQILGHQFH WR SURWHFW WKHLU VRYHUHLJQ
interests. That does not mean to say that he remains absolutely liable. If the pilot is 
negligent, the Master must account for himself but, if he could not have prevented the 
casualty in accordance with the normal principles of negligence, he will not be to blame. 
+DG WKH0DVWHURI WKH6HD(PSUHVV IROORZHGWKH&RPSDQ\¶V VWDQGLQJRUGHUV IRUSLORWDJH
SURFHGXUHV KDG KH GUDZQ KLV FRQFHUQV WR WKH SLORW¶V DWWHQWLRQ DQG UHFHLYHG VDWLVIDFWRU\
replies, then his culpability in consequent pollution offences, usually such a source of fear 
for the master in such circumstances, could not be established, according to the demands of 
international law for a fair trial98. How the Port State views that may be a different matter, 
SDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHVFHQDULRLQZKLFKVRPH3RUW6WDWH¶VHnvironment has been damaged by a 
marine pollution event, while the vessel was in a compulsory pilotage area but, necessarily, 
remaining under the responsibility of the Master. Such was the case of the Tasman Spirit. 
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On the 27th July 2003, the Maltese-flag 7DVPDQ6SLULWZDVERXQGIRU3DNLVWDQ¶VQDWLRQDORLO
refinery at Karachi with a cargo of 67,800 tonnes of Iranian light crude, and 440 tons of 
heavy fuel oil in the aft bunkers, when she ran aground in compulsory pilotage waters as 
she approached the port. Her condition deteriorated as she was subjected to continuous 
stress from the heavy swell of the prevailing south-west monsoon and she subsequently 
EURNHLQWZRVSLOOLQJDQHVWLPDWHGWRQQHVRIKHUFDUJR7KHYHVVHO¶V0DVWHU99 was 
arrested and charged with conspiring to ground the tanker with criminal intent to cause 
pollution and injury. They were detained for eight months facing criminal charges. After 
compensation agreements were negotiated, Pakistan dropped the criminal charges and the 
seafarers were released. Despite the fact that the ship was in compulsory pilotage waters, 
the pilot was not among those arrested, while the Master and his officers faced a harrowing 
period of detention without trial, on the grounds of criminal accountability that, finally, had 
to be abandoned100. 101 
 
7KH([FHSWLRQWRWKH0DVWHU¶V$XWKRULW\ 
 
7KH LVVXH RI FRPSXOVRU\ SLORWDJH KDV HYROYHG DW D PRGHVW UDWH EXW WKH 0DVWHU¶V
responsibility remains intact. It is therefore open to him to dismiss the pilot rather than carry 
out his directions. The only area where the Master seems to have no discretion at all, has 
been established by Statute for at least the last 150 years and has not changed appreciably 
since then. During the First World War the Britain Steamship Company was managing the 
Matiana which became the subject of litigation after an incident while she was in convoy 
under the command of a Royal Navy officer. The issue in contention involved the 
relationship between the Master and the Navy Commander and reached the House of Lords 
in 1921102. 
 
Contemporary law was provided in the Naval Discipline Act 1866, sections 30 and 31 of 
which compelled the Master of a merchant ship in convoy to obey the Royal Navy 
commander in all matters relating to the navigation or security of the convoy, provided that 
he did not have to participate in combative action against an enemy ship. Lord Shaw 
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 Together with her chief officer, third officer, chief engineer, second engineer, third engineer and the 
quartermaster, as well as the salvage master 
100
 For further information, refer International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd, London 
www.itopf.com  
101
 The case pre-GDWHGWKH,02¶V*XLGHOLnes For The Fair Treatment Of Seafarers In the Event Of A 
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summarised the situation thus: 
 
So far as the direction of the course of the vessel was concerned, the merchant 
captain and officers were no longer in control. The naval officers were. 
 
This situation subsists with the Current Law, section 131 Naval Discipline Act 1957, which 
covers ships under convoy and provides that it is the duty of a Master in command of a 
merchant ship that is sailing in convoy under the command of a Royal Navy officer, to obey 
WKHRIILFHU¶VGLUHFWLRQVLQDOOPDWWHUVUHODWLQJWRWKHQDYLJDWLRQRUVHFXULW\RIWKHFRQYR\. If 
the Master fails to comply with any such direction, the Royal Navy officer may compel 
obedience by force of arms103, and neither he nor any person acting under his orders shall be 
liable for the consequent loss or damage to life and property. 
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2.2 The Master and the Owner 
 
 
(i) The Loss of the Master-Owner Relationship 
 
Overview 
 
This, the second head of the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the evolution of the 
0DVWHU 8QGHU *RG UDWLRQDOLVHV NH\ IHDWXUHV ZKLFK FKDUDFWHULVH WKH 0DVWHU¶V FRQWUDFWXDO
obligation to maximise the commercial return for the shipowner, while mitigating risks to 
the owner inherent iQPHUFKDQWVKLSRSHUDWLRQV,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKH0DVWHU¶VU{OHVDVDJHQW
servant and representative of the owner are examined as a foundation to establishing the 
ULVN WR WKH RZQHU E\ DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU DFWV RU RPLVVLRQV
arising in the course of their employment, which have become criminalised. In consequence 
conclusions may be drawn which define the risks in law to which the Master exposes the 
owner, and offers an explanation, therefore, for the loss of the relationship in recent years. 
 
 
The Relationship of Agency 
 
As the era of deep sea maritime trade was truly blooming in the nineteenth century, it 
became commercially essential that the investors be persuaded that their money was in safe 
hands ± or at least, as safe as possible under the circumstances of all the risks that stalked 
the opportunities for profit. With no established communication, and few trustworthy 
businessmen in the far-flung loading ports where cargoes had to be negotiated, the venturers 
had to place their trust in somebody to protect their interests, and the Master was the most 
reliable man on the spot. If his ship were arrested he had to secure her release. If supplies 
ran out or gear was lost or broken, he had to arrange for their replacement, and raise the 
necessary funds if need be104. Besides, the Master often had a financial stake in the 
DGYHQWXUHKLPVHOI6ORZO\EXWZLWKXQGHQLDEOHORJLFWKH0DVWHU¶VFRQWUDFWXDOUHODWLRQVKLS
was developing into partner, employee, and agent. 
 
This was a critical object-lesson in the evolution of the relationship between the Master and 
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the Owners, which illustrates extremely well the principles which define the modern law of 
Agency. While there seem to be as many examples of an agent in maritime trades as there 
are tradespeople, the concept can be described simply as the relationship that exists between 
two persons when one, called the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called 
the principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal's legal position in respect of 
third parties by the making of contracts or the disposition of property. The ancient case of 
Tweddle v Atkinson105 was not a marine action but, nevertheless, demonstrates extremely 
well the issue of Privity. The Claimant (known before 1999 as the Plaintiff) was the son of 
the late John Tweddle, who had arranged with the equally-late William Guy that a marriage 
portion would be given to the Claimant as part of the marriage arrangement. Although he 
was the individual who was to be the beneficiary under the contractual arrangement, he was 
neither the offeror nor the offeree. The Court delivered the clear general principle that 
parties who have not personally closed the contract do not derive any rights from that 
agreement nor are they subject to any burdens imposed by it. 
 
The birth of the law of Agency was essential in order to cure what would otherwise have 
been a fatal problem for contracts in maritime commerce; after all, it is one of the corner-
stones of English Law that the only parties who can sue on a contract are those who have 
made valuable commitments to each other in the bargain106. The commercial logic was 
articulated by Blackburn J in Ireland v Livingston107, in describing the process by which 
cargo is to be delivered by the seller to the buyer (more properly described for the purpose 
of this exercise as the consignee, because the obligation for the carriage of the goods must 
be discharged by the carrier to the person entitled to receive them). Once the contract of sale 
is agreed, the seller raises an invoice to the consignee, containing the sale price, the 
premium for the cargo insurance and the freight, the contractual fee for the carriage by sea 
which must be paid upon delivery at the port of discharge. Although the seller is the party 
who has closed the contract with the carrier, the benefit of the contract, therefore, goes to 
the consignee. By the same token, when the ship duly discharges the cargo it is the 
consignee who will have to pay the freight, in accordance with the contract with the carrier; 
unless, of course, that cargo is not delivered, in which case the contractual obligation will 
not have been met to deliver the cargo and, so, the consideration under that contract, the 
freight, cannot prima facie be demanded against the consignee. If the non-delivery is in 
consequence of some breach of the contract for the carriage of goods for which the carrier is 
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held liable, then the consignee will recover the value of the cargo from the carrier; if the 
carrier is not liable, then the consignee will call upon the cargo insurance policy which the 
VHOOHU KDG DUUDQJHG RQ WKH FRQVLJQHH¶V EHKDOI DQG ZKR SDVVHG RQ WKH SUHPLXP LQ KLV
invoice. In substance, therefore, Justice Blackburn explained, the consignee enjoys the same 
rights and obligations as if he had been the original contracting party with the carrier (and, 
indeed, the cargo insurer). By the same token, unless the seller expressly assumed some 
personal liability to the carrier (who could then choose whom to sue), the seller would not 
enjoy any such rights and obligations. 
 
The effect of the concept is that the agent is an individual in whom his principal could place 
his trust and so would not get him into trouble; or, indeed, would get him out of trouble as 
quickly as he had got into it. If this concept is taken to the context of the Master-Owner 
UHODWLRQVKLSIRUWKHVKLSRZQHUWKLVLQGLYLGXDONQRZQDVWKHµDJHQW¶ORJLFDOO\KDGWREHWKH
same one in whom he had placed his trust to bring the ship safely home: the Master. From 
the viewpoint of the Master, the critical feature is that, having closed a contract on behalf of 
the owner, he is not then personally liable to the third party on that contract. Only if the 
Master had not identified or named the owner as his principal could the third party bring a 
claim against him ± and even that would be an up-hill struggle, for the third party could 
very easily make enquiries with the Flag State register as to the correct title of the 
principal108.  
 
,WPXVWEHVDLG WKDW WKH0DVWHU¶V UHODWLRQVKLSZLth the Owner in the context of Agency is 
where the Author drifts from a consensus with Professor Gold109, who labours under the 
belief that the Master is personally liable under all contracts he concludes in relation to the 
ship. The Master may be held accountable to a third party in negligence if they break a duty 
of care to that third party who suffers damage as a reasonably foreseeable consequence, 
notwithstanding any contractual terms agreed between the Owner and the third party110, but 
a Master acting with the usual authority of their disclosed Principal, the Owner, will not be 
liable to the third party in a contract. As the humble Agent, they may have endorsed the 
contract but liability rests on the Principal for whom they acted ± or, rather, on the Principal 
whom the third party believed they were getting bound into a contract with, so ably 
demonstrated in the case of the Starsin1117KH0DVWHU¶VFRQWUDFWXDOOLDELOLW\ZLOOEHOLPLWHG
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to that owed to the Owner and defined according to the express or implied terms of their 
employment112.  
 
The Special Relationship 
 
That being said, the Master has a special contractual relationship with the Owner at 
Common Law, arising out of their common interest in the success of the marine adventure, 
which could be relied upon to maintain the bond between them. But the changes in the 
pattern of ship management over the last thirty years have seen the outsourcing of skills, so 
that the business managing the operation of the ship is often entirely unrelated to the 
Owner. They may well have sub-contracted the crewing contract to another business, while 
they only won the management contract because of a tender which offered the lowest cost, 
DQG DQ\ DGGLWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO FRVW ZRXOG FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH PDQDJHU¶V ERWWRP-line budget. 
Indeed, the manager may be operating with the very minimum of resources, far from able to 
provide the support which the Master might be entitled to expect from the Owners of the 
asset over which he has control. Thus, far from sharing a common interest with the Master, 
the management company may very well have a vested interest in avoiding legal 
accountability by dissociating itself from the Master¶VDFWVRURPLVVLRQV, for it would derive 
no financial benefit from such association but could be exposed to risk if tKH 0DVWHU¶V
tortious acts led it LQWRYLFDULRXVOLDELOLW\7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWLIWKH0DVWHU¶VDFWVRU
omissions had given rise to criminal liability, in which a Prosecutor may seek to establish 
that both Master and manager shared common features in the mens rea and the actus reus. 
The management company doubtless would be horrified to face the risk that it might share 
criminal accountability ± such had not been contemplated when it tendered for the work ± 
but, after all, that was why the Merchant Shipping Act established criminal liability against 
them for a dangerously unsafe ship under Section 98 if they had assumed responsibility for 
safety in the contract with the registered owner (in that situation the owner would actually 
avoid criminal liability altogether).  
 
Of great importance to the Master, this lack of support includes administrative management 
RIWKHVKLS¶VEXVLQHVV7KH0DVWHUWRGD\LVH[SHFWHGWREHDEXVLQHVVPDQDJHUVRPHWKLQJ
which they had not envisaged in the heady days of their youth as they embarked on their 
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maritime career. Professor Gold touches upon this in his paper113 in terms of the 
PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHVKLS¶VEXVLQHVVEXWWKLVGRHVDQLQMXVWLFHWRWKH9LFWRULDQ0DVWHUZKR
had to do much the same thing. It is just that, in the intervening period, global 
communications and shifts in the pattern of asset investment had fostered a closer, parental 
relationship between the Master and the Owner. By contrast, Gold illustrates the 
contemporary situation by articulating many of the coPSODLQWV RI WRGD\¶V 0DVWHU ZLWK
fatigue high on the list, having to navigate through heavy traffic, sometimes in bad weather, 
having to make judgments on the safety of the ship in balance with the commercial 
demands of the shareholders. The consequence of WKH 0DVWHU¶V IDLOXUH XQGHU VXFK
conditions could lead to a charge of criminal negligence. How the Master defends such a 
charge may well depend on just what decisions the Master made as a result of balancing 
legal duties against commercial demands. 
 
This issue of the battle between legal duty and commercial pressure is not an emerging 
problem; at the very most, it is a re-emerging problem, for the changes in ship management 
have forced the Master back to the position in which they found themselves in the 
environment of maritime commerce which characterised the Victorian era. Writing of that 
period, and the extreme clippers of the China tea trade, Basil Lubbock revealed the 
HYLGHQFH XQGHUSLQQLQJ WKH 0DVWHU¶V U{OH LQ WKH EXVLQHVV RI VKLSSLQJ ZLWK SHUVRQDO
knowledge of his witnesses, conveying a graphic picture of the Master, who must be 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHVKLS¶VEXVLQHVVDQGZKRWHQGVWRFDUU\RXWWKDWEXVLQHVVLQJRRGIDLWK. 
He observed that there were very few successful Masters in the trade, most being either too 
cautious or too reckless; it was just a few Masters  
 
whose endurance equalled their energy, whose daring was tempered by good 
judgment, whose business capabilities were on a par with their seamanship, and 
whose nerves were of cast iron114. 
 
Such qualities would be highly regarded by Owners today, provided that the Owners would 
not face criminal accountability if those qualities led to a catastrophe for which the Master 
was held to blame in some Port State jurisdiction.  
 
The successful Master in this context was the one who conducted a risk-benefit analysis 
designed to maximise the commercial return, and mitigate the dangers if possible. But the 
Master had a comfort zone upon which he could rely: there is no evidence to suggest that 
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criminal accountability would ensue in the context of nineteenth century law if, in making 
his decision, the Master took a decision which modern law would associate with negligence. 
 
It is apparent that the evolution of maritime commerce was marked by the need for 
investors to repose their confidence in the Master, as a very sensible solution to the problem 
of an absence of communication and, therefore, management control over the entire voyage, 
once the vessel had sailed over the horizon. There is not a great deal of evidence about how 
the Master thought of this ± save for the evidence of Captain Hilary Marquand (1825-1872), 
whose opinions, as revealed in his edited memoirs, were unrestrained ± presumably thanks 
to the fact that they were not published for a century after his death. Writing of his 
appointment as Master, he glowed: 
 
« OHW PH DSSHDU WR WKH ZRUOG DV UHDOO\ ZDV D WUXO\ KDSS\ EHLQJ DW KDYLQJ
attained to the summit of my ambition at so early an hour of my life. Proud of the 
preference shown to me over the many eager aspirants which were about. Proud 
with the feeling of competency, which until then I had thought buried in the 
recess of my own knowledge, but which was now publicly declared to the world 
by other tongues than mine, and stood as a halo of sunshine arounGPH«,WLV
QR VPDOO FKDUJH WKDWRIPDVWHURID VKLS WUDGLQJ URXQG WKHZRUOGZLWK µFDUWH
EODQFKH¶WRDFWIRUWKHSURPRWLRQRIWKHRZQHU¶VLQWHUHVW115 
 
Captain Marquand, however, held very firm views indeed about the commercial risks 
inherent in his appointment: 
 
That man must be able to combine at once the essential qualities of merchant, 
and broker, to that of ship master, and I feel no reluctance to add that no man in 
whatever situation he may be, is surrounded with a greater set of disguised 
enemies in the mercantile world«116 
 
The cause of such bitter commentary can be found, not in his memoirs but in the case of 
Marquand v Banner117. Captain Marquand had been Master of the Secret, for which a 
voyage charter had been fixed in 1854 to Buenos Aires.   The vessel was loaded with 
general cargo, for which the Master duly signed bills of lading. Then on the 23rd January 
1855 the charterers suspended payment and on the 19th February executed a general 
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assignment of their property for the benefit of their creditors. Anxious to ensure that the 
freight payable by the consignees did not end up in the wrong hands, the Owners, via their 
agents, gave notice to the various shippers that the freight should not be paid to the 
charterers but to the ship-Owners. The charterers¶WUXVWHHVJDYHWKHOwners notice that they 
wanted the freights paid to them, though. When the ship arrived in Buenos Aires on the 13th 
March, Captain Marquand managed to collect a modest amount of the freight due, but the 
Owners were still badly at a loss IRU WKH FKDUWHUHUV¶ GHIDXOW XQGHU WKH FKDUWHUSDUW\ 7KH
Owners were duly sued for the recovery of the freight which Captain Marquand had 
collected as their agent. In his Judgment, Wightman, J held that the wording of the 
charterparty made the charterers the parties entitled to the freight. Much to his disgust, 
Captain Marquand had believed himself acting as agent to the Owners, when he tried to 
mitigate the financial loss caused by ruthless, very likely dishonest, charterers, only to have 
to deliver to them in the end, what money he could recover. Given this, though, the close 
commercial association between the Master and the owner is clear and obvious. 
 
The special relationship was acknowledged as indispensible to maritime operations, and has 
been embraced DQGHQFRXUDJHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKH&RPSDQ\¶VU{OHLQ
VXSSRUWLQJ WKH 0DVWHU¶V DXWKRULW\ PRVW UHFHQWO\ WKURXJK WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6DIHW\
Management Code 2002 µ,60¶, which requires the Owners¶ VKRUH-based management 
system to support thH 0DVWHU¶V 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG $XWKRULW\ ,Q IDLUQHVV WKRXJK XQGHU
English law this merely codified the Common Law position which had evolved with the 
paternal relationship that had grown up between the Master and the owner, largely 
following the era described by Captain Marquand, when global communications gave the 
Owners the ability to assist and get involved ± albeit, of course, ultimately to protect their 
investment. As graphic illustration of this, the Owners¶RZQFRPSDQ\RUGHUVJHQHUDOULVN
management instructions to their ships, show just how little the former practice has changed 
with the ISM Code. The following are extracts from Standing Orders given by the Bowater 
Steamship Company Limited in 1957118 and mirror the relationship between the Master and 
the Owner: 
 
The Master is at all times the personal representative of the Owners. His 
authority is supreme in every respect, at all times, both at sea and in port, over 
all departments and all employees on board ship. 
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The British Statutes and Courts of Law having constantly proclaimed that the 
Master of a ship is the universally recognized representative of the Owners while 
the Master remains in command, he cannot divest of his identity and 
responsibility nor the authority pertaining thereto.  
 
By comparison, the ISM Code offers little change in substance (although in form it makes 
big changes with the introduction of torrents of paperwork): 
 
The Company should ensure that the SMS operating on board the ship contains a 
clear statement emphasizing the master's authority. The Company should 
establish in the SMS that the master has the overriding authority and the 
responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention 
and to request the Company's assistance as may be necessary. 
 
The difference between the approaches taken in 1957 and 2002 may appear inconsequential 
in this context ± until the influence of criminal accountability is introduced as twenty first 
century society promulgates new statute law to enforce its ethics. 
 
Evolution by Statute Law 
 
The relationship between the Master and owner found its way into statute law, notably 
following ratification of the Hague Rules 1924, which evolved into the Hague-Visby Rules, 
adopted by the United Kingdom in the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971. The Hague-
Visby Rules provide inter alia that the carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of 
the voyage to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and properly man, equip 
and supply her119. It is the Master's personal duty to ensure that the vessel is in all respects 
safe to proceed to sea, which includes the above requirements ± thus, as the Master 
exercises their untrammeled discretion to decide to proceed to sea, they patently make an 
agency decision which will render the owner accountable to the cargo-owner for any 
damage. Such issues as seaworthiness are well-defined by Hague-Visby and, therefore, 
VWDQG DV FRPSHOOLQJ DXWKRULW\ IRU GHILQLQJ D YHVVHO¶V FRQGLWLRQ ZKHQ  LQWHUSUHWLQJ WKH
criminal implications of section 98 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which renders the Master 
and the owner criminally liable if a ship in a UK port, or a UK-registered ship in any other 
port, is dangerously unsafe. Section 94 defines µGDQJHURXVO\XQVDIH¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIEHLQJ
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unfit to go to sea without serious danger to human life because of the condition, or the 
unsuitability of the ship, her machinery or equipment, or if she is undermanned, overloaded 
RUXQVDIHO\ORDGHGRUµDQ\RWKHUPDWWHUUHOHYDQWWRWKHVDIHW\RIWKHVKLS¶ 
 
Such a worry does not escape the independent ship manager, for Section 98 provides that, if 
the owner has passed management control over safety matters either directly, by a 
charterparty or management agreement, or indirectly, under a series of charterparties or 
management DJUHHPHQWV WKHQ WKHFKDUWHUHURUPDQDJHU VKDOO VLPSO\VWDQG LQ WKHRZQHU¶V
place for the purpose of criminal liability under the Act. In all such cases, the Master retains 
responsibility for ship safety and, indeed, guards still their unfettered discretion as to 
whether to proceed to sea; in addition to the provisions of the 1995 Act, the risk under 
FXUUHQWODZUDLVHVLWVKHDGLIWKH0DVWHU¶VDFWRURPLVVLRQDPRXQWVWRFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFH
As a result, the Master-owner relationship potentially imperils the owner or manager, unless 
they can mitigate their position by distancing themselves from the Master. 
 
The potential for criminal accountability can be identified most recently in the Bribery Act 
2010, which finally came into force in July 2011. Section 1 creates an offence where a 
person offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, in order to 
induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity, or to reward a person 
for the improper performance of such a function or activity. Such a function or activity 
would include any function of a public nature, any activity connected with a business, any 
activity performed in the course of a person's employment, or any activity performed by or 
on behalf of the company. However the Master is described, therefore - as agent, 
representative or employee - they will be defined within the Act. For better or for worse, 
inducements to officials in many parts of the world have long been accepted as an 
occupational hazard of maritime operations, and the close relationship between the Master 
and the owner conveys a dangerous picture to the shore-based management operation. 
 
That relationship would be a hard one to deny, given the practical reasons so graphically 
illustrated by the MDVWHU¶VU{OHDQGWKHHYROXWLRQRI6WDWXWHLaw has created undercurrents 
in strategic planning that have driven risk management decisions and, whether intentionally 
or not, are perceived to have eroded the Master-owner relationship. 
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The High Water Mark ± and the Ebb Tide 
 
It is very apparent that the evolution of the relationship between the Master and the Owner 
was a model of logic: the Master retains complete responsibility for anything that occurs on 
or involves their ship, but the liabilities arising out of such operation are covered under the 
RZQHU¶VOLDELOLW\LQVXUDQFH7KHVWDWXWRU\SURYLVLRQVDULVLQJRXWRIWKH+DJXH-Visby Rules 
assured some equity for the Owner, however, in the so-called nautical fault defence, 
relaxing liability upon them for tKH0DVWHU¶VQHJOLJHQWDFWVRURPLVVLRQVRYHUZKLFK WKH\
had no control and reached its pinnacle ± and swansong ± with the final appeal in the 
Tasman Pioneer case in 2010120. But overall, this apparently paternal, Owner-Master 
relationship, begged the perception that any suggestion of criminal accountability against 
the Master would see the vigorous intervention of the Company in their defence. It 
characterised the high water mark of the relationship, which had been achieved thanks to a 
sustained period, throughout much of the twentieth century, when efficient global 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH0DVWHUZKHUHYHUWKHVKLSPD\EHDQGWKH&RPSDQ\¶VVKRUH
office, with the senior managers, the lawyers and the experienced technical support staff, 
often presided over by the charismatic figure of the Chairman who had hands-on control of 
the day-to-day operation of the ship121.  
 
With the benefit of such a reassuring, paternal hand at the corporate helm, the investor was 
able to speculate with confidence on financial risk in the context of a shipowning operation, 
making it worthwhile for them to purchase shares that gave them a yield which was better 
than that found in other industries, earning a divided paid out of income and a capital 
surplus upon final disposal of the shares. For UK flag companies, all went according to plan 
in the early post-war years, with little incentive to spend development cost on competitivity 
as long as the profits came tumbling in - until the collapse of the British Empire brought an 
end to all the protected trades which had helped the British merchant fleet to prosper, and 
imperial disintegration led to a massive struggle by those emergent nations to win maritime 
emancipation, for they understood that the protection and development of their own 
merchant fleets was the key to their prosperity.  Moreover, many countries, great and small, 
realised that by subsidising their shipping industries they would help them to develop and, 
at the same time, obtain foreign currency which would be so important to their balance of 
payments. As those developing countries learned to process their own resources, they no 
longer needed the know-how and the supply of bulk raw materials from Britain; while the 
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development of instantaneous global communications had become so sophisticated as to 
render business passenger travel by sea suddenly prehistoric. Moreover, social reform at 
home brought a massive escalation in British crewing costs, rendering British companies 
even less able to compete with the new rivals from emergent maritime nations. 
 
%\WKH¶VWKHILQDQFLDOVWRUPVZKLFKKDGEHHQVWDUWHGE\WKHVZHHSLQJFKDQJHVSRVW-
war were gathering pace on every trade route in the world, and the reshaping of the British 
shipping industry became glaringly obvious following the crippling seamen's strike of 1966. 
The British Government set up a Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, chaired by Lord 
Rochdale in 1968, to review the organisation and structure of the UK shipping industry, its 
methods of operation and any other factors which affect its efficiency and competitiveness. 
The Committee sought the opinions of all the major players in the British Fleet - and got a 
rude awakening from some of the country's key decision-makers, such as Lord Vestey, 
Chairman of the Blue Star Line, who wrote in February 1968: 
 
The trend of our shipping profits over the past ten years has been downwards 
and unsatisfactory. For the future we hope that the changing pattern of British 
liner shipping, particularly in the development of unitisation and 
containerisation of cargo will improve the present very depressing financial 
situation, but it will take several years before anything approaching an adequate 
return on the capital invested and risks involved is shown122. 
 
It was not just investment risk that was brought into sharp focus, in the same year Mr 
-XVWLFH%ULGJHKHOGDJDLQVWWKH&RPSDQ\RQWKHLVVXHRIHPSOR\HU¶VOLDELOLW\123, observing: 
 
«LWLVQRWRQO\WKHUHDVRQDEOHEHKDYLRXURIHPSOR\HHVZKLFKLWLVDQHPSOR\HU¶V
duty to anticipate; it may include unreasonable behaviour. 
 
Such findings would have struck home to shipowners when considering the application of 
increasingly expensive litigation to the concept of vicarious liability in the shipboard 
management scenario, in which the Master has responsibility ± and unassailable authority ± 
over shipboard operations and, thus, for anything potentially litigious occurring on or 
LQYROYLQJWKHLUVKLSEXWWKHOLDELOLWLHVDULVLQJRXWRIWKDWPXVWEHFRYHUHGXQGHUWKHRZQHU¶V
insurance, whether hull and machinery or protection and indemnity.  
 
Nevertheless, the industry today perceives this to have been the age defining the zenith of 
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the relationship between the Master and the Owner. In order to establish whether the Master 
shared the same opinion of the relationship, it is appropriate to hear the evidence of a 
former officer of another organisation, the China Navigation Company, who served during 
the high-point of that period in the evolution of the Master. The China Navigation Company 
is the wholly owned deep-sea shipping arm of John Swire & Sons Limited. Incorporated 
under English law with its registered office in London, but operated from its base in Hong 
Kong, the ships were registered under the UK flag and, subsequently, transferred to the 
Hong Kong register.  
 
This witness embarked on his sea career in 2FWREHU  +H ZDV DZDUGHG KLV 0DVWHU¶V
Certificate ten years later, but was not given command as Master until 1970, which he held 
for the next 24 years. When appointed Master, he was very aware of the power and 
authority which the Company reposed in him for the safe operation of the vessel and could 
rely on what he saw as a common  understanding of the needs of shipboard management as 
the Company provided them, in the form of Fleet Instructions, today understood as 
Company Standing Orders. In addition, though, he was responsible for his own Standing 
Orders, which underpinned his special responsibility as Master ± his unassailable discretion 
also meant unassailable accountability for anything which might go wrong, so, on joining 
WKH VKLS KH FRYHUHG DQ\ SRVVLEOH JDSV EHWZHHQ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V 6WDQGLQJ 2UGHUs and his 
SHUVRQDOULVNZLWK0DVWHU¶V6WDQGLQJ2UGHUVDVZHOODVZULWLQJ1LJKW2UGHUVHDFKHYHQLQJ
at sea at about 2000 hours124. To make sure that all the officers had read and understood the 
orders, they had to sign them on joining the ship.  
 
He understood very clearly his responsibility as Master for the safety of the ship  within the 
meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act (1894, as it then was) and nobody in the Company 
could compromise that. As an example, on one occasion he was sailing as Master of a ship 
which was carrying a cargo of iron ore from India to Japan when she was caught in typhoon 
conditions and had to lie hove to about 200 miles off Hong Kong for a lengthy period, 
during which time damage was caused to the engine. When better conditions prevailed, he 
DGYLVHGWKH&RPSDQ\¶VRIILFHLQ+RQJ.RQJRIWKHVLWXDWLRQDQGRIKLVLQWHQWLRQWRGLYHUWWR
+RQJ .RQJ IRU HQJLQH UHSDLUV 7KH &RPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHU LQVWUucted him to carry out the 
repairs at sea or in Taiwan, but he advised management that, notwithstanding their 
instructions, he was, in the interests of the safety of the ship, proceeding to Hong Kong for 
repairs, and did so. He was aware that the Company could do many things contractually, but 
they could not override his judgment in such matters. 
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The hypothetical question arises, as to whether he would have felt compelled to carry out 
the instructions not to enter Hong Kong had they come from the port authority. On 
reflection, and mindful of his personal liability, particularly in relation to Port State Control, 
he felt that he would have been obliged to comply, particularly when confronted with the 
dilemma of the safety of his own ship or the safety of a port which he would have been 
entering with a 45,000 ton bulk carrier without permission, particularly on the basis that 
they would have special knowledge of potential risks of which he was unaware. 
 
In terms of the paternal relationship between Master and Owner, this witness emphasised 
that, while as Master he appreciated his heavy responsibility in managing the safe and 
efficient operation of the ship, at the same time, he would have expected ± and was utterly 
confident that he would have received ± the protection of the Company if he ever needed it. 
There was, he said, a tremendously respectful relationship in China Navigation Company 
between management and the Master. Always aware of his wider responsibility, being 
answerable for claims against the Company, not only in terms of liability but also 
profitability, he was very conscious of the pressure to keep going and manage the ship 
through any problems that were encountered, but would always have expected the Company  
to support him and, if necessary, get him out of trouble as soon as he got into it.  
 
What has changed since this witness retired in 1994? His impression of the shipping 
industry today is that the relationship between management and the Master has been eroded 
by a number of factors, and that the Master may well no longer have confidence that he can 
rely on his company to support him in a crisis. In so far as the reasons for this decline must 
be analysed, he believes that the root causes can be summarised very largely as economic. 
Pressures on shipping forced changes in management and in fleet operation. Without 
prompting by the Rochdale consultation with Lord Vestey, this witness attached importance 
to the expertise and experience of relatively expensive British and Commonwealth officers, 
who had qualified from well-organised navigation schools, giving high priority to safety, 
efficiency and economics; but the Company gradually moved away from employing British 
and Commonwealth officers because their salaries and pension requirements had left them 
as less economically viable, so fewer were employed and were replaced by cheaper officers, 
who did not give such a high priority to the issues of safety of navigation which concern 
Port State judicial systems so keenly today. But the logic of the transition had been made 
safer for the Company ± and their insurers - by the process of satellite navigation systems 
and electronic, almost instant, communications, in contrast to former practices of celestial 
navigation and radio communication, which enabled, really, anybody, to run a ship and to 
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be acceptable to good Owners and insurers.  
 
As the Rochdale Report reflected, so this witness shared the understanding that  the 
HFRQRPLF UHFHVVLRQ RI WKH ¶V DQG ¶V IRUFHG FRPSDQLHV WR UHFRQVLGHU KRZ WKH\
could operate profitably, and was aware that the organisation and management structure of 
the Company had changed. That being said, though, his personal experience, right up until 
the time he left, left him sure that he had access to the management team as and when he 
ZDQWHGLW0RUHRYHUWKH&RPSDQ\¶V)OHHW&RPPRGRUHKDGDFFHVVQRWRQO\WRPDQDJHPHQW
but also had the right of access to the board of directors if he felt the matter was serious 
enough.  
 
Such access would have been a matter of envy in other companies ± and by the same token 
would reinforce the position of the Master in a senior management rôle pursuant to the 
Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007. His opinion ends on a starkly realistic note: 
 
I accept, however, that we were very fortunate in CNCO and things may well 
have been very different in other companies. While I am appalled at the recent 
case studies of the Zim Mexico III and the Hebei Spirit, I am not necessarily 
surprised in the light of how the industry has developed and would say that the 
Master is treated as the fall-guy for Management125.  
 
A second witness, Captain Graeme Drewery, joined China Navigation Company in 1964; 
KHREWDLQHGKLV0DVWHU¶V&HUWLILFDWH LQDQG LQ WKDWSRVLWLRQKHVHUYHG WKHFRPSDQ\
until his retirement in 1997. Reinforcing the opinions of the first witness, he was very much 
DZDUH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V UHOLDQFHXSRQ KLP WR PDLQWDLQ RUGHU DQG GLVFLSOLQH RQ ERDUG DV
well as ensuring the safe arrival of the cargo at the port of discharge. This included the safe 
navigation of the vessel, sometimes in demanding circumstances. For example, there were 
occasions when he would have to take the ship through waters that were hazardous due to 
rocks and shoals, not to mention countless small craft. The compelling factors driving him 
were the commercial priorities of the Owners, but his skills of professional competence and 
leadership were what the Owners relied on. In return, he was confident that he could rely 
upon everybody in the Company he needed to.  
 
Captain Drewery believes that changes in shoreside management have played a significant 
rôle in the changing relationship between the Master and the Company. For purely 
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commercial reasons, shore offices dispensed with marine superintendents, and employed 
engineering superintendents instead. As a management response to changing times in the 
industry, this may have been adequate in meeting the demands of legal obligations to ensure 
that the fleet was seaworthy, but a vital link in the family relationship between the Owners 
and the Masters was lost, because that link depended upon an understanding that comes 
from experience, and engineering personnel have different rôles and responsibilities from 
deck personnel. 
 
With the evolution of shoreside management within the industry, the Master is strongly 
aware that the loss of the parental relationship exposes himself to greater risks because he 
realises that his responsibility has not diminished at all. This becomes a significant problem 
ZKHQ DGGLQJ WKH IDFWRU RI PDQDJHPHQW FRQWURO RYHU WKH VKLS¶V DIfairs. This is starkly 
illustrated by the issue of communication. Language barriers can present major problems 
for shipboard management, which is the responsibility of the Master as part of his duties. 
But the Master does not get any choice over the nationality of his crew ± he gets what he is 
given by the shore office (which might be a ship management agency which has no 
corporate relationship with the Owners). It was, of course, a communication problem which 
was held partly accountable for the loss of the Estonia. In the personal experience of this 
witness, when Master of the Foochow, he was handing over on her transfer in 1980 to a 
South Korean subsidiary, when it became very clear indeed that the Korean deck crew 
could not understand a word of their instructions or advice. As a result, he feared for the 
efficient management of the subsequent voyage. 
 
The Case of the Tasman Pioneer 
 
With this broad view of the situation from the senior management on board the ship, it is 
possible to make a value-judgment on the relationship between the Master and the Owner, 
DVD UHDODGYDQWDJH WRERWKSDUWLHVSUHVHUYLQJ WKH0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\EXW WUDQVIHUULQJ
liability to the Owner, who, in turn, will transfer the risk to his Insurer. To this extent, 
therefore, the OwQHUPXVWEHZDUHRI WKH ODZIXOQHVVRI WKH0DVWHU¶VFRQGXFW The Master 
retains absolute discretion in the navigation of the ship, for which the Merchant Shipping 
(Safety of Navigation) Regulations 2002126 reflects the body of international law that 
upholds this globally, but that potentially carries with it accountability for WKH 0DVWHU¶V 
DFWLRQVDQGLIVXFKDFWLRQVDUHRXWVLGHWKH2ZQHU¶VFRQWUROWKHQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
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them may become strained. In real terms, tKH2ZQHU¶VYLFDULRXVOLDELOLW\ZRXOGSULma facie 
PDNH WKHP OLDEOH IRU WKH0DVWHU¶V QHJOLJHQFH LQ WKLV VLWXDWLRQ against which shipowners 
have held the nautical fault defence in the Hague-Visby Rules in very high esteem indeed. 
The part which it plays in the context of maritime commerce can be difficult to reconcile, 
though, for while the Master and the Owner are both engaged in the maritime adventure to 
make a profit, their interests may diverge, with consequences on liability. This can be 
illustrated very well in a study of the recent case of the Tasman Pioneer127, a vessel in the 
fleet of Tasman Orient Line, a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Navigation Company.  
 
On the evening of the 1st May 2001, the Tasman Pioneer, a multi-purpose break bulk cargo 
carrier built in 1979, left Yokohama, bound for Pusan in South Korea, with a passage plan 
that allowed for a safe voyage but, by the following day, the Master was concerned that she 
was running late and, therefore, took the commercial decision to shorten the voyage time by 
some 40 minutes by taking the channel between the island of Biro Shima and the 
promontory of Kashiwa Shima. The purpose was very clear: it was in the interests of his 
employer to restore the time schedule to that envisaged at the time when they had calculated 
the profitability of the voyage. Having altered course he entered the channel at 02.50 on the 
3rd May ± but then, disastrously, the ship lost all images on her starboard radar. He 
apparently realised that he was now in a precarious position and made a command response 
to abort the passage through the channel. This manoeuvre was not successful, though and 
the ship struck bottom off Biro Shima with such force that her speed was immediately 
slowed from 15 knots to some 6 or 7 knots.  
 
Shortly afterwards the ship took a list to port with water discovered in the forward ballast 
tanks and cargo holds. The Master ordered the pumps activated but he did not alert the 
Japanese Coastguard, as he should have done, or seek other assistance. The ship then sailed 
at close to full speed for a further two hours, some 22 nautical miles, before anchoring in a 
sheltered bay. It was only then that the Master contacted the ship managers in Greece, 
without, however, specifying the cause of damage or its full extent.  
 
7KH&RXUW¶VHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHHYLGHQFHDERXWWKH0DVWHU¶VJRRGIDLWKZDVQRWFRPIRUWLQJ
His initial explanation of the casualty had been that the ship had hit an unidentified floating 
object and the Court heard that he then schooled the crew to adopt this explanation in the 
inquiry conducted by the Japanese Coastguard, in the course of which the truth eventually 
emerged. Mr Justice Williams took the view that his initial decision to use the passage east 
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of Biro Shima and his subsequent attempt to abort the transit, were navigational decisions 
which he had, indeed, taken in good faith - he was endeavouring to save time and keep to 
VFKHGXOH LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK KLV FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQV WR PHHW WKH VKLS PDQDJHUV¶
legitimate demands. Where he abandoned his good intentions lay in his actions after the 
grounding, held the Judge; in particular his failure to notify promptly the Coastguard and 
KLVPDQDJHUVRIWKHFDVXDOW\DQGWKHVKLS¶VSRVLWLRQDQGFRQGLWLRQPRUHVHULRXVO\VWLOOIRU
its implications of dishonesty, in his fabrication of the story that the ship had hit an 
unidentified submerged object, which could not have been motivated by his paramount duty 
to the safety of the ship, crew and cargo. The whole sum of his conduct, the Judge held, 
 
was intended to allow him to misrepresent and lie about the true circumstances 
of the casualty so as to absolve himself from blame and in particular to hide his 
reckless decision to transit the inside channel of Biro Shima Island in order to 
take a short cut route128« 
 
For all its blatancy in terms of gross negligence, the uncomfortable theme clearly 
establishes the priority given by the Master to his obligation towards the commercial 
success of the voyage. Where there is a risk to his own exposure to prosecution, the Master 
must rapidly make a risk-benefit analysis ± will the risk to his personal position outweigh 
the commercial pressure, or vice versa? 
 
Intriguingly, the Hague-Visby Rules have been challenged in the form of the new 
Rotterdam Rules. Currently only two of the 24 signatories have ratified this Treaty129 and so 
another 18 States must ratify, but it has been the subject of much discussion, nevertheless. 
The principle of fault-based liability for loss of or damage to goods has been maintained but 
elimination of the nautical fault defence exposes the Owner to the full force of the principle 
of vicarious liability. The challenge confronting the global maritime community in the 
ratification of yet another body of statutory limitation rules is a recurrent theme which 
divides opinion on the new Rules130. 
 
The LVVXHSHQHWUDWHVGHHSHUVWLOOLQWRWKH2ZQHU¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVVZLWKWKHLVVXHRIFRUSRUDWH
manslaughter. With the evolution of the crime of criminal negligence, the Master may well 
be arraigned on an indictment with the downstream consequence of incriminating the 
Owner in a very serious crime indeed. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that modern 
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 See Lloyd¶s List, 11 October 2011, Legal Experts urge Brussels to redraft Rotterdam Rules/OR\G¶V
List, Informa plc 
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maritime management practice identifies a priority in putting clear water between them and 
the Master when it comes to corporate accountability, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
The Tasman Pioneer case leaves a great many questions of unfinished business in the 
0DVWHU¶VU{OHLQFRPPHUFLDOULVN 
 
 84 
(ii) The influence of Corporate Accountability 
 
Overview 
 
Corporate accountability does not lend itself to precise definition, but has been well 
summarised by Swift as addressing the requirement or duty to provide an account or 
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRURQH¶VDFWLRQVWRZKRPHYHURQHLVDQVZHUDEOH1317KHµZKRPHYHU¶KDVFRPH
to be known as the stakeholder; just who satisfies that definition naturally has been the 
subject of litigation in negligence for generations, but the Neighbour Principle in Donoghue 
v Stevenson must offer the best guidance in the context of this work: a stakeholder will be 
somebody so closely and direFWO\DIIHFWHGE\WKH&RPSDQ\¶VDFWWKDWLWVKRXOGUHDVRQDEO\
foresee that they would be so-affected132. With the implementation of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, corporate accountability for the crime of 
manslaughter has taken on statutory form, which satisfies the normative ethics of a society 
that demands redress for catastrophic events such as the Herald of Free Enterprise and the 
Marchioness, but at the cost of the nerves of ship operators. This chapter charts the decline 
and fall of the relationship, culminating in a study of the issues for combating piracy ± the 
current event which might just make or break the relationship.     
 
The Exxon Valdez Experience 
 
In the Exxon Valdez case, the corporate accountability for the Master¶VFRQGXFW± or what 
was perceived to be his conduct ± was illustrated very clearly indeed. At about 9 minutes 
past midnight on the 24th March 1989, the vessel, loaded with about 1,263,000 barrels of 
crude oil, ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, on the coast of Alaska. 
There were no personal injuries, but about 258,000 barrels of oil spilled into the sea when 
eight cargo tanks ruptured. Damage to the vessel was estimated at $25 million and the lost 
cargo cost about $3.4 million ± while the clean-up cost during 1989 was $1.85 billion. It 
was the worst pollution event in American history at that date, contaminating more than 
1,300 miles of coastline, destroying the livelihoods of people dependent upon fishing and 
subsistence hunting in the region and killing hundreds of thousands of birds and marine 
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mammals; as recently as April 2010 scientists had discovered that residual spill was still 
being ingested by wildlife and would persist in threatening vulnerable species for 
decades133.  
 
The National 7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ 6DIHW\ %RDUG¶V LQYHVWLJDWLRQ FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH ILYH
probable causes of the grounding, only one of which incriminated the Owner in that it had 
failed to supervise the Master and provide a rested and sufficient crew for the vessel134. But 
WKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRI([[RQ¶VFXOSDELOLW\ZDVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHRULJLQDORUGHURIWKH)HGHUDO
Court that it pay $5 billion in punitive damages. A Federal Appeal in 2006 halved it to $2.5 
billion and, it must be said, the US Supreme Court further reduced the punitive award to 
just over $500 million in 2008. More than $2 billion had been spent on clean-up and 
recovery, while Exxon paid at least $1 billion in damages overall.  
 
There is no doubt that the Company, therefore, faced harsh corporate accountability for the 
spill, while Captain Hazelwood had to accept responsibility as Master, when the Coast 
Guard suspended his certificate for a period of nine months. He was charged with being 
drunk at the time of the grounding, although he was acquitted at his Trial, but was convicted 
of a misdemeanour of negligent discharge of oil, for which he was fined $50,000 and 
sentenced to 1,000 hours of community service. His employer dismissed him. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Owner of a crude tanker would view the Exxon Valdez case as a study 
in the need for caution ± and the accountability for the consequence of a risk management 
failure. ,QWKHFDVHRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUWKHLU0DVWHU¶VQHJOLJHQFHWKRXJKWKH\KDGDVRXQG
argument to excuse themselves from liability. Mindful of thH 0DVWHU¶V XQDVVDLODEOH
authority in the safe navigation of the vessel, the Owner could argue persuasively that it 
could not overrule the Master in their duty of care and, therefore, the Owner should be 
SURWHFWHG IURP OLDELOLW\ LQ WKH HYHQW RI WKH0DVWHU¶V negligence. This persists as the core 
feature of the nautical fault defence in the Hague-Visby Rules; what horrifies the 
shipowning community is the current evolutionary creep of international statutory limitation 
provisions, by which the Rotterdam Rules sweep away the long-established nautical fault 
defence, with the result that the carrier will be liable for all or part of the loss, damage or 
delay if the Claimant proves that the event set forth is subsequent to a fault of the carrier or 
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their Master. If the bill of lading in the Tasman Pioneer case135 had fallen under the 
Rotterdam Rules instead of Hague-Visby, the Owners would have been hard-pressed to 
SHUVHYHUHZLWK WKHDUJXPHQW WKDW WKHLUYLFDULRXV OLDELOLW\VKRXOGQRWDSSO\ WR WKH0DVWHU¶V
gross misconduct, even though the damage to the deck cargo had occurred as a consequence 
RIWKH0DVWHU¶VHIIRUWVWRSURWHFWKLVRZQLQWHUHVWVUDWKHUWKDQWKHLUV 
 
The shipowner identifies a greater mischief still with the evolution of the law of criminal 
negligence against the Master, should the Master incriminate them in a crime under the new 
Corporate Manslaughter Act136, whose origins stemmed from public and political 
unhappiness with the corporate positions presented in the Herald of Free Enterprise and 
Marchioness disasters, among others. The offence is committed if the way in which the 
CRPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGcauses a person's death, and amounts to a 
gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. Liability 
for the death no longer must be attributed to the conviction of manslaughter against a 
member of the controlling mind of the CRPSDQ\EXWE\DµPDQDJHPHQWIDLOXUH¶LQYROYLQJD
person who plays a significant rôle in the making of decisions about how the activities are 
to be managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a 
substantial part of those activities. The Master fits perfectly this definition. If a person is 
killed, and particularly if the Master is confronted with allegations of criminal negligence, 
that may be used in evidence against their employer, the shipowner, in order to establish 
that there was a management failure giving rise to the crime of corporate manslaughter. The 
8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO137 published guidelines in 2010 which stated that the 
fine which would likely be imposed upon the convicted company would seldom be less than 
£500,000 and could be measured in millions of pounds.  
 
Such threats encourage the owner to distance themselves from the Master as far as they 
possibly can, for, if the owner is to be held vicariously liable for such negligence then the 
consequences in terms of damages may result in punishment which the maritime world had 
seen first imposed in the Exxon Valdez case, involving fines, punishing compensation 
claims, and plunging share values with which to contend. 
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The frightful fiend now treading close behind the Master has taken form and substance in 
the dilemma revealing itself in a very real drama currently confronting the maritime 
community, arising out of the need for some self-protection against piracy. In a situation in 
which the Master is responsible for the safety of life and the property of the vessel herself, 
they are keenly aware of the risks in meeting that responsibility when attacked by pirates ± 
and the shipowner may be held equally accountable by virtue of their relationship with the 
Master. 
 
The Stress-test of Piracy 
When our friends China Navigation Company acquired the Bank Line from Andrew Weir 
Shipping in 2006, the assets which passed to the new Owners included the Teignbank, a 
multi-purpose cargo ship that had been converted for round-the-world service from an 
Arctic freighter built for the Soviet Union in 1984. China Navigation renamed her 
Boularibank but, with the global economic downturn, her last round-the-world service was 
scheduled for the spring of 2009. She was on this last run, under the command of her UK-
certificated Master, Captain Peter Stapleton, with a mainly-Russian crew of 31 including 
four British cDGHWVDQGFDUU\LQJHOHYHQSDVVHQJHUVDQGWKH0DVWHU¶V wife, when, on the 28th 
April, 120 miles northeast of Socotra Island at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden, Captain 
Stapleton saw, on the radar, a green blip travelling in the wrong direction. It might have 
been innocent fishermen ± but turned out to be Somali pirates, and two skiffs were launched 
from the mother vessel, closing rapidly on the Boularibank at a speed of some 26 knots. 
Captain Stapleton realised that they could not out-run the pirates, so he carried out evasive 
manoeuvres, while under fire from the assailants' assault rifles and rocket-grenades, one of 
which exploded above the bridge138.  
&DSWDLQ 6WDSOHWRQ ZDV RI FRXUVH DFXWHO\ DZDUH RI WKH ULVN WR WKH OLYHV RI WKH VKLS¶V
company and the passengers ± the safety of life being the overwhelming issue in his 
responsibility as Master. He was also aware that current law left him naked to do more than 
prepare to repel the pirates with the sort of force to which merchant ships are limited both 
by convention and by domestic laws. Risk management procedures were put in place in 
accordance with these limitations, which involved turning the fire hoses on the attackers, 
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and EXQGOHV RI KHDY\ WLPEHU EDXONV ZHUH KXQJ RQ URSHV RYHU WKH VKLS¶V VLGH EHKLQG WKH
forecastle, while container twistlocks were made ready to throw; then the outside staircases 
were blocked by ropes, all outside watertight doors were closed, and the passengers were 
ordered to hide in the corridors behind the wheelhouse. Captain Stapleton then steered his 
22-year old ship on a zig-zag course, creating a wash to keep the pirates' boats away.  
The attack failed and the pirates broke off. Captain Stapleton was later awarded the UK 
Merchant Navy Medal for exceptional bravery during the attack. A Russian destroyer 
captured 29 suspected pirates shortly afterwards; but there was little more that the naval 
protection force could do. The pirates were disarmed, and then had to be released.  That is 
the current law and, for the Master, it is a minefield which could lead to their accountability 
for the most serious crimes if they get it wrong. 
Piracy in this context is defined by UNCLOS Article 101 as consisting of any illegal acts of 
violence or detention committed for private ends by persons on a private ship, whether they 
call themselves crew or passengers, and directed against another ship either on the high 
seas, or at least in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. This definition has been 
incorporated into English law by virtue of s26 Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security 
Act 1997 and, accordingly, applied to the venerable statutory provisions which will be 
enforced against a person who commits an act of piracy, and it matters not which is the Flag 
State of the pirate ship or the innocent vessel139. According to the legal theory of English 
criminal law, the offender may be arrested, tried and punished, in this case, in the Crown 
Court140, even though the alleged offence took place in international waters. If the offending 
activity took place within the jurisdiction of UK territorial waters, then the Defendant will 
be arraigned on the charge in domestic law of robbery, under the Theft Act 1968141 and 
tried in the Crown Court, irrespective of which State had allocated its flag to the innocent 
vessel142. In terms of Sovereign State jurisdiction, this is an obvious example of the 
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common-sense application of the clear statement rule143. 
 
By the same token, any act taken by the innocent party resulting in death or personal injury 
to the assailant may be subject to accountability in the same jurisdiction. As a result, the 
Master of the innocent vessel will remain accountable to the laws of the Flag State, or the 
Port State under the clear statement rule for the death of the individual, and if a defence 
such as self-defence failed, then the Master would be exposed to a sentence for murder, if 
malice aforethought is established, or manslaughter if it is not. Even if the defence is 
successful and the Master is acquitted, they may have spent years on remand in custody in 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV RU FRQGLWLRQV ZKLFK ZRXOG EH XQUHFRJQLVDEOH WR WKH UHDGHU RI WKH ,02¶V
Guidelines on the fair treatment of seafarers. To the shipowner, the contract of employment 
PD\ZHOO LQFULPLQDWHWKHPRQ WKHEDVLVRIWKH0DVWHU¶VGHIHQFHWKDW WKH\ were protecting 
the property and employees of the owner as their employee, representative and agent and 
the resultant death occurred because of a management failure to preserve the assailant from 
death during the offending activity144. 
 
It may not be justice, but it is the law; as such, the issue of protection is fraught with 
difficulty. Notwithstanding that the Master may possess a firearms certificate granted by the 
Flag State, by Section 13, Firearms Act 1968, the Master may, without holding a certificate, 
have in their possession a firearm or ammunition on board a ship, but only as part of the 
equipment of the ship. As such this has traditionally been defined to mean distress flares 
and, in any event, is dependent upon how the MCA would view the provision of firearms 
IRU DSSURYDO LQ WKH VKLS¶V VHFXULW\ SODQ DV UHTXLUHG E\ the International Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS). The prevailing Marine Guidance Note145 containing guidance on this 
issue explained the hazards somewhat dramatically in its strong discouragement of carrying 
and using firearms on board at all146. 
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Even if the Master were held lawfully to be in possession of such weapons while on board 
the vessel, when she comes alongside in the port of another State, the question begs itself as 
to what will be the consequence in law. While a Flag State has the power to make laws 
granting powers permitting their merchant ships to carry firearms, the acknowledgement of 
such by a Port State may be open to question. As one example, the Master of a merchant 
ship arriving at a South African port, which has firearms on board, must apply for a permit 
from the South African Police 21 days prior to their arrival in South Africa147. How the 
procedure is to work in practice remains somewhat unclear, for example, in the situation in 
which the charterer had not even nominated her port of discharge at the time when she had 
left her port of loading. 
 
In fact the issue of carrying firearms on board a vessel at all is fraught with difficult 
questions, not the least being how secure are the firearms in the right hands, and how 
hazardous would it be if the firearms somehow got into the wrong hands on a voyage? If, in 
a pirate attack, a member of the crew fired a weapon and some personal injury was 
inflicted, whether intended oUQRWDQGZKHWKHURUQRWGXHWRWKHFUHZ¶VLQH[SHULHQFHZLWKD
firearm, the Master would still be held accountable, very possibly for criminal negligence. 
Worse still for the shipowner, they would be incriminated as WKH 0DVWHU¶V HPSOR\HU IRU
whom they were playing a significant rôle in the making of decisions about how the 
VKLSRZQHU¶V DFWLYLWLHV ZHUH PDQDJHG RU RUJDQLVHG DQG VXFK PDQDJHPHQW IDLOXUH FRXOG
result in the dread consequence of a conviction for corporate manslaughter, with all that 
entails in the form of fines, subsequent compensation claims, and the publicity ultimately 
affecting the share price. 
 
For all of these reasons, shipowners have recently developed a cunning plan to employ 
privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships, to minimise the risk of a 
hijacking and deliver a higher level of self-defence. Encouragingly, such attention to the 
problem lends VXSSRUW IRU WKH 0DVWHU¶V SRVLWLRQ; the trouble is that the risks of criminal 
accountability have not gone away for the shipowner or operator.  For this reason, in May 
 WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0DULWLPH 2UJDQLVDWLRQ µ,02¶ KXUULHGO\ SXEOLVKHG LQWHULP
                                                                      
extension to other claims in a piracy situation are very limited. Perhaps the most useful recent case was 
Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd [2010] EWHC 280 in which the High Court held, that 
kidnap and ransom cover is a longstanding and important feature of the insurance market, and can be 
enforced, while the payments of ransom were recoverable strictly as a sue and labour expense. But while 
this may comfort the shipowner, it does little to assist the Master. 
147
 Firearms Control Act 2000 
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guidance148, in which it emphasised the importance that Flag State jurisdiction and thus any 
laws and regulations imposed by the Flag State concerning the use of such private security 
forces will apply to their vessels. It further emphasised that the laws of Port and Coastal 
States may apply, obviously when their sovereign jurisdictions are involved, either if the 
vessel is in those waters of if their nationals are shot. And the UK Government had 
µVWURQJO\GLVFRXUDJHG¶ WKHSURYLVLRQRIVXFKPHDVXUHVRQERDUGVKLSV149 ± in Government 
jargon, this meant that the UK Government would not assist in the event of some 
consequence arising out of their use. 
 
%XW ZH OLYH LQ LQWHUHVWLQJ WLPHV )LQDQFLDO SUHVVXUHV KDYH VWUHWFKHG WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V
defence capability beyond the point at which the Royal Navy can cost-effectively protect 
UK flag vessels, even in high risk regions. Such considerations added weight to the urgency 
pleaded by shipowners in the UK fleet for protection against piracy attacks, many of whom 
had already resolved to provide armed protection on their ships with the use of the private 
security forces against which the IMO had cautioned. As a result, at the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting in October 2011, the British Prime Minister announced a 
radical change in policy, to permit UK flag ships to be licensed, if they (that is, the 
shipowner) wish, in order to have armed security guards on board their ships. 
 
For the Master, this barely provides a fig leaf for protection in law. The importance of 
maintaining the unassailability of the position of the Master Under God is a key feature of 
any guidance, for, naturally, the Master will remain responsible for all consequences, from 
the very possession of a firearm to the death of an individual, hence the IMO cautioned the 
shipowner to ensure that the command and control structure linking the ship operator, the 
Master, the ship's officers and the contract security team leader has been clearly defined and 
documented ± for the purpose of establishing the critical evidence should a Trial follow 
some event. 
 
)RUDOOWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHHIILFLHQWVKLSERDUGPDQDJHPHQWRf 
such security protection, exposure to Flag State law remains if the vessel is attacked in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ZDWHUV DQG WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V OLFHQFH ZLOO FDUU\ OLWWOH ZHLJKW ZLWK WKH
DXWKRULWLHV LQ RWKHU 3RUW 6WDWHV ,Q UHVSRQVH WR WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW¶V DQQRXQFHPHnt, the 
Egyptian Government promptly announced that it would not permit armed merchant vessels 
                         
148
 MSC.1/Circ.1405 23 May 2011: Interim guidance to shipOwners, ship operators, and shipmasters on 
the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area 
149
 See MGN 420(M): para 5: The UK Government strongly discourages the carriage and use of firearms 
onboard UK registered ships for the protection of personnel or for the protection of the ship and/or its 
cargo. 
 92 
to proceed through the Suez Canal, whether or not they possessed a licence issued by the 
Flag State.  This starkly highlights the point that tensions between Flag State and Port State 
have not gone away ± DQG WKH 0DVWHU¶V FULPLQDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ PD\ MXVW EH XQGHUOLQHG
further, if the defence of a vessel results in the breach of Port State laws, exposing the 
Master to risk of prosecution and, quite possibly, imprisonment ± let alone breaches of Flag 
State obligations, for the Master will still be held to account for the deaths of individuals 
according to Flag State laws.  
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(iii) The Loss of the Relationship: Risk and Responsibility on the Owner 
 
We have seen150 how the General Steam Navigation Company was formed on the basis of 
FRUSRUDWHRZQHUVKLSE\ZKLFK LQGLYLGXDOV¶ OLDELOLWLHV DUH OLPLWHG WR WKH VKDUHZKLFK WKH\
have invested by virtue of the cash payment committed. With this in mind, the Company 
must consider how to convey to investors the best argument for putting their money with 
them. Continuing with the story of General Steam illustrates this business in context: with 
the end of the First World War a rebuilding programme was essential, and ten, fine new 
ships were ordered for the fleet for Continental trading from London and Southampton, but 
the cost was a crippling burden to the Company, coming at a time when there was bitter 
rivalry for the work that was coming out of a European Continent that was struggling to 
rebuild itself. It was at that stage, that the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company entered the scene. P & O could command a great deal of funding, but needed 
European business to fill their ships; General Steam had the strongest agency business in 
Europe to fill their ships, but needed funding. So it was, that, in late 1920, P & O bought the 
controlling interest in General Steam: the investment aspirations both for General Steam 
and for P & O were satisfied151. 
 
But the owners of the ships were still General Steam; P & O merely owned shares in that 
Company in the same way as any legal individual; they were part shareholders in the body 
which owned the assets and were not, themselves, at risk for criminal accountability for the 
&RPSDQ\¶V DFWV Rr omissions. When P & O bought the remaining shareholding in 1976, 
there was no such gulf in liability, for they were now the asset-holders and, thus, were the 
controlling mind; in consequence, P & O Ferries were the controlling mind which was 
accountable for the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise, even though they had only 
acquired the Owners, Townsend Car Ferries, a month previously152.  
 
And thereby hangs a tale. The Herald FDVHDQGLQSDUWLFXODU-XVWLFH6KHHQ¶VFRPPHQWVLQ
the Inquiry, sent shock-waves through the industry, but the corporate liability issue should 
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 See p 35 supra 
151
 In fact, the relationship between General Steam and P & O pre-dated this by some years, and had been 
reached by a somewhat tortuous route. As ever, the world of merchant shipping is intricately intertwined 
with strands of influence and, impressed with General Steam many years before the acquisition, James 
Lyle Mackay, later Lord Inchcape,  had bought shares in the company. He was almost entirely responsible 
for the merger of  P&O and the British India Steam Navigation Company  in 1914, when he became 
Chairman and Managing Director of the entire group ± and it was from then that P&O acquired its 
influence. 
152
 mv Herald of Free Enterprise. Report of Court No. 8074. Formal Investigation (July 1987), page 2: At 
the time of the casualty the HERALD was owned by Townsend Car Ferries Limited, which was a 
subsidiary of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
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not have come as any surprise; after all, the idea of the single ship company had developed 
in the nineteenth century to protect assets from legal risk. 
 
It was the Exxon Valdez casualty which awoke the maritime world to the measure of 
damages associated with a crude spill, with the shipowner embroiled in litigation for the 
next 20 years. On reflection,  the response of any shipowner must logically ask the question, 
How could the risk be managed both as to liability and quantum? The management board, 
of course, ultimately has to protect the assets, in the terms of shareholder value, and so 
would have adopted the customary management procedures of considering the treatment 
options: 
 
1 Should they do nothing? This option would invariably have to be discarded in such 
circumstances. 
2 Should they terminate the risk? Realistically, this would mean abandoning shipping 
operations, which would have to be discarded ± they have to move their cargoes about the 
ZRUOGDQGFKDUWHULQJRWKHUSHRSOH¶VVKLSVZRXOGVLPSO\QRWbe cost-effective. 
3 They could transfer the risk, in terms of insurance ± there is already compulsory 
insurance in place to a minimum level for crude spills, and additional cover is frequently 
DGRSWHGLQWKHLQGXVWU\SURYLGHGE\WKHVKLSRZQHU¶VSURWHFWLRQDQGLQGHPQLW\DVVRFLDWLRQ
although they might not want to consider total cover, which might incur unacceptably high 
premiums. 
4 How might they then treat the risk, that is, do something about it? A management 
adviser might counsel ways to treat the risk of liability in two ways: 
i They might distance themselves from the person with management control on the 
vessel, the Master, who, of course, has absolute discretion in their navigational judgment 
and, so, the Owner might say, We cannot be blamed because we cannot tell the Master how 
to do their job; 
ii They might minimise the risk by avoiding liability without losing the value of the 
DVVHW¶VSURILWDELOLW\7KLVZRXOGQHFHVVLWDWHVRPHFUHDWive thinking on just how to go about 
asset management ± and the Post-War world offered the solution in a new generation of 
VROXWLRQV ZLWK LQGHSHQGHQW UHJLVWHUV ZKHUH D µEUDVV SODWH¶ FRPSDQ\ LQ DQ RIIVKRUH 6WDWH
complied with the laws of the Flag State jurisdiction which regulated the ships, as well as 
their tax liabilities, and the net profits would then be repatriated to the shareholders who 
still held the investment in the principal company, the original Owner, which now exercised 
simple control by managing the brass plate business. 
 
In fact, in this context the principal company did not even have to conduct the ship 
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management function itself ± such could be outsourced, to any of a growing number of 
companies ready, willing and able to operate vessels, who would tender highly competitive 
bids for the work, and as the competition for that work grew stronger with more joining the 
field, so the competitive tendering grew more cut-throat still. In truth, a number of the 
traditional shipowners had decided that they could no longer generate a satisfactory profit in 
shipowning operations and would serve their shareholders better by selling the hardware ± 
the ships themselves ± thus creating a windfall, and concentrating on independent ship 
management. Each company which followed suit, increased the competition for the job of 
PDQDJLQJDQ2ZQHU¶VVKLSV 
 
So what would be the benefit of owning and operating the ships, in the traditional way? If 
the operator / manager assumed responsibility for operational risk, they may well have to 
defend proceedings arising out of negligence ± possibly criminal negligence - but the 
Owner, an entirely separate entity, could not be held liable to a Judgment creditor or a Court 
and thus risk the asset value of the vessel. 
 
The operator saw the situation as delivering an income using the skills resources in their 
business, while they did not have the value of the asset on their Balance Sheet, while the 
OwnHU FRXOG QRW GHULYH D SURILW IURP WKH VKLS¶V WUDGLQJ DFWLYLWLHV EXW VWLOO UHFHLYHG a 
valuable return in the form of profits associated with a lease of the ship ± a lump sum 
premium and a regular fee. 
 
It was the ship operator managing her, who really had the relationship with the Master now, 
establishing the contractual relationship and giving the management instructions.  And the 
world was taking note; hence, in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the UK makes the 
manager liable for operational violations153. 
 
The business of maritime economics keeps the profitability of the maritime adventure under 
constant review, to maximise profit for the minimum risk. The complexities that result from 
creative management strategies, though, can be bewildering. We may take the example of 
the Triciolor154, a single screw Pure Car Truck Carrier grossing 46,792 tons, which was 
built at Tsuneishi in 1987. She was registered in Tønsberg, under the Norwegian 
                         
153
 See, eg, s100 making the Owner liable for the unsafe operation of a ship but if the ship is bareboat 
chartered, or is managed, either wholly or in part, by a person other than the Owner under the terms of a 
management agreement, then the bareboat charterer or the manager will be liable. 
154
 Naturally the ultimate purpose of establishing ownership and responsibility lay in the dispute resolution 
process; in this case reference is made to the remarkable United States decision in Otal Investments Ltd v 
mv Tricolor 08-3031 (an appeal in March 2012 held that the Court found no error in the District Court's 
allocation of liability). 
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independent flag. She was owned by Capital Bank, Scotland, who had nothing to do with 
her management or operation, though, for she was on bareboat-charter to Wilhelm 
:LOKHOPVHQ ZKLFK IDU IURP EHLQJ D UHFNOHVV RSHUDWRU UDQNV WRGD\ DV RQH RI 1RUZD\¶V
leading centres of maritime expertise and a leading international supplier of maritime 
transport. Commercial operation was conducted by Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines AS, a 
company established in 1999 and owned jointly by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen and 
Walleniusrederierna AB, Stockholm but manning and technical management was 
contracted to Barber Ship Management AS, Oslo. Her Master was a Norwegian national, 
who commanded 22 Philippino crew. But this is all part of the management function in 
maritime economics with which Governments have not interfered. 
 
So the Owner now has come a long way from the traditional image of nineteenth century 
operations, with the effect of divesting itself of WKH ULVN DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH YHVVHO¶V
QDYLJDWLRQEXWWKH0DVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDOQHJOLJHQFHUHPDLQVXQWRXFKHG7KHUHVXOW LV WKDW
the operator, not the Owner, has little vested interest in protecting the Master ± it is not any 
asset on their Balance Sheet which the Master is controlling ± but the assumption of 
OLDELOLW\ IRU WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V YLRODWLRQV ZRXOG VWLOO GDPDJH WKHLU SURILW
stream, in terms of Court Orders on liability and quantum of damages. 
 
Why, then, should the manager take such a risk? It is a rhetorical question, of course, for 
this entire process has had the effect of distancing the Master from the Owner who may 
avoid or mitigate corporate accountability in criminal prosecutions and vicarious liability in 
civil claims, and the operator / manager has scant incentive to assume such a burden of 
liability, instead responding to the risk management function in a way which leaves the 
Master exposed. 
 
TKHHYLGHQFHFRQILUPVWKH0DVWHU¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHULVN6HDIDUHUV¶5LJKWVInternational, an 
independent organisation with a focus on the law concerning seafarers, conducted a survey 
of 3,480 seafarers, which was undertaken in the 12 months to the end of February 2012. 
Almost 24 per cent of Masters who responded to the questionnaire stated that they had 
faced criminal charges during this period, while 87 per cent of seafarers who faced charges 
relating to the discharge of their professional duties said that they did not have legal 
representation155. In truth, after copious research there is scant evidence that the Owner has 
SURYLGHG IRU WKH 0DVWHU¶V OHJDO GHIHQFH LQ UHFHQW \HDUV DOWKRXJK WKHUH LV D crumb of 
comfort in the last of the traditional treatment options, by transferring the risk to insurers; in 
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 http://www.seafarersrights.org/tag/criminalisation/ 
 
 97 
the case of Captain Mangouras, remanded in custody in Spain pending the criminal 
investigation into the Prestige disaster, the bail was secured by a bank guarantee, arranged 
not by the Owner but by its P & I Club. But that still does not diminish the risk of criminal 
accountability.  
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(iv) The Master and the Business of Commercial Risk 
 
Overview 
 
'HYHORSLQJ WKH WKHPHV ZKLFK RULJLQDWH LQ SUHYLRXV FKDSWHUV WKH 0DVWHU¶V SRWHQWLDO IRU
criminal accountability, as a consequence of commercial risk, is examined in the context of 
contemporary maritime operations, taking as a study the emerging maritime environment in 
WKH+LJK$UFWLF7KLVVHFWLRQSXWVLQFRQWH[WWKH0DVWHU¶VU{OHLQWKHEXVLQHVVRIPDULWLPH
commerce in the twenty first century, presenting a stark introduction to the following 
chapter, which is crucial to the work.    
 
 
The Rationale 
 
The business of maritime commerce has always been in motion; sometimes fast, or slow, 
depending on the maritime economic cycle, it is constantly driven by tensions of 
competition, with rival Owners anxious to return a profit on their assets, by whatever means 
possible. That necessarily involves exploiting all the advantages that might be available 
either in reducing costs or increasing liquid assets and, in their unique rôle in the business 
of marine operations, the Master has the enormous advantage of being able to contribute by 
relating their skills and their expertise to the Owners¶REMHFWLYHV156. Where an opportunity 
for profitability arises, therefore, the Master needs to meet those objectives, and, 
necessarily, needs to adapt to change in order to meet them. In the twentieth century this 
was surely identified most keenly in the development of crude oil transport; the continuing, 
and continuingly insatiable, demand globally for crude as an indispensible part of industrial 
activity, has galloped into the twenty first century spurred on by the gathering realisation 
that crude oil supplies are dwindling, and becoming more expensive, thus providing the 
impetus for the development of resources in the High Arctic, and for transport through the 
Northwest Passage that can shorten voyage times dramatically, bringing down costs. While 
WKH0DVWHU¶VVNLOOVDQGH[SHUWLVHDUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKQHZFKDOOHQJHVLQH[SORLWLQJWKHVHQHZ
opportunities, they must meet the attendant commercial risks, which have been rendered 
enormous on the Master personally, thanks to the ethics which society has attached to the 
protection of the environment, and the attendant penalties that accompany such protection, 
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 Tallack, R, 1996, Commercial Management for Shipmasters, Nautical Institute, London, Chapter 1 
passim  
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in the form of criminal accountability.  
 
      
The Risk of Crude Oil Pollution 
 
The tanker is perhaps the most influential mode of cargo transport, due to the dependence of 
the world on its precious cargo - oil fuel has become blood to an industrialised society.  
Post-war, the earth's nations consuming vast quantities of oil naturally grew uneasy about 
their dependence on the whims of the crude-producing countries and so they wanted to 
establish refineries on their own territories as well as saving the cost of having the crude 
refined before reaching them.  Thus the import of crude was stimulated around the world.  
At the same time, oil had to be transported fast, regularly and at the lowest possible cost. 
 
The demand for oil that was generated by this brave new world encouraged naval architects 
to develop the ideas of economies of scale that had been born with ships such as the 
Narragansett, a dedicated tanker built as early as 1903, with a deadweight tonnage of 
12,500. The era of the supertanker only emerged after the Second WRUOG:DUZLWK%3¶V
British Adventure, built in 1951 and capable of lifting 28,000 tonnes of crude, making her 
the largest tanker in the world but, by 1957, Esso had developed the concept with orders for 
the 'City' class of twelve tankers, commencing with the Esso Guildford, handed-over in 
1957, capable of lifting 36,040 tons of crude. 
 
In the following years the mighty names in crude transport constantly out-paced each other 
in building ever-greater ships to satisfy the West's demand for petroleum. The remarkable 
thing is that, within ten years, crude carriers were being commissioned around the world 
that put those giants in the shade. When laid down in the United States in 1959, the Torrey 
Canyon had a deadweight capacity of 60,000 tonnes but she was later enlarged in Japan to 
120,000 tons capacity. In 1967, Esso ordered two ships of 193,000 deadweight tonnes, but 
they rapidly were overtaken by another order which Esso placed, for a tanker of 250,000 
deadweight tonnes. In that same year, the industry - the whole country - was sent into shock 
when, on the 18th March 1967, the Torrey Canyon ran aground on the Seven Rocks, off the 
Scilly Isles. Nine days later, the files of the British Government's statutory expert adviser, 
the Nature Conservancy, were reflecting on the desperate struggle to protect wildlife from 
the effects of the disaster. Ten months later, they were able to take stock of the long-term 
effects and reported that a total of 200 miles of coastline in Cornwall and Brittany had been 
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contaminated by at least 40,000 tons of Torrey Canyon oil in spring 1967157. Oil ending up 
on the shore had reached up to over 30 feet on exposed cliffs. The experts were horrified to 
discover, also, that the chemicals used to disperse the crude were just as toxic as the matter 
they was meant to destroy, and even extended damage to previously unpolluted areas. By 
the 13th May, 1968, the Government's Hazardous Cargoes Committee was making out the 
special case of oil. The Cabinet Office wanted a list of references relating to the effects of 
oil pollution on the environment and wanted to ensure that those on wildlife were covered. 
The effects of methods of treatment should not be included but they realised the difficulties 
of separating the references to the effects of oil and oil emulsifier on the environment and 
considered that although their remit did not go beyond oil pollution, they could point out in 
a covering note that measures employed to reduce oil pollution might present further 
hazards to wildlife. 
 
The damage to wildlife was horrendous. Taking an indicator species, the Atlantic Puffin, it 
was found that crude oil and chemicals actually combined to poison, drown and suffocate 
them. Then the poisons kill their food supplies in the delicate balance of nature, and those 
which had not been killed already, then starve.  As the fish stocks become lower, the puffin 
population must decrease proportionately - until it reaches the critical level below which the 
species could not be sustained. These findings were not restricted to studies following the 
Torrey Canyon disaster but have followed nearly every major crude pollution event, 
including the Exxon Valdez, the Sea Empress and the Prestige. The consistency in using the 
same indicator species adds compelling authority to the scientific findings158. 
 
7KH ULVNV RI FUXGH SROOXWLRQ ZHUH FUDYLQJ WKH ZRUOG¶V DWWHQWLRQ DQG WKH ZKHHOV RI
international law were grinding away slowly. In 1973 the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships was adopted, to become the MARPOL Convention. It 
was modified in 1978 and, today, is the most important global treaty for the prevention of 
pollution from the operation of ships, the backbone of international maritime environmental 
law, covering all the technical aspects of pollution from ships and governing the design and 
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equipment of ships, establishing a system of certificates and inspections and, crucially, 
obliging states to provide reception facilities for the disposal of oily waste and chemicals 
ashore. Its benefit is to regulate the discharge of toxic waste into the environment by routine 
operations. In fairness, when the problem takes the shape of a tanker breaking up on the 
URFNV RI D VHQVLWLYH FRDVWOLQH LQHYLWDEO\ LQ WKH JODUH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V WHOHYLVLRQ FDPHUDV
provisions for routine waste management do not help a great deal159.  
 
MARPOL had a difficult gestation and birth, partly involving the complexities in 
negotiations arising out of inconsistent priorities between States Parties, and within the 
GHFDGH WKH ZRUOG¶V PDULWLPe economies had other worries to contend with. By 1986, the 
Director-General of the General Council of British Shipping was saying that, in view of the 
barrage of blows that the UK fleet had suffered, it was remarkable that any British shipping 
companies had survived at all. But the crude carriers had carried on growing. Vessels such 
as the Seawise Giant were built to lift 560,000 tonnes of crude, with a service speed of 16 
knots, faster than many dry cargo ships a fraction of their size. Well-manned and 
maintained, supertankers are remote risks, and indeed have been proved to transport oil 
more safely than much smaller tankers; but when economics force operators to make 
savings, the risks rise alarmingly. 
 
 
The High Arctic 
 
Given the environmental risks inherent in crude oil pollution, the scale of the disaster 
presented by the unit size of these huge vessels feeds the human need to find somebody to 
blame, and when the damage is exacerbated by the very remoteness and pristine natural 
beauty of the environment, the phenomenon of human psychology demands criminal 
accountability. Professor E Scott Geller160 has drawn conclusions from the standpoint of 
psychology that there is hardly ever a single person to blame for such a disaster, but the 
human reaction is to demand that the alleged offender be punished by the criminal law, and 
a single person is already accountable in the person of the Master. How they discharge their 
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 For the sake of completeness, mention should be made of the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which was adopted in 1969 and amended by a protocol coming into 
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to compensate claimants who suffer oil pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties, and places 
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discharged. In terms of criminalisation, its relevance is limited. 
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accountability is a matter for them. In March 1989 the Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince 
William Sound on the Alaskan coast. Roger Howard161 estimated that, within five hours, at 
least 11 million gallons of crude oil had spilled into the sea, covering some 11,000 square 
miles of ocean that contaminated 1,200 miles of coastline. 80 per cent of the cargo stayed 
on board the vessel, though; LURQLFDOO\ WKDQNV ODUJHO\ WR WKH YHVVHO¶V 0DVWHU &DSWDLQ
Hazelwood, whom the US Coast Guard praised for exemplary handling of the stricken ship, 
which helped to prevent more cargo spilling into the sea and possibly saving human life as 
well162. Nevertheless, he was prosecuted by the State of Alaska on an indictment which 
included felonies of criminal mischief, operating the Exxon Valdez while intoxicated, and 
reckless endangerment, as well as a misdemeanour, or less serious charge, of negligently 
discharging oil. The Jury Trial lasted two months, resulting in his acquittal on all the 
charges except the misdemeanour, when he was sentenced to 1,000 hours of community 
service, which consisted of picking up rubbish along Alaskan roadside verges, and a 
compensation order of $50,000163. No other individual faced criminal charges, certainly 
nobody from Exxon, who promptly blamed their Master164. 
 
In fairness to the conscience of twenty first century society, the perceived risk to the 
environment in the Arctic is immense165, with difficulties in emergency response arising out 
of the very remoteness of the region, as was discovered to the horror of the response teams 
in the Exxon Valdez case166. In reality, though, the demands of twenty first century 
civilisDWLRQSUHVHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWDUHLUUHVLVWLEOHWRWKHWDQNHUVHFWRURIWKHZRUOG¶VIOHHW. 
Tanker Owners can identify such huge commercial opportunities that an environmental 
disaster may be viewed as an eminently manageable risk, that can be contained within 
tolerable levels of such financial cost which the ethics of society feel a suitable punishment 
WRSD\7KHULVNRIFLYLOFODLPVFDQEHWUDQVIHUUHGDGPLUDEO\WRWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VLQVXUHUV%\
contrast, the accountability of the Master remains a risk for their own personal assessment, 
and as the convenient individual available for blame, as Captain Hazelwood discovered at 
the hands of his former employer, and the Coastal State.  
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 %HKDU5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The environmental issues and the commercial issues in this region are immensely complex, 
and conflict between the two can be predicted with the inevitability of Greek tragedy. In 
2005, a joint project undertaken by the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science 
Committee published a 1,042-page report167 which warned that the reduction in sea ice in 
the region would have devastating consequences on the wildlife of the region; this would 
have a downstream consequence on the indigenous peoples who relied upon it as a food 
resource. But it also emphasised that the same reduction in sea ice would likely increase 
maritime commerce, both as to ships and access to resources which those ships would be 
lifting. The obvious consequence presents new employment opportunities for Masters, for 
whom their criminal accountability may be viewed as an occupational hazard. As the 
commercial opportunities for shipowners gather pace, the Flag State will be anxious to 
ensure that its obligations under international law are met. 
 
These obligations are clearly defined in UNCLOS, Part II Section 1 of which provides for 
the sovereign limits of a Coastal State to extend up to 12 nautical miles beyond its land 
territory and any archipelagic waters; in this area, known as the territorial sea, merchant 
vessels of all States have the rights of innocent passage, that is, so long as the voyage is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the Coastal State. That being said, Article 
21 authorises the Coastal State to exercise its jurisdiction over such vessels, essentially by 
statutory regulations managed by the Court process, in order to ensure  the SWDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQ
rights over matters including, amongst other things, the safety of navigation and the 
regulation of maritime traffic, the conservation of the living resources of the sea,  the 
prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State, the 
preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution, and the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration 
or sanitary laws and regulations of the Coastal State. Most importantly for the Master, 
Article 21.4 requires that ships of other Flag States exercising the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally 
accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. The key 
issue to bear in mind, is the focus on the obligation on ships, not their Master ± that is, the 
thing over which the Flag State has sovereign management control by reason of the 
allocation of its flag, in whom they have reposed their confidence in the Master who has 
been clothed with their certificate of competency. The importance in this distinction will 
become apparent in Section Four. 
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The powers of the Coastal State are addressed further by Article 27 which is cunningly 
drafted to limit the zeal of its Courts by stating that its criminal jurisdiction should not be 
exercised on board the vessel of another Flag State passing through the territorial sea to 
arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed 
on board the ship during its passage, save only if the consequences of the crime extend to 
the Coastal State; or if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good 
order of the territorial sea; or if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit 
traffic in proscribed drugs168 7KH 6WDWH PD\ DOVR µDVVLVW¶ DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ SHUKDSV
euphemistic, word employed in the Convention) if asked to do so by the Master or by a 
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the Flag State. 
 
Beyond the territorial sea, the Coastal State does not have any such powers, save those 
reserved for the exclusive economic zone defined in Part V of the Convention, confirming 
the Coastal SWDWHV¶VRYHUHLJQULJKWVfor the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, including those in the waters superjacent to the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil, EXW OLPLWLQJ WKH 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ WKDW LV LWV MXGLFLDO
enforcement, to protect installations and structures (such as drill rigs), the conduct of marine 
VFLHQWLILF UHVHDUFK DQG D VZHHSLQJ SURYLVLRQ IRU µRWKHU  ULJKWV DQG GXWLHV¶ GHILQHG LQ WKH
Convention. 
 
2IFRXUVHWKH&RDVWDO6WDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQFDQEHZHOO-established when the calculations of 
rights from the baseline are agreed by other States. Where there is no such Treaty, as in the 
High Arctic, the Master is sailing into potentially disputed waters. And we have not even 
touched upon the potential flashpoint of disputed boundary rights in international straits: in 
this case, the emerging North West Passage, which Part III of the Convention protects by 
requiring bordering States to respect by refraining from interrupting the rights of transit 
passage by a ship of another Flag State, save for the protection of safe navigation or the 
marine environment or resources, or the protection of health and immigration, customs and 
revenues. The relevance to the North West Passage lay in the issues between the United 
States and Canada; the former demands the transit rights through the Passage according to 
the provisions in UNCLOS for international straits; the latter asserts sovereignty over the 
Passage which lies, it argues, solidly within the definition of its archipelagic territory.  
 
The Master navigating through the High Arctic, therefore, will be very conscious of four 
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obligations: 
 
1. Their obligation to the Flag State as Master 
2. Their obligation to obsHUYHWKH3RUWRU&RDVWDO6WDWH¶VULJKWVLQWKHUHJLRQKRZHYHU
uncertain the geographical boundaries may be  
3. Their obligation to the shipowner as Agent as well as Employee 
4. Their obligation to protect their RZQLQWHUHVWVJLYHQWKHLQGXVWU\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWion 
of their criminalisation. 
 
The shipowner will be keenly aware of their obligations to the Flag State and to the various 
Port or Coastal States whose laws they will have to observe. It must come as no surprise, 
therefore, to follow the developments in design and propulsion of the ships that the 
shipowner is embracing, at huge cost but, of course, such expenditure is relative to the 
potential return; an eminently acceptable risk treatment option on any cost-benefit analysis 
and a hard-earned lesson from Grimshaw v Ford169. ,WLVEHOLHYHGWKDW)HGQDY¶VSURVSHFWLYH
Polar Capesize dry bulk carriers would be designed to operate in multi-year floes and cut 
through 1.8 metres of ice, but would cost as much as twice the price of a standard Capesize 
not built for the challenges of the High Arctic. When this concept turns to crude tankers, the 
stakes, of course, are much higher.  
 
For all that, Russia is well ahead in the development of tanker tonnage in the 
environmentally-sensitive High Arctic, where the fortunes to be made are astronomical, but 
so are the costs of making those fortunes. In the dawn of the twenty first century, the 
Russian crude giant Sovkomflot forged a joint venture with Swedish company Stena Bulk 
for the purpose of sharing in the development costs and profits of a new generation of 
WDQNHUV WR FDUU\ 5XVVLDQ FUXGH IURP WKH *XOI RI )LQODQG DQG 5XVVLD¶V +LJK 1RUWK WR WKH
European Continent. When the resultant flagship, Stena Arctica, was completed in 2005, 
VKH ZDV WKH ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW WDQNHU LQ KHU LFH class. Capable of lifting 117,100 tonnes of 
crude, though, the Owners were taking no chances, with a heavily reinforced hull that is 
wide-bodied and shallow, so that she can minimise risk when navigating through hazardous 
waters, and a propulsion system massively over-specified than that for normal tankers, 
helping her to get out of trouble as fast as she got into it. The vast achievements of 
                         
169
 Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 757: 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw barely 
escaped with his life from a flaming Ford Pinto which had been built with potentially fatal safety problems, 
ZKLFK)RUGKDGDOOHJHGO\F\QLFDOO\WUHDWHGZLWKWKHILUVWULVNRSWLRQRIµ'RQRWKLQJ¶IROORZLQJDFRVW-
benefit analysis. A California jury passed a $126 million civil judgment for Richard, setting a benchmark 
for Punitive Damages awards (although the saga of such awards was subsequently ameliorated by Romo v. 
Ford Motor Co., Calif. App. Ct., Fifth App. Dist., No. F034241 (2003) and State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 31 PSLR 321 (2003).  
 106 
technology have certainly transformed the business of navigation but if vigilance and care 
are relaxed, if the most advanced scientific aids to navigation fail the officer of the watch, 
the old sea demons of storm, rock, shoal, ice and fire lie in wait170.  
 
The opportunities presented by global warming encouraged Russian initiative to develop 
exponentially in this environment. In December 2009, the Russian Government released a 
press story to the newswires that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had launched an oil tanker 
which was capable of slicing through over a metre of ice, bringing Russia a step toward its 
decade-long ambition to launch its first offshore oilfield in the Arctic. The Kirill Lavrov had 
been designed for Sovkomflot in a masterly sweep of lateral thinking; the naval architects 
have developed a theory ± in fact, evolutionary rather than revolutionary as the original idea 
is nearly a century old - using a specially designed ice-breaking stern in heavy ice and a 
bow for open water. As a shuttle tanker, especially designed to transport oil by sea from 
Russia's offshore oil fields in the Arctic, she is capable of lifting 70,000 tonnes of crude. 
Dually classed with Lloyd's Register and the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, she 
and her sister, Mikhail Ulyanov can reach a speed of 16 knots moving ahead in open waters, 
but can break through ice 1.2 metres thick when moving astern at a speed of three knots, 
shuttling the crude drilled to the buyers' orders, all year round, irrespective of winter ice.  
 
The regulatory demands are high, as the international community demands in the modern 
era of environmental awareness. The revised structural requirements for the Polar Ship 
Rules of the International Association of Classification Societies reflect those demands, 
forcing upward trends in shipbuilding costs that must be balanced somewhere if the 
Owners' shareholders are going to make the dividends that make their investment risks 
worthwhile. It must, after all, come as no surprise that the two Sovkomflot newbuildings 
represent the highest order, in terms of cost, in the history of Russian merchant 
shipbuilding. But the potential rewards presented by the opportunities make the risk 
ZRUWKZKLOHWKHZRUOG¶VPHGLDZDVLQQRGRXEWWKDWWKLVQHZEXLOGLQJSURMHFWZDVGHYHORSHG
RQWKHEDFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQ5XVVLD¶VFODLPWRWKH$UFWLFUHJLRQ
VSRWHQWLDOO\KXJHPLQHUDO
riches. 
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High $UFWLF&DVXDOW\5LVNV7KH0DVWHU¶V$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ&RQWH[W 
 
While the regulatory demands seek to offer comfort in the construction of ships in this 
environment, the real accountability rests on the shoulders of the Master in command of 
such a vessel. As representative of the Flag State and agent of the Owner (although not 
necessarily in that order), the Master of such a ship is more comfortably placed when 
confronted with Port and Coastal State environmental demands but, for all the engineering 
progress made today, the geography remains as hazardous as ever, as evidenced in The 
United States Coast Pilot171: 
 
Each season has its own weather problems, each waterway its own 
SHFXOLDULWLHV« 7KH LFH WKUHDW LV FRPSRXQGHG E\ ILHUFH ZLQWHU VWRUPV ZKLFK
bring a variety of wind, wave, and weather problems on an average of every 4 
days. A combination of strong winds, rough seas, and cold temperatures can 
result in superstructure icing, in which sea spray and sometimes precipitation 
can freeze to a ship's superstructure. This adds tremendous weight and creates 
GDQJHURXV LQVWDELOLW\« )RJ FDQ IRUP LQ DQ\ VHDVRQ EXW LV LW PRVW OLNHO\ LQ
spring and early summer, particularly over open waters. Along the shore, fog is 
also common in autumn. Occasionally, steam fog will develop during the 
ZLQWHU« 
 
7KH0DVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQWLVWKHNH\IHDWXUHXSRQZKLFKFRPPDQGGHFLVLRQVDUH
WDNHQ RQ WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI ULVN $V D GLUHFW FRQVHTXHQFH LW LV XSRQ WKH 0DVWHU¶V
professional judgment that their accountability will stand or fall. By no means is the Master 
doomed to absolute liability ± but it will be tested under the stress of cross-examination at 
Trial. In Grace v General Steam172 DFDVH LQYROYLQJ WKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU WKHLU
professional judgment on whether a port was safe due to ice conditions, it was wisely held 
(obiter) that when a claim for damages is being considered, the event has happened and 
need no longer be forecast. In this context, the Master should not be deprived of his remedy 
merely because, in ignorance of the danger, he entered a port which well-informed men 
might erroneously have pronounced to be safe; nor is he to be given damages if he sustains 
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injury in conditions which fall short of the danger-point merely because well-informed men 
might have erroneously pronounced his entry to be foolhardy173.  
 
It is a valuable exercise to compare the wisdom of this decision with those which prevail in 
more recent case studies, such as that of the Hebei Spirit. The difference, of course, lay in 
the shifting sands of the normative ethics of Port State societies, which have done so much 
to advance the current law of criminal accountability. This has chilling significance when 
applied to the High Arctic. The introduction of constant maritime traffic to the region must 
be an essential consequence of the exploitation of mineral resources in the region; while the 
retreating sea ice will enable deep sea trade to use the Northwest Passage and thus reduce 
voyage routes from Europe to the Far East by some 5,000 miles. 
 
Casualties in the High Arctic are already manifesting themselves. In July 2010, two 
Russian-flag tankers owned by the Murmansk Shipping Company, Indiga and Varzuga, 
loaded with 13,300 tons of diesel-fuel, were sailing through the partly ice-covered Northern 
Sea Route, saving both time and cost as the distance from Europe to Asia via the north is 
much shorter than traditional routes through  Suez, Panama, or around Africa to Asia. Then, 
at an exact position not given, they collided in difficult ice conditions, exacerbated by poor 
visibility. The hull of Indiga was damaged, but the vessel did not lose seaworthiness. No 
spill was reported but the risk was clear and apparent. Each was capable of lifting 16,000 
tonnes of crude, and both were ageing sisters ± the Indiga was built in 1976, the Varzuga in 
1977, designed before ship construction specifications and Port State laws changed in the 
wake of the Exxon Valdez and successive casualties174.  
 
On the 1st September 2010, the Nanny was 11 nautical miles from Pointe au Pic, Canada, 
bound for Montreal with a cargo of 2.4 million gallons of diesel fuel when she ran aground 
on a sandbar about 50 kilometres southwest of Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, Canada in Simpson 
Strait within the Arctic passage. Plans were made to transship some of the cargo to another 
ship, to lighten the vessel so she could float off the sandbar. The operation to ease her off 
the sandbank took two weeks. Given her ability to lift 9,177 tonnes of environmentally 
deadly oil or chemical-based cargoes, the potential hazard raised alarm bells in the media ± 
and in the local communities, whose inhabitants, of course, would have such things in mind 
when they voted in the next elections.  
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Then the short-sea tanker Mokami, incredibly belonging to the same company in the 
Woodward Group, ran aground on the 4th October 2010 in the harbour of a small coastal 
Labrador community, although the company that owns it said she was empty. Although she 
was more diminutive with a cargo-carrying capacity of 3,015 tonnes, it transpired that, in a 
four month period Mokami ran aground three times, and there was one grounding in 
previous years. 
 
The Woodward Group casualties naturally invite conclusions to be drawn on whether the 
causes were on the part of the Owner, or the Master, or technical error for which neither 
were responsible175. 
 
A prosecution of the Master on the basis of criminal negligence raises the issue, again, as to 
whether the evolution of the law of criminal negligence leads to the criminalisation of the 
Master, falling beyond the protection of UNCLOS and MARPOL. 
 
As J B Ismay, Chairman of the White Star Line, discovered in 1912, the adjective 
µXQVLQNDEOH¶DSSHDUVRQO\LQWKHYRFDEXODU\RIWKHIRROKDUG\ZKLOHWKHVSHFLDOKD]DUGVLQ
the Arctic, presented by icebergs floating freely through the shipping lanes for much of the 
year, and poor visibility for even more of the time, with extreme cold and high winds, 
conspire to increase the likelihood of a casualty and reduce the likelihood of an effective 
response.  
 
The prospect of an early settlement of the conflicting jurisdictional claims by Canada, 
Russia, the United States and Denmark (not to mention Norway and Sweden) in the High 
Arctic may be euphemistically described as unlikely. Without such a treaty, there can hardly 
be established a consensus on rights of sovereign legal jurisdiction and, in consequence, the 
Master who meets with an environmental accident which devastates the innocent wildlife of 
this region, is unlikely to be gifted with mercy by the Coastal State which has suffered. To 
this extent, the High Arctic scenario predicts a deepening gulf between the theory of 
MXULVSUXGHQFH DQG WKH UHDOLW\ RI QRUPDWLYH HWKLFV LQ FRQWHPSRUDU\ VRFLHW\ %DXPDQ¶V
understanding of the fairness of criminal justice demands that humanity and reasonableness 
in punitive justice are dependent on the choice which a society makes in evaluating and 
applying moderation in the punitive process176 but a moderate approach is an unrealistic 
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possibility when confronted with a pristine environment that WKH&RDVWDO6WDWH¶VVRFLHW\VHHV
to have been raped by an event whose origins lay in the lust for a trading profit. 
 
7KH VROXWLRQ KRZHYHU YLVLWV %DXPDQ¶V FRQFHSW RI PRGHUDWLRQ XSRQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
regulation of relationships already in place between Port State and Flag State. The Master 
has been appointed by the laws of the Flag State, the Flag State owes Convention 
obligations to the Port or Coastal State, thus the Master has already volunteered himself as 
accountable to the normative ethics of the sovereign laws of the Flag State, which must 
meet its Convention obligations. In the contemporary model of jurisdictional uncertainty in 
the High Arctic, the Coastal State which has suffered loss will likely achieve much more in 
terms of a fair deal in justice and in compensation if it addresses the Flag State on such 
matters.    
 
)URP WKH0DVWHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ RQO\ LI WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHP IDLOV WR
embrace the concept of moderation, does this cunning plan break down.    
    
      
 111 
Section Three: The Golden Thread laid Bare 
 
3.1 Criminalisation and Sovereignty 
 
 
(i) Risk Management by Port State ± the Cradle of Criminalisation 
 
Overview 
 
This chapter turns the focus of the work on the key mischief identified in the introduction, 
by analysing case studies to illustrate the tensions between jurisprudence and the normative 
ethics of Port State jurisdictions leading to the concept of Criminalisation. In this way, the 
work develops the key themes which are necessary to address in the reasoning of the core 
issue in the concept. 
 
 
Captain Laptalo and Port State Justice 
 
Article 2 of UNCLOS defines maritime sovereignty of a Coastal State beyond any doubt, to 
extend beyond its land territory to the territorial sea, which Article 3 identifies broadly as 
the 12-mile limit. The purpose of the territorial sea naturally is to ensure that the State can 
implement and enforce its laws, in the protection of its people, by addressing key priorities, 
including health and safety, immigration, defence and terrorism, marine and agricultural 
environmental protection, revenue and resource protection. It is axiomatic that the way in 
which the state legislates for this must reflect the moral standards of its society, regulating 
its concept of right and wrong which underpins the concept of Justice. This must, itself, be 
defined, in order to present a persuasive argument for the ethics which flow from it. John 
Stuart Mill¶VFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKHQDWXUHof Justice focus on the classification of moral rules 
of behaviour, which go beyond any other rules for guidance in life by identifying an 
absolute obligation, in the maintenance of well-being for that particular society177. 
 
UNCLOS provides a strong check on unlimited management control by Port State on ships 
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engaged in innocent passage through territorial seas. Article 27 states that the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Coastal State should not be exercised on board the ship of another Flag 
State passing through its territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation 
in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only if 
the consequences of the crime extend to the Coastal State; or if the crime may disturb the 
peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; or if it is necessary to do so in 
order to control illegal drug trafficking; or, if the Master (or a diplomatic officer or agent of 
the Flag State) specifically asks the Coastal State to assist. In any such circumstances in 
which the Coastal State seeks to exercise its criminal jurisdiction on the vessel, if the 
Master so requests the Coastal State must notify Flag State.  
 
The problem arises when thH3RUW6WDWH¶VVRFLHW\¶VFRQFHSWFRQIOLFWVZLWKWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of Justice held by societies in other States, particularly where laws are promulgated in a 
State, which are inconsistent with its Treaty obligations with other States. 
 
The recent case of the Coral Sea illustrates the position of the Master under God, when the 
normative ethics of society clash with the rights of a ship registered under another flag in its 
sovereign jurisdiction. Captain Kristo Laptalo was Master of the Coral Sea; with the fine 
lines of a reefer built in 1976, she was registered in Nassau under the Bahamas flag. A 
Croatian national, Captain Laptalo was 58 when, in June 2007, his ship loaded a cargo of 
200,000 pallets of bananas at the Ecuadorian port of Guayaquil. A routine search by 
Ecuadorian police failed to reveal any evidence of illegal drugs having been stowed with 
the cargo.  
 
The charterers initially nominated the port of discharge as Civitavecchia, Italy and the ship 
sailed on the 6th July. Then, 13 days later, orders were received from the charterers 
instructing them to steam to the port of Aegion in Greece. More specific orders, to 
discharge 27,377 pallets at Aegion, came 17 days into the voyage. So they did. 
 
The cargo was resting shore-side at Aegion ZKHQDTXDOLW\FKHFNFDUULHGRXWE\WKHVKLS¶V
agent revealed that 51.6 kilos of cocaine had been hidden in the cargo. The ship had been 
cleared to sail and was awaiting the pilot, when Captain Laptalo was informed of the 
discovery, and he promptly disembarked to inspect the pallets himself.  
 
He was then arrested by the Greek authorities, together with Lithuanian first mate 
Konstantin Metelev and Filipino bosun Narciso Carcia. Captain Laptalo was remanded in 
custody at Korydallos prison, a high security jail on the outskirts of Athens, while his 
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lawyer, Stamatis Tzelepis of the Ioannis Iriotis law office, expressed some remarkable 
personal opinions to LlR\G¶V /LVW178, saying that  the fight to have the men freed on bail 
would be difficult; that jailing of crew in drug cases was almost routine in Greece; and 
PDNLQJDQXPEHURIFRPPHQWVWR/OR\G¶V/LVWZKLFKVKHGVRPHOLJKWRQKLVSURIHVVLRQDO
opinion of the approach taken by the Courts in this situation. As a litigation lawyer, his 
opinion may carry some authority when he criticisHG WKHMXGJHV¶GHFLVLRQLQZKDWZDV LQ
his experience, a unique case in which they had convicted his client without any evidence of 
guilt whatsoever, neither as to the circumstances of the case nor of any guilty mind on the 
0DVWHU¶V SDUW ± LQ 0U 7]HOHSLV¶V VXEPLVVLRQ UHQGHred obvious by the fact that Captain 
Laptalo did not even know which port of discharge the charterers would nominate when 
they left Ecuador. 179 
 
The case duly went to Trial, about a year later, when, among the Prosecution witnesses, the 
harbour master from Aegion, far from incriminating Captain Laptalo, expressed his opinion 
that the Defendants could not hide drugs on the ship and that the Master was not culpable.  
 
The Prosecution submitted, however, and the Court accepted the argument, that Captain 
Laptalo as Master had to know everything that was going on board the ship, including the 
content of the cargo she was carrying. The Prosecution also submitted that it was illogical 
that someone would send cocaine without any control over it. They said that the claim by 
the Ecuadorian police that they had inspected the cargo before the ship sailed proved that 
the drugs were loaded onto the ship somewhere in the open sea.  
 
Some of the evidence was the subject of comment by the vice president of the Seafarer's 
8QLRQRI&URDWLD3UHGUDJ%UD]]RGXURZKRWROG/OR\G¶V/LVWWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQZDV
based on the 3URVHFXWLRQ¶V ZLVKHV ZKRVH ZLWQHVVHV GHQLHG WKH FKDUJHV180. Brazzoduro 
echoed the shock with which the maritime community received the news of Captain 
/DSWDOR¶V FRQYLFWLRQ SDUWLFXODUO\ IRFXVLQJ RQ WKHLU LQFRPSUHKHQVLRQ RI WKH 3URVHFXWRU¶V
assertion that he must be guilty simply because he was the Master181. 
 
On the 17th July 2008, Captain Laptalo was sentenced to 14 years in prison and a fine of 
200,000 euros. The first officer Konstantin Metelev and bosun Narciso Garcia were 
released.  
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Captain Laptalo appealed against conviction and sentence. At the appeal hearing, the 
Judicial Council apparently found sympathy with the Defence argument that it would have 
been physically impossible to access the cargo once it had been loaded. Moreover, it was 
reported that prosecutors eventually admitted that there was no evidence that Captain 
/DSWDOR ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH VPXJJOLQJ ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ /OR\G¶V /LVW UHSRUWHG WKDW WKH
Court heard submissions from international experts in maritime law that it is not the Master, 
but the company that trades bananas that was responsible for the cargo's content, as well as 
the location to which the ship was headed.  
 
The Judicial Council concluded that neither Captain Laptalo nor any other Master could be 
prosecuted according to command responsibility ± DFFRUGLQJ WR /OR\G¶V /LVW VHWWLQJ  D
precedent which may be used in the future in similar cases - and the Judicial Council 
reversed the decision against Captain Laptalo182. 
 
Concurrently, and possibly without even considering it, the Court brought the decision into 
line with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, that everyone charged 
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.  
 
What antagonised the normative ethics of the global maritime community was that Captain 
/DSWDOR¶VPLVIRUWXQHZDVEHFRPLQJDQRFFXSDWLRQDOKD]DUG6WHSKHQ&RWWRQVSRNHVPDQIRU
WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV)HGHUDWLRQDUWLFXODWHGWKHLQGXVWU\¶VRSLQLRQWKDWWKLV
was another example of the phenomenon which was making a criminal scapegoat of 
Masters in order to appease the normative ethics of Port State societies, no matter the 
injustice perceived by the global maritime community. While expressing satisfaction with a 
happy outcome for Captain Laptalo WKH LQGXVWU\¶V FRQFHUQVKDGRQO\EHHQ UHLQIRUFHGE\
this case, that the phenomenon had exposed the Master to the risk of unfair prosecution, 
simply as the most convenient target in order to satisfy the normative ethics of Port State 
societies to find somebody to punish for an event, whether or not that somebody was 
blameworthy183.  
 
The Emerging Problem  
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2Q WKH IDFHRI LW&DSWDLQ/DSWDOR¶V FRQYLFWLRQZRXOG DSSHDU FRPSHOOLQJHYLGHQFHRI WKH
criminalisation of the Master, as part of an evolving process of risk management by the Port 
State ± the prosecution of Masters is the risk treatment option in the modern global battle 
against illegal drugs. The contribution of this case to the argument is considerable because it 
illustrates that the Port State relied on an assumption of facts, simply arising out of the 
DQFLHQWSULQFLSOHRIWKH0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHDIIDLUVRIWKHVKLSZKDWLWGLGWKHQ
was to apply that to the normative ethics of the society of the Port State which in recent 
years has legislatHGFULPLQDO OLDELOLW\IRUGUXJVPXJJOLQJDQGFRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH0DVWHU¶V
position in law rendered his liability strict in this case; that is, obviating the necessity of 
establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had possessed the necessary mens 
UHDIRUWKHRIIHQFHLQTXHVWLRQ,QWKHSURFHVVWKH0DVWHU¶V+XPDQ5LJKWVKDGEHHQLJQRUHG 
 
It is submitted that this is the critical evidence to support the contention that the 
criminalisation of the Master (not merely a seafarer), according to MichalowsNL¶VGHILQLWLRQ
is identified as an emerging problem, insofar as it has been precipitated by the normative 
ethics of society which has led to an evolving pantheon of crimes that have emerged in 
recent years, as exemplified by laws for the control of environmental damage and illegal 
drugs in the above case studies. 
 
Recalling the protection to the Master enshrined in Article 230 of UNCLOS, which 
provides for monetary penalties only for a pollution offence, except in the case of a wilful 
and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea and the demands of Article 230(3) to 
UHVSHFW WKH0DVWHU¶V+XPDQ5LJKWV WRD IDLU WULDO LWZRXOGEHDPLVFDUULDJHRI MXVWLFHIRU
DQ\6WDWH¶V&RXUWWRSURVHFXWHRUSXQLVKD0DVWHULQVRPHZD\ZKLFKLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
that ± yet a chronology of convictions for pollution offences stands as evidence that States 
are ignoring this. 
 
Professor Gold asserts184 that the practice of arraigning Masters after a maritime accident 
appears to have originated with the prosecution in 1989 of Captain Hazelwood of the Exxon 
Valdez. Herry Lawford supports this185, lending weight to the view that the Exxon Valdez 
case had an important effect on the normative ethics of American society - from the 
Government to the People and those who influence its opinions in such matters, notably the 
environmental experts and the media ± as to how it should respond to an oil pollution event. 
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Hitherto, a Master had no cause to suspect that they would risk serious criminal punishment 
for an error in navigation or shipboard management. For his part in the Exxon Valdez event, 
Captain Hazelwood was arraigned on a range of felony charges, on which he was 
subsequently acquitted, but was convicted of a misdemeanor charge of negligent discharge 
of oil, fined $50,000, and sentenced to 1,000 hours of community service (a sentencing 
alternative to imprisonment).  
 
The Company faced a claim for record punitive damages on the allegation that it had to bear 
responsibility because it had put a drunk in charge of its tanker. There is some truth in this: 
Captain Hazelwood was an alcoholic before his appointment to command the vessel ± but 
no finding of fact was made that he was drunk at the time of the grounding. According to 
some compelling journalistic research, it is also true that, in 1985, he was Master of Exxon 
Chester with a cargo of asphalt when she ran into a storm, in which her mast was damaged, 
carrying away her radar and radio communication. While the crew prepared to abandon 
ship, he apparently rallied them and guided them to safety.186 After he was appointed 
Master of Exxon Valdez in 1987, she subsequently received safety awards in 1987 and 
1988. The criminal punishment of the Company SDLGVFDQWUHJDUGWR&DSWDLQ+D]HOZRRG¶V
merit, and led to a generation of litigation in the case of the punitive damages awarded 
against it. While Exxon made a concerted struggle to mitigate its corporate position, there is 
no evidence of any paternal relationship between the Master and the Owner in this case187. 
The problem was emerging of a Port State ethic to criminalise the Master, accompanied by 
a distancing by WKHHPSOR\HUIURPWKHLUHPSOR\HHWKHVKLS¶V0DVWHU, in order to avoid or 
mitigate the risk of accountability.  
 
Herry Lawford very properly points out that criminal accountability evolved as a 
management control tool by the UK in the nineteenth century, though. This development of 
statutory regulation culminated in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, which reflected 
6RFLHW\¶VGHPDQGIRUWKHFRQWURORIVKLSVDIHW\E\FULPLQDOSHQDOWLHVIRUGLsobedience. So, 
for instance, by section 442, if a Master allowed the ship to be loaded so that the key part of 
the load-line was submerged, he (with the Owner) would be guilty of a criminal offence. 
Another example can be found in section 457(2) which provided that the Master would be 
guilty of a criminal offence if he knowingly took a ship to sea in such an unseaworthy state 
as to endanger life. 
 
7KLVUDWLRQDOHKDVEHHQGHYHORSHGZLWKFXUUHQWODZZKLFKFRQILUPVWKH0DVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQDV
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the individual with ultimate responsibility ± and, hence, accountability. Section 98 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 holds the Owner and Master criminally liable if their ship is 
dangerously unsafe, as defined by Section 94(2), whether as to the condition, or the 
unsuitability of the ship or any part of her or her equipment, or any other matter relevant to 
her safety. This provides a convenient springboard to launch into one of the most pertinent 
case studies on criminalisation, for it addresses the very statutory provisions which would 
FRQIURQW&DSWDLQ'DYLG/HZU\ LQXQGHUOLQLQJ3URIHVVRU*ROG¶V DVVHUWLRQ188 that the 
major policy influencers ± the shipowners, the exporters, the traders and the insurers ± had 
never even acknowledged that there was much of a problem, and nobody listened to the 
Master.  
 
The Case of the Herald Of Free Enterprise 
 
By the summer of 1986, the board room of P & O Ferries was thinking hard about its long-
term strategy, in order to keep its position in the market-place and satisfy the shareholders. 
Paradoxically, it was this decision which led to the Company taking over the Ownership 
and operation of the ill-fated Herald of Free Enterprise, just a month before her foundering. 
The Herald was one of three sisters, a modern roll-on/roll-off passenger/vehicle ferry 
grossing 7,950 tons, and one of the largest vessels of her type when she left her German 
builders in 1980. She had been designed at a time when her Owners, Townsend Thoresen, 
knew that every second and every penny counted in the cut-throat competition on the 
English Channel. Indeed, so thorough had her design concept been, that the linkspans at 
either end of her planned service, between Dover and Calais, were especially built to match 
WKHOHYHOVRIWKHVKLS¶VFDUGHFNVLQRUGHUWRHQDEOH simultaneous loading of both decks and 
thus minimise the time required for turn-around in port.  
 
The competition just carried on growing on the English Channel, one of the most crowded 
seaways in the world ± and the Dover-Calais run was the most competitive crossing, 
because it was the shortest ± MXVW  PLOHV ORQJ :KLOH WKH 8.¶V JURZLQJ WUDGH ZLWK WKH
European Community undoubtedly contributed to the rising demand, competition was 
heating up thanks to a number of factors. In July 1984 The UK Government announced the 
privatisation of the former State-owned ferry operator Sealink, which would lead to more 
pressure still on the competitiveness of the rival ferry operators on the route. Then, in 1986, 
after generations of aborted attempts to initiate a tunnel project, and in the teeth of bitter 
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opposition from the ferry operators, the French and British governments finally gave the go-
ahead to build the Channel Tunnel.  
 
In the face of these factors, the board rooms of ferry operators had to consider how best to 
conduct their prime function: to maximise a yield for their investors. It was against this 
background, that P & O Ferries had to make some bold business decisions. As a short sea 
shipping company, it had a hugely successful tradition, making the most of its once-mighty 
foundation in the shape of the General Steam Navigation Company, whose controlling 
interest had been acquired by P & O in late 1920, and then bought outright in 1972 when P 
& O remodeled it as P & O Ferries (General European) Limited189.  
 
It was the management of the financial risks and opportunities which were uppermost 
among the concerns in the board room of P & O Ferries; safety management did not feature 
in their job descriptions. Out of that management of risk, they found a solution, when they 
resolved to buy out their very formidable rival, Townsend Thoresen, reducing the 
competition and spreading the overheads. In February of 1987, the deal was completed and 
the directors of P & O Ferries implemented their plans for maximising the financial yield.  
 
Their own ferries on the Dover-Calais route were doing their job very satisfactorily; they 
GLG QRW QHHG 7RZQVHQG¶V WRQQDJH WKHUH VR LW ZDV GHFLGHG WR VZLWFK WKH +HUDOG RI )UHH
Enterprise to the Zeebrugge route. The only problem was that the linkspan at Zeebrugge had 
QRWEHHQGHVLJQHGZLWKWKH+HUDOGLQPLQGVRWKDWIRUWKHYHVVHO¶VXSSHUYHKLFOHGHFNWREH
accessed by the ramp, it was necessary to trim the ship by the head and flood her ballast 
tanks, to lower the level of the vehicle deck to the linkspan. 
 
When the Herald left Zeebrugge on the 6th March 1987, not all the water had been pumped 
out of the bow ballast tanks, causing her to be some 3 feet down at the bow. Mr Stanley, the 
assistant bosun, was responsible for closing the bow doors but he had been released from 
duties by the bosun before the sailing time. He duly went to his cabin and fell asleep; 
WUDJLFDOO\ KH VOHSW WKURXJK WKH µ+DUERXU 6WDWLRQV¶ FDOO ZKLFK RUGHUHG WKH FUHZ WR WKHLU
assigned sailing positions. It was not part oIDQ\ERG\HOVH¶VGXWLHVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHERZ
doors were closed before sailing, save the overriding duty of the Master to ensure that the 
vessel was in all respects safe to proceed to sea. Her design of clamshell bow doors made it 
impossible for Captain David Lewry to see from the bridge if the doors were opened or 
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closed, though. 
 
The Herald sailed at 7.05 pm local time, with a crew of 80 and some 459 passengers, 81 
cars, 3 buses, and 47 trucks. Passing the outer mole 19 minutes later, she increased speed, 
when a bow wave began to build up under her prow. At 15 knots, with the bow down 3 feet 
lower than normal, water began to break over the main car deck through the open doors at 
the rate of 200 tons per minute. 
 
In common with other roll on ± roll off veVVHOV WKH +HUDOG¶V PDLQ YHKLFOH GHFN ODFNHG
transverse bulkheads and, so, the sudden flood of water through the bow doors quickly 
caused the vessel to become unstable. The Herald listed 30 degrees to port almost 
instantaneously, as water continued to pour in and fill the port wing of the vehicle deck, 
causing her to capsize 40 seconds later. The Herald settled on the sea bed at slightly more 
than ninety degrees with the starboard half of her hull above water. There had been no 
chance to launch any of the sKLS¶VOLIHERDWV 
 
At least 150 passengers and 38 members of the crew lost their lives when the vessel 
capsized, the worst disaster for a British vessel in peacetime since the sinking of the Titanic 
in 1912.  
 
The prevailing legislation at that time for the conduct of an inquiry was the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1970, defining the statutory provision for a judicial investigation into the loss 
or presumed loss of a UK-registered ship anywhere in the world, as is the responsibility of 
the Flag State, or such loss of any ship that foundered in UK territorial waters, as is the 
responsibility of the Port State. This Formal Investigation was conducted by Mr Justice 
Sheen190, whose findings sent the industry into nervous shock. 
 
The Court heard the evidence of a director of the Company, Mr Develin, who, when asked 
who was responsible for considering matters relating to safety in the navigation of the 
&RPSDQ\¶VVKLSVDQVZHUHGAshore, the system would be to take a consensus of the senior 
masters. The Judge took the view that, without a properly qualified marine superintendent, 
it sounded sensible to rely on such a consensus; the problem revealed by the evidence, 
though, was that the shore management took very little notice of what they were told by 
their Masters. In any event, the Masters only met infrequently ± indeed, for some two and a 
half years there had been no meeting at all between Management and Senior Masters, 
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although, latterly, there had been some improvement in this. What really became very clear 
to the Judge, though, was the frustration felt by the Masters that the Marine department 
simply did not listen to the complaints or suggestions or wishes of their Masters. And the 
Judge agreed. 
 
But that was no defence to the charge against Captain Lewry that, as Master of the vessel, 
he knowingly took a ship to sea in such an unseaworthy state as to endanger life. The Judge 
was compelled to address this strictly according to the statutory provision (as summarised 
above). He explained his findings in full on this: 
 
Captain Lewry was Master of the Herald on the 6th March 1987. In that capacity 
he was responsible for the safety of his ship and every person on board. Captain 
Lewry took the Herald to sea with the bow doors fully open, with the 
consequences which have been related. It follows that Captain Lewry must 
accept personal responsibility for the loss of his ship191.  
 
In judging his conduct it is right to look at it in perspective. Captain Lewry has served at sea 
IRURYHU\HDUV+HKDVKHOGD0DVWHU¶V&HUWLILFDWHRI&Rmpetency (Foreign Going) for 
over 20 years, and he has been in command of a ship for 10 years. Captain Lewry joined the 
Herald on 13th March 1980 as one of five masters. The Company has issued a set of 
standing orders which included instructions for Readiness for Sea, which required heads of 
department to report to the Master immediately they were aware of any deficiency which 
was likely to cause their departments to be unready for sea in any respect at the due sailing 
time. In the absence of any such report the Master was advised to assume, at the due sailing 
time, that the vessel was ready for sea in all respects. As a result, Masters came to rely upon 
the absence of any report at the time of sailing as satisfying them that their ship was ready 
for sea in all respects. On the 6th March, Captain Lewry saw the Chief Officer come to the 
Bridge. Captain Lewry did not ask him if the ship was all secure and the Chief Officer did 
not make a report. Captain Lewry was entitled to assume that the assistant bosun and the 
Chief Officer were qualified to perform their respective duties, but, in the words of the 
Judge, he should not have assumed that they had done so. He should have insisted upon 
receiving a report to that effect. It was apparent to the Judge, however, that the shadow of 
blame on Captain Lewry should be mitigated by three particular points: 
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1. Captain Lewry merely followed a system which was operated by all the Masters of 
the Herald and approved by the Senior Master, Captain Kirby.  
2. 7KH µ6KLS¶V VWDQGLQJ RUGHUV¶ LVVXHG E\ WKH &RPSDQ\ PDGH QR UHIHUHQFH DV WKH\
should have done, to opening and closing the bow and stern doors. 
3. Company ships had proceeded to sea with bow or stern doors open on five known 
occasions before the Herald casualty.   
 
Some of the incidents in point 3 were known to the management, who had not drawn them 
to the attention of the other Masters. Captain Lewry had, himself, said in evidence that, if he 
had been made aware of any of those incidents, he would have instituted a new system on 
board his ship which would introduce positive reporting to ensure that the doors were 
closed. The Judge viewed his evidence with a certain caution, however, commenting, rather, 
that  
 
It is possible that he would have done so. But those Masters who were aware of 
the occasions when ships proceeded to sea with bow or stern doors open did not 
FKDQJHWKHLURUGHUV«7KH IDFW WKDWRWKHU0DVWHUVRSHUDWHG WKHVDPHGHIHFWLYH
system does not relieve Captain Lewry of his personal responsibility for taking 
his ship to sea in an unsafe condition. In so doing he was seriously negligent in 
the discharge of his duties. That negligence was one of the causes contributing to 
the casualty192. 
  
While the function of the proceedings was to investigate the cause of the casualty, it did not 
have the power to punish ± save, under section 56 (4), which provides that, if, as a result of 
the investigation, an inquiry is satisfied that a UK-qualified officer has been seriously 
negligent in the discharge of his duties, and if the inquiry is satisfied that it caused or 
FRQWULEXWHG WR WKHFDVXDOW\ KHPD\FDQFHORU VXVSHQG WKHRIILFHU¶V FHUWLILFDWH ,Q&DSWDLQ
/HZU\¶V FDVH WKH &RXUW WRRN LQWR DFFRXQW WKH PHQWDO DQG HPRWLRQDO VWUDLQ ZKLFK KDG
burdened him as a result of the disaster but, on balance, felt that it would  be failing in its 
duty if it did not suspend his Certificate of Competency. Accordingly, the court suspended 
&DSWDLQ/HZU\¶V0DVWHU¶VFHUWLILFDWHIRURQH\HDU 
 
It was not Captain Lewry whom the Judge identified as the villain of the piece, though. 
While the apparent fault lay with the shipboard management function, that is, the 
individuals with hands-on control of the crisis - the Master, the Chief Officer and, to a 
                         
192
 Ibid, para 12.5 
 122 
lesser extent, the assistant bosun ± the inquiry could not avoid drawing the conclusion, after 
analysing the exhaustive evidence, that the underlying fault lay within the management 
control structure, and those responsible for safety as a strategic function of the company. 
Some safety system had to be rolled out on a company-wide basis, which was down to the 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶VGLUHFWRUV ,WZDV DIWHU DOO WKHLUXOWLPDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR
HQVXUH WKDW WKH VDIHW\ RI WKHLU SDVVHQJHUV ZDV PDLQWDLQHG ZKLFK WR WKH -XGJH¶V PLQG
should have led them to ask themselves, what orders should be given for the safety of their 
ships? The Board, however, did not appear to have appreciated their responsibility for the 
safe management of their ships.  As a result, not a single director had been charged with the 
duty of organising safety on the Herald. In terms of Board responsibility, this was 
understandable, if inexcusable ± $V ZLWK PRVW FRPSDQLHV WKH %RDUG¶V PDQDJHPHQW
function was designed primarily to ensure a profitable yield for the shareholders. And that 
was what led tR WKH -XGJH¶V FRPPHQWV LQ WKH 5HSRUW ZKLFK KDYH VXEVHTXHQWO\ UXPEOHG
thunderously through the boardrooms of every shipowner in the country:  
 
All concerned in management, from the members of the Board of Directors down 
to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be regarded as 
sharing responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the 
body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness193. 
 
While Mr Justice Sheen had exercised his power to deal with Captain Lewry by way of 
reviewing his certificate of competency, though, the Judge had no power to order any 
redress against the Company; recourse would have to follow in a more appropriate Court. 
And while His Lordship criticised the directors in the Herald Inquiry in the most scathing 
WHUPVSRVVLEOHWKHVDPHZRUGVSDUDGR[LFDOO\EHFDPHWKHGLUHFWRUV¶VDOYDWLRQ7KHIDFWWKDW
the evidence led to the conclusion that the directors had not appreciated their responsibility 
for the safe management of their ships, that they had not applied their minds to the question 
of safety and their lack of comprehension of what their duties were, showed that no director 
had assumed any personal responsibility which underpinned a duty of care and, in the 
absence of that, there could not be any realistic prospect of a conviction for manslaughter 
against a director and, thus, under the identification doctrine, no prospect of a successful 
prosecution against the Company for corporate manslaughter. 
 
Mr Justice Taylor had to wrestle with the concept of the controlling mind in the ensuing 
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prosecution of P & O Ferries in the Herald case194, when he re-stated the law that a 
corporation may be culpable of the crime of corporate manslaughter where an individual, 
ZKRLVSDUWRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VFontrolling mind, does an act which fulfils the pre-requisites 
for the crime of manslaughter. However serious the disease of sloppiness had taken hold, 
the mere failure of the management system to prevent a death, in the absence of an 
individual guilty of manslaughter, could not, itself, sustain a conviction. In the trial against 
P & O, therefore, the prosecution was doomed to fail. After a half-time submission, the 
judge ruled that the prosecution was not in a position to satisfy the doctrine of 
identification. 
 
 
&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQRIWKH0DVWHU¶VProfessional Judgment 
 
Although the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007195 has sought to 
redress such a problem in future, the iniquity of the situation, which saw the Company 
escape liability but punLVKHG WKH 0DVWHU FRPSHOV VRPH V\PSDWK\ ZLWK 3URIHVVRU *ROG¶V
observation196 that contemporary case law offers the view that the Master today seems to 
KDYH PDQ\ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV EXW IHZ LI DQ\ ULJKWV DVVHUWLQJ WKDW WKH 0DVWHU¶V FRPPDQG
function is derived from a number of customary rules, very few of which are defined in 
terms of legislation ± he remains Master Under God with all the express and implied 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWKDWOHGWR&DSWDLQ/DSWDOR¶VSURVHFXWLRQLQ*UHHFH 
 
In his Judgment in Grace v General Steam Navigation Company197, a civil case involving 
an allegation of negligence on the part of the Master, Mr Justice Devlin famously expressed 
his sympathies with the Master, whose professional judgment on all the factors determining 
safety must be exercised at the time when the Master makes his decision to proceed. While 
they have to anticipate situations as part of their risk management function, the Master is 
not expected to be clairvoyant. As a result, their professional judgment will be based on 
factors such as the estimated position which would be reached at the planned time by any 
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well-informed and experienced Master; if a decision is based upon such an estimate the 
0DVWHU¶VFXOSDELOLW\ZLOOQRWEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWLQWKHOLJKWRIsubsequent events, it 
is proved to be erroneous. At most that would be a mere error of judgment, which does not 
itself give rise to liability in negligence, which is dependent upon a wrong done and an 
injury actually sustained, giving rise to a right to damages; that right does not, by itself, 
IROORZVRPHRQH¶VHVWLPDWHRIZKHWKHUDZURQJLVOLNHO\WREHGRQHRUDQLQMXU\OLNHO\WREH
sustained. As Justice Devlin concluded, 
 
A Master is not to be deprived of his remedy because, in ignorance of the 
danger, he entered a port which well-informed men might have erroneously 
pronounced his entry into the port to be foolhardy198. 
 
The question in this case depended upon the Master's own judgment, a very subjective issue 
for a mere error of judgment will not itself give rise to a claim in negligence ± it must be 
established that the standard of care reasonably owed by the Master as a professional person 
has been broken. Historic authority for distancing the idea of a mere error of judgment from 
liability for negligence is found LQ WKH %ULWLVK :UHFN &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V ,QTXLU\ LQWR WKH
Titanic disaster, in which Sir Robert Finlay, representing the White Star Line, invited the 
Court to find that there was no error of judgment on the part of the navigating officers 
whatever, to which the Wreck Commissioner, Lord Mersey, said: 
 
That means also no negligence. 
 
Sir Robert Finlay replied, Certainly199. 
 
The picture in current law has evolved more clearly, still, to shed much light on the 
standards by which an allegation of negligence must be tested. This is conveyed articulately 
in the recent case of Passarello v Grumbine200 in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which  
establishes key principles for us, and clarifies the issue well that, in cases in which the 
judgment of a professional person is concerned, negligence cannot be established merely 
because of an unfortunate result which might have occurred despite the exercise of 
reasonable care. This case involved a claim in negligence against a physician but the rule 
applies equally to Masters that such professional persons are permitted a broad range of 
judgment when carrying out their professional duties and so are not liable for errors of 
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judgment unless it has been proved that an error of judgment was the result of negligence. 
Crucially for the case of the Master, it was held that the standard of care to be established in 
professional negligence cases is objective in nature, because it focuses on the knowledge, 
skill, and care normally possessed and exercised by the professional in question. 
ConVLGHUDWLRQ RI D PHUH µHUURU RI MXGJPHQW¶ LPSURSHUO\ UHIRFXVHV DWWHQWLRQ RQ WKH
SURIHVVLRQDO¶VVWDWHRIPLQGDWWKHWLPHLWLVLPSURSHUEHFDXVHWKHFLYLOWRUWRIQHJOLJHQFHLV
concerned with consequences, a test which must be objective, rather than the DefHQGDQW¶V
state of mind, which must be established by a subjective test. 
 
This underscores one of the critical problem areas which define the ills of criminalisation, 
for the evolution of modern criminal liability owes a great deal to the civil tort of 
negligence. The downstream consequence is that the characteristics of certain crimes, to 
which the Master has been exposed in recent times, have had to evolve in reliance upon the 
civil tort of negligence in order to meet social demands for the criminalisation of the 
0DVWHU¶VSURIHVVLRQDODFWLYLW\; Passarello v Grumbine homes in on the key point, that the 
respective objective and subjective tests for establishing liability are irreconcilable and 
render the idea of criminal negligence fatally flawed. 
 
But the normative ethics of society will not be denied. While observing those ethics, the 
task of risk management by the Port State clearly demands the strict observation of the 
0DVWHU¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV GXULQJ WKH OLWLJDWLRQ SURFHVV ± the right to a fair trial has long-
preceded written international Conventions201. That being said, an uncomfortably large 
percentage of cases confirms the delicate balance to be struck between the administration of 
justice and the Will of the People, which may not always be harmonious. A glaring example 
of this is found in the case of Captain Mangouras, Master of the Prestige which, in 
November 2002, was involved in a catastrophic event which led to a spill of 70,000 tonnes 
of fuel oil into the sea, endangering marine life and, consequently, leading to a criminal 
investigation by the Spanish authorities. In the meantime, the Spanish Court remanded 
Captain Mangouras, a Greek national, in custody and set his bail at an incredible 3 million 
euros. The case was appealed to the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds of an 
infringement of the European Convention on Human Rights202. 
 
The Court confirmed203 that a remand in custody with such a high bail could only be 
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required as long as reasons justifying that detention prevailed, and that the authorities had to 
take as much care in fixing appropriate bail as in deciding whether or not the 'HIHQGDQW¶V 
continued detention was indispensable. But the Court went on to uphold the normative 
ethics of the Port State over the human rights of the Master and expressed the opinion that 
new realities had to be taken into consideration in interpreting the requirements of the 
Human Rights Convention, namely what it referred to as the growing and legitimate 
concern both in Europe and internationally in relation to environmental offences and the 
tendency to use criminal law as a means of enforcing the environmental obligations 
imposed by European and international law204. The Court held the view that the 
increasingly high standard which was demanded by individual human rights required 
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies. In 
consequence, the Court could not rule out the professional environment which made 
GHPDQGV XSRQ D 0DVWHU LQ &DSWDLQ 0DQJRXUDV¶V SRVLWLRQ  The Court went further and 
approved the relevance of the environmental damage in considering the question, and 
expressed no surprise that the Spanish Court should have adjusted the amount required by 
way of bail in line with the level of liability incurred. The Master was in custody for 83 
GD\V EHIRUH D EDQN JXDUDQWHH IRU WKH VXP ZDV DUUDQJHG QRW E\ &DSWDLQ 0DQJRXUDV¶V
Owners, but by the Protection and Indemnity insurers. 
 
Many would argue that this decision champions the approach of the risk society and, 
whether b\DFFLGHQWRURWKHUZLVHSXWVWKH0DVWHU¶VKXPDQULJKWVGRZQLQWKH3RUWSWDWH¶V
list of priorities. More seriously still, by attaching a remand in custody and bail conditions, 
issues which are pertinent in criminal proceedings, to the seriousness of the pollution event 
rather than any allegation of criminal intent, the element of criminalisation has ostensibly 
been approved by the European Court.   
 
The late Lord Bingham205 understood the point, which has been revealed repeatedly in this 
work, that governments ultimately must be accountable for the administration of justice, but 
governments are anxious to win the support of the voters who will return them to office at 
the next election, so they will concentrate on measures which will earn them the support of 
the majority. If the will of the majority conflicts with the rights of the minority, then the 
process of a prosecution risks the condemnation of those who support the minority ± such 
as the maritime community in the case of the Hebei Spirit.  
 
But at least the government ministers will retain their seats at the next election.  
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7KH7ULDOSURFHVVLWVHOILVGHSHQGHQWXSRQWKH-XGJH¶VFRPSHWHQWPDQDJHPHQWSRZHUVDQG
turns heavily on a fair conclusion based on the evidence. Sometimes this may involve a 
judicial decision which is unlikely to satisfy the emotive opinions of local society, but the 
right to a fair trial demands neutrality from such emotions. In this context, the case history 
of the Hebei Spirit may be contrasted with another case involving General Steam206, in 
which the Claimant Owners of a lighter were seeking damages for loss sustained when the 
EDUJHVDQNDIWHUFROOLGLQJZLWK*HQHUDO6WHDP¶VTern in the River Thames in January 1929. 
The River was regarded by the Watermen and Lightermen as their domain, and the loss 
incensed the River community, whose normative ethics demanded justice and, perhaps, a 
certain amount of retribution, in the form of a Judgment in their favour. It was as a result of 
this, that the Judge, in fact the President of the Court, declared in his Judgment that he 
understood their feelings, but would not be swayed from his duty: 
 
This case has developed a good deal of human interest as well as matters of 
some importance in respect of the navigation of the reaches of the River Thames 
which need to be investigated with absolute care and with absolute regard to the 
regulations207. 
 
The Judge, then, is neither more nor less than the voice of the legal system to which they, 
through their legal training, are able to gain access208. In the bulk of the cases, they can gain 
access to the system, but cannot influence it, because they must simply follow the existing 
rules and principles which the system has established. Hard cases, however, demand a 
consideration of the legal principles involved in order to ensure the best possible result, 
even if this means ignoring previously-established rules. In hard cases, therefore, judges can 
influence the system. Professor H L A Hart209 conveyed the argument forcefully in terms 
that judges have a fairly strong discretion in determining hard cases, in which they will be 
LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKHPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOYDOXHVRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\ ,WZDV+DUW¶VYLHZ
however, that they never have complete discretion, for those influencing factors create 
checks and balances on the system, checks and balances demanded by society, a view 
which was forcefully underpinned by Lord Simons in Shaw v DPP210 in which he 
articulated the power which the Courts still hold today, of upholding the supreme and 
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fundamental purpose of the law, with the purpose to conserve not only the safety and order 
but also the moral welfare of the state. 
 
It is in the category of hard cases that the criminalisation of Masters falls.  
 
 129 
(ii) The Evolution of Injustice ± Criminal Negligence 
   
Overview 
 
Many of the case analyses shed light upon the golden thread running through this work, 
which challenges the very foundation of criminal proceedings in Negligence. The 
conclusion can be drawn that the perception of Criminalisation of the Master emerged 
concurreQWO\ZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPRGHUQOHJDOFRQFHSWRIµFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFH¶,Q
this context, the irreconcilable differences between a crime and a tort expose the flawed 
basis of this hybrid concept, upon which a rational philosophy of law cannot be built for 
criminal negligence. The inherent weakness in the rationale of criminal negligence is at the 
FRUHRIWKHVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\¶VGLVPD\RYHUWKHXQIDLUQHVVRIFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\RIWKH
Master in twenty first century society.  
 
The Case of Captain Schröder 
 
While I certainly do not discount the terrible consequences that have resulted 
from this negligence, what he has been convicted of is really a civil offense [sic] 
211
 
 
Thus said Judge Callie Granade, District Judge for the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Alabama, in sentencing Captain Wolfgang Schröder, Master of the Zim 
Mexico III who was convicted of homicide. In March 2006 Captain Schröder had been in 
command of the vessel, in a compulsory pilotage area, when she collided with a dock-side 
crane at Mobile, Alabama. The consequence led to the death of a dock-worker, in what 
mariners world-wide believed to be a mere error of judgment. Captain Schröder was 
LQGLFWHGXQGHU WKH6HDPDQ¶V0DQVODXJKWHU6WDWXWHDV0DVWHURI WKHVKLS, for misconduct, 
negligence, or inattention to his duties on the vessel, resulting in the death of the dock 
worker. The jury convicted him and he faced a sentence of imprisonment of up to 16 
months. At his sentencing, Judge Granade noted that the law required jurors to find that 
Schröder was guilty of simple negligence, a lower standard of unlawfulness more 
commonly associated with civil disputes.  
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The problem arises in that the characteristics which define guilt in criminal law are very 
different from those for establishing liability in civil law. That being said, however, the laws 
of the twentieth century evolved in a process of criminalisation to make a Defendant Guilty 
of a crime based upon the principles upon which liability in negligence is founded. It is 
axiomatic, therefore, that the modern tort of negligence came first. 
 
The Modern Law of Negligence  
 
Street on Torts presents a good starting point for a definition for the law of torts as 
comprising: 
 
« the obligations imposed on one member of society to his or her fellows and 
provides a range of remedies for harms caused by breach of those obligations212.  
 
The main question which underlies the theory of tortious liability, is how the law must 
reconcile the competing interests. An act, even though it is malicious, will not incur such 
liability unless the interest violated is protected in tort. In the matter of torts, we are 
addressing the consequence of the unlawful act or omission: has the interest of an innocent 
third party been violated or not? The mental element is irrelevant: the civil law confines 
itself to the question as to whether the Defendant was to blame for that consequence. 
 
This is precisely identifiable in the evolution of liability for negligence, in which the 
Claimant must persuade the Court that it has suffered an actionable and careless infliction 
of damage as a result of the breach of a duty of care by the Defendant. The principles of the 
tort of negligence were founded upon establishing a duty that arose as a result of the 
relationship between the parties, and that the duty was broken. In Grant v Australian 
Knitting Mills213, Lord Wright emphasised the priority under English law first to establish 
duty before liability can be addressed; the mere fact that a person suffers loss, even by the 
act or omission of another, does not by itself give a cause of action against another. The oft-
quoted maxim of Brett MR (then Lord Esher) in Le Lievre v Gould214 remains compelling: 
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A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he 
owes no duty to them. 
 
The key to establishing liability, therefore, hinges upon the underpinning evidence which 
established that relationship in law - evidence which, in civil proceedings, must persuade 
WKH&RXUWRI WKH&ODLPDQW¶V FDVHRQ WKHEalance of probabilities. Lord Denning famously 
GHVFULEHG WKH &ODLPDQW¶V EXUGHQ DV KDYLQJ WR SHUVXDGH WKH &RXUW RQ WKH EDODQFH RI
probabilities that the facts underpinned its case. If, on the underpinning evidence, the Court 
thinks it more probable than not, the burden is discharged; if the probabilities are merely 
equal, then it has not215. 
  
The case of Donoghue v Stevenson216 defines the principles in the current law. In this case 
the appellant sought to recover damages from the respondent, who was a manufacturer of 
aerated waters, for injuries she suffered as a result of consuming part of the contents of a 
bottle of ginger beer which had been manufactured by the respondent, and which contained 
the decomposed remains of a snail. The ginger beer had been purchased for the appellant by 
a friend in a café and arrived at the table in its customary bottle of dark opaque glass, when 
the appellant had no reason to suspect that it contained anything but pure ginger beer; 
having had some of the contents poured into a tumbler, which she drank quite uneventfully, 
her friend was then proceeding to pour the remainder of the ginger beer into the tumbler 
when a decomposed snail accompanied the rest of the contents out of the bottle. The 
appellant claimed damages for alleged shock and severe gastro-enteritis. The appellant 
further averred that the ginger beer was manufactured by the respondent to be sold as a 
drink to the public (including the appellant); that it was bottled by the respondent and 
labelled by him with a label bearing his name; and that the bottles were thereafter sealed 
with a metal cap by the respondent. She further averred that it was the duty of the 
respondent to provide a system of working his business which would not allow snails to get 
into his ginger beer bottles, and that it was also his duty to provide an efficient system of 
inspection of the bottles before the ginger beer was filled into them, and that he had failed 
in both these duties and had so caused the event. 
 
,WZDV/RUG$WNLQ¶VVSHHFKZKLFKGHILQHd the modern principle, introducing the concept of 
the neighbour as the party to whom the Defendant owed a duty of care: 
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You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is 
my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which 
are called in question217.  
 
Lord Atkin's colleagues illuminated his observation with their own analysis of this 
redefined principle of duty. It is apparent that Donoghue v Stevenson brought evolution, not 
revolution, to the law of negligence; nevertheless, it was this humble bottle of ginger beer 
which provided the hard case that led to the illumination of the principles underpinning the 
tort of negligence, although the principles themselves had not changed. This is well-
evidenced by the nineteenth century collision cases in the River Thames, when the 
underpinning evidence was not contractual but statutory, in the form of the London River 
By-laws, Admiralty Regulations and Common Law rules on liability ± as Dowell v General 
Steam revealed (albeit demonstrating the inconsistency between the bodies of law)218. That 
being said, Donoghue v Stevenson clarified the principle so that the Claimant must establish 
on the balance of probabilities: 
 
a) that the Defendant, the party alleged to be negligent had a duty to the injured party to 
avoid acts or omissions which might cause him loss or damage ± for example, the Master, 
who is responsible for safety on board their ship, clearly owes a duty of care as a result as 
regards lawful visitors to the ship, whether or not they are contracting parties219. 
 
b) that the Defendant was in breach of that duty of care, generally by showing that his 
conduct fell below the reasonably expected standard to be owed by such persons in those 
circumstances. 
 
c) the Claimant must have suffered damage as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
Defendant's breach of duty. 
                         
217
 Donoghue (or McAlister) v Stevenson [1932] All ER Rep 1; [1932] AC 562, p580 
218
 Dowell v. General Steam Navigation Co (1855) 5 El & Bl 195 
219
 Mention must be made of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, where the House of 
Lords held that in novel factual situations, for a duty of care to exist, there must be (a) proximity between 
the parties, (b) foreseeability of harm / loss and (c) it must be fair, just and reasonable for the law to impose 
the duty; subsequently applied in Marc Rich & Co AG and Others -v- Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd and 
Others [1995] 3 All ER 307; [1995] UKHL 4; [1996] 1 AC 211; [1995] CLC 934; [1995] 2 LLR 299; 
[1996] ECC 120; [1995] 3 WLR 227; [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 299, in which Lord Steyn said that the 
common law of negligence develops incrementally on the basis of a consideration of analogous cases 
where a duty has been recognised or desired. 
 133 
 
Damages are awarded in compensation with the purpose of putting the Claimant in the 
position he would have been in, had the negligence not taken place ± so long as that is all 
that the measure of damages does; they certainly cannot put the Claimant in a better 
position than he would have been220.  
 
This gallop through the general principles of negligence starkly demonstrates the foundation 
principle characterising the tort that the DeIHQGDQW¶V VWDWH RI PLQG ± their mens rea, 
essentially ± is not the determining factor in their culpability. For all the motives of the 
Master of the Tasman Pioneer in exacerbating an already serious casualty, the subjective 
motivation of the Master could not change the quality of their acts or omissions in the 
navigation of the vessel so as to alter the laws of civil liability221. 
   
Characteristics of a Crime 
 
By contrast with the civil law, crimes are wrongs which threaten the well-being of Society 
and, to that extent WKH\ JR EH\RQG WKH PHUH LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK VRPH LQGLYLGXDO¶V SULYDWH
right; in short, Society must be protected. Sir Carlton Allen had it thus222: 
 
Crime is crime because it consists in wrongdoing which directly and in serious 
degree threatens the security or well-being of society, and because it is not safe 
to leave it redressable only by compensation of the party injured. 
 
Smith and Hogan convey a compelling image in what defines the characteristics of a crime, 
which can be very subjective223: 
 
WhHQDFLWL]HQLVKHDUGXUJLQJWKDW³7KHUHRXJKWWREHDODZDJDLQVWLW«´KHLV
expressing his personal conviction that some variety of act is so harmful to 
society that it ought to be discouraged by being made the subject of criminal 
proceedings. 
 
The next sentence has stark significance for this work:  
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There will almost invariably be a body of opinion which disagrees224. 
 
The conflicting bodies of opinion need not be confined to a particular jurisdiction however; 
there is nothing to prevent the observation applying to a body of opinion in a Port State with 
that in a Flag State, if the law in question is to be applied against both.  
 
Smith and Hogan proceed with some critical analysis of the development of criminal law in 
England with the view that there has been a disproportionate use of the criminal law to 
deal with regulatory offences225. In view of the purpose of the regulatory offences for 
pollution envisaged in UNCLOS and MARPOL, this demonstrates a key clash between the 
theory of criminal accountability DQG WKH 0DVWHU¶V FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ IRU SROOXWLRQ RIIHQFHV
The theory has been expanded by the Law Commission in a consultation paper published in 
2010226, in which it states that a crime should only be defined with a view to punishing an 
individuals whose seriously reprehensible conduct deserve the stigma associated with a 
criminal conviction. Most pertinently, it states: 
 
It should not be used as the primary means of promoting regulatory objectives. 
 
In the context of this theory, we can establish a simple definition of the characteristics of a 
crime, which needs just two elements:  
 
1 The actus reus contains all the elements in the definition of the crime except the 
Defendant's mental element. It is generally, but not invariably, made up of the Defendant's 
conduct and sometimes the consequences of that conduct, as well as the circumstances in 
which the conduct took place. 
 
2  The Prosecution must also establish the Defendant's Guilty Mind, or mens rea. The 
primary function of the Prosecution case therefore must be to establish the Defendant's 
intention to commit the crime227. A result is intended when it is established beyond 
reasonable doubt as the Defendant's purpose - that is, that it was the intended result.  
 
This was qualified by section 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967, which provides that, when 
assessing whether the Defendant had the necessary mens rea, the Jury shall not be bound to 
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infer that the Defendant intended or foresaw the result of his actions merely because it is the 
natural and probable result of those actions, but by the subjective test of whether he actually 
did intend or foresee that such result would ensue, but the Jury must apply the test 
objectively by drawing such inferences from the evidence as appears proper in the 
circumstances (the Statute¶VRZQZRUGV 
 
This reference to the 1967 Act illustrates the point that it is up to Parliament as to how it 
qualifies the requirement of mens rea in general; how particular issues are refined, may be 
established by decided cases. A notable example of this in context is recklessness, 
qualifying the requirement of intent, which will incriminate a person in a particular offence 
depending on his awareness of a risk given the circumstances or the result that may be 
apprehended from the circumstances228.   
 
In crLPLQDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WKH 3URVHFXWLRQ PXVW HVWDEOLVK WKDW WKH 'HIHQGDQW¶V PHQV UHD
coincides with the actus reus required for the crime. If ever there is an illustrative authority 
which blends instruction with entertainment, it is the non-marine case of Deller229. The 
Defendant persuaded a third party to purchase his car by representing that it was free from 
encumbrances. Deller, however, had previously borrowed money from a finance company 
which had taken a mortgage over the car as security and, so, he believed that he was telling 
a lie ± satisfying the mental element of dishonesty. When it transpired that the car was 
mortgaged and, therefore, very unfree from encumbrances, he was charged with obtaining 
property by false pretences by intentionally misrepresenting a past or existing fact, contrary 
to section 32 of the Larceny Act 1916. But it then transpired that the bill of sale for the 
transaction had not been registered in accordance with legal requirements and, therefore, the 
mortgage was void. The car, therefore, had been free from encumbrances all along, so the 
DFWXV UHXV IRU WKH FULPH ZDV QRW SUHVHQW DQG 0U 'HOOHU¶V FRQYLFWLRQ ZDV TXDVKHG RQ
appeal230. 
 
The requirement of mens rea remains the key issue in determining criminal accountability; 
this most ancient of bastions in criminal law was upheld by Lord Reid in Sweet v Parsley231, 
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in the presumption that Parliament does not intend to make criminals of people who are not 
blameworthy for what they did232, quoting the venerable Brett J in R v Prince233: 
 
Upon all the cases I think it is proved that there can be no conviction for crime 
in England in the absence of a criminal mind or mens rea. 
 
The demands made by the requirement of mens rea on criminal liability require some 
qualification of the general principle, if a person, who does not intend to cause a harmful 
result, takes an unjustifiable risk of causing it. Such is the foundation of recklessness, in 
which either the Defendant was aware of its existence or, in the case of an obvious risk, the 
Defendant failed to give any thought to the possibility of its existence234. This will be 
examined in more detail below, for its importance to the argument concerning negligence 
cannot be understated.  
 
No such demands of legal principles are required in a civil claim, however: merely, that the 
&ODLPDQW KDV VXIIHUHG ORVV DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH 'HIHQGDQW¶V EHKDYLRXU  7KH JXOI
between civil liability and criminal liability rests, ultimately, therefore, on how the law 
determines blameworthiness. If the differences between the two are irreconcilable, then the 
gulf must be unbridgeable. 
 
The Gulf: Criminal Accountability for Negligence 
 
Lord Hailsham famously re-VWDWHG %UHWW -¶V PD[LP ZKHQ KH KHOG RELWHU LQ Haughton v 
Smith235,  
 
The deed does not make a man guilty unless his mind be also guilty. 
 
The crucial issue is that this clarifies the common law and applies also to crimes under 
statute law, because English statute law falls short in giving guidance on crimes involving 
negligent behaviour236. The excellent reason for this, is that, historically, English law did 
not identify a concept of criminal negligence. In order to dissect and analyse this, therefore, 
we must seek some guidance elsewhere on just what the State intended.  
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For all the faults of the American system as demonstrDWHG LQ &DSWDLQ 6FKU|GHU¶V FDVH
Article 33 of the Criminal Code can be paraphrased to provide a sound starting point with 
the guidance that an act committed with express intent to bring the desired consequence 
upon the victim ± or with the acknowledgment of the inevitability of such a consequence by 
WKH'HIHQGDQW¶VDFWLRQ - shall be considered as a crime. This establishes the first of three 
limbs falling within the definition of mens rea as originally developed in Roman Law, with 
the concept of dolus directus (direct intent), where the consequences of an action were both 
foreseen and desired by the Defendant.  
 
Naturally it is essential that this eventuality can be rejected in a case of negligence, which 
conveniently leaves two alternatives to be addressed. In this respect, the range of opinion 
differs, not only as to analysis but even as to definition. The American Criminal Code237 
offers the distinction, and can be paraphrased in that: 
 
1 A crime will be committed negligently if the Defendant foresaw the consequence of 
their action as reckless, that is, if the Defendant saw the risk or inevitability of the 
consequence in the action, and went ahead with the action nevertheless, thus allowing the 
consequence to follow or treating the risk with indifference;  
 
2 by comparison, a crime will be committed by negligence if the Defendant either had 
foreseen the possibility of the risk to the victim and expected without valid reasons that the 
consequence would be prevented, or had not foreseen the possibility of the consequence but 
should have done. 
 
By creatively associating common factors from a range of academic opinion in Roman 
Law, some parallels can be drawn:   
 
1 Dolus indirectus, where some collateral consequence of an act falls upon the victim 
and, although foreseeable as a certainty, the consequence was not specifically desired by the 
Defendant; nevertheless, he carried on regardless, with full knowledge of the risk.  
 
2 Dolus eventualis is defined where the Defendant foresees as a possibility ± not 
necessarily a certainty - the consequence which befell the victim, and still proceeds with the 
act in question. 
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A great deal of disagreement, not to say confusion, bedevils the analysis of the two as 
discrete levels of negligence, both in academic arguments and in case law, giving rise to the 
inevitability of confusion. In reality, both fall within the category of a crime committed 
negligently under the American Code, without addressing the crime committed by 
negligence. On that basis, the American system touches parts that the Roman system cannot 
UHDFKQDPHO\ WKH'HIHQGDQW¶VDVVXPSWLRQRI WKHULVN± in other words, the consciousness 
and acceptance of the risk. In analysing the Canadian model, Lareau238 supports the phrase 
coigned by Fletcher to characterise the distinFWLRQE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHµLQQHUSRVWXUH¶RIWKH
Defendant, describing the state of mind which embraces consciousness and acceptance of 
the risk, even if it were not the primary consequence desired by the Defendant239.  
 
If the logic of the argument is developed, therefore, had the risk not formed part of the 
'HIHQGDQW¶VPHQWDOHOHPHQWWKHQWKHUHZRXOGQRWEHWKHPHQVUHDIRUDFULPH,WLVWKLVVWDWH
RIPLQGZKLFKRIIHUVWKHNH\WRWKHVROXWLRQIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VVWDWH
of mind must necessarily be established by a subjective test, analysing guilt by the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLQWHQWUDWKHUWKDQE\WKHWHVWZKLFKSODFHVWKHMXU\¶VIRFXVRQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHV
RIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWV 
 
The application of the principle in the context of negligence must, therefore, rest upon the 
definition of the appropriate test. Having discredited thoroughly the objective nature of the 
test in R v Adomako240 and condemned it in Williams v Natural Life Health Foods241, a 
subjective test must offer the only alternative. The only outstanding issue that can remotely 
IDOOWREHGHWHUPLQHGLVZKHWKHUWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VµLQQHUSRVWXUH¶KDGEHHQµUHDVRQDEOH¶7KH
question of reasonableness was defined in R v K242, when the ever-redoubtable Lord 
Bingham put the position that the Defendant's belief must be established as honest and 
genuine; if so, it need not necessarily be reasonable by any objective standard, although, the 
more unreasonable the belief, the less likely it is to be accepted as genuine.243 
 
In essence, therefore, criminal liability will depend upon the question as to whether the 
'HIHQGDQW¶V VWDWH RI PLQG DPRXQWHG WR UHFNOHVVQHVV If the Master of a vessel genuinely 
does not apprehend the risk that a crime could occur as a result of their action, then, at most, 
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they have made an error of judgment, which leaves them blamelessly inadvertent; while 
such may still leave them accountable in the tort of negligence, it does not incriminate them 
in a crime. The test has been established under English law, in a succession of cases in 
criminal damage, culminating in the House of Lords decision in R v G244. While striving to 
interpret the Will of Parliament ± ZKLFKLVWKH&RXUW¶VSULPHIXQFWLRQLQWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
of criminal law - the House of Lords held a subjective standard to apply so that, a person 
who, without lawful excuse, destroys or damages any property belonging to another, either 
with intent or by recklessness, will be guilty if he is aware of the risk that a circumstance 
exists or will exist; or a result when he is aware of a risk that the result will inevitably 
follow; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk. 
  
Such basic principles have evolved through a succession of judicial decisions, particularly 
as to recklessness. In fairness, these characterise the very essence of a hard case, which 
demands a consideration of the legal principles involved in order to ensure the best possible 
result, even if this means ignoring previously-established rules. Naturally, the judge will 
manage the process by drawing upon the arguments presented by the advocates ± &LFHUR¶V
sage observation is as relevant today as ever, that if cases could speak for themselves, no 
one would employ an advocate245 ± but, in hard cases, the judge can influence the system.  
 
The coQVWDQWIDFWRUUXQQLQJWKURXJKDOORIWKHPFOHDUO\WRXFKHVXSRQWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VVWDWH
of mind. In R v G246 Lord Bingham articulated the point beyond any doubt that conviction 
of a serious crime should depend on proof not simply that the Defendant caused (by act or 
omission) an injurious result to another but that his state of mind when so acting was 
culpable. Taking an obvious and significant risk by intention or recklessness would satisfy 
Lord Bingham of a guilty mind but not if the Defendant did not perceive the risk; whatever 
that made him, it did not make him a criminal.247 
 
Neither one thing nor the other 
 
The evolution of the criminalisation of the Master has run parallel with the hard-fought 
campaigns in which the Courts have struggled to define criminal liability for negligence, 
that is, guilt in the absence of intention or recklessness. Perhaps it was a solution that was 
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all too easy, to take the principles of the tort of Negligence and seek to apply them to a 
crime, notwithstanding the irreconcilable differences between their characteristics.  
 
It is an uncomfortable paradox, that the modern tort of negligence has had a critical, and 
potentially critically-GDPDJLQJHIIHFWRQWKH0DVWHU¶VFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\LQWKHPDWWHU
of manslaughter. Not that such a thing can be explained easily; in his paper The Homicide 
Ladder in the Modern Law Review248, Victor Tadros made psychology the interrogator of 
the question of human behaviour when it comes to putting manslaughter into the context of 
normative ethics. The conclusion finds that, when a sudden death takes place, it is human 
nature for people to find somebody to blame, and the reasoning behind the conclusions 
drawn may not bear any similarity with principles of law. As a result, the blame process 
may not be mapped onto any legal argument defining the characteristics of the crime of 
manslaughter, which means that the normative ethics of society present the hazard to the 
process of a fair trial by demanding criteria that cannot be justified according to demands of 
jurisprudence.  If society demands redress, therefore, the law which is put in place to serve 
that demand must stand up to scrutiny according to basic concepts of fairness in criminal 
accountability. Manslaughter has proved particularly vulnerable to such scrutiny; indeed, 
the very starting point has proved troublesome, for a definition has been notoriously 
difficult to establish. In Andrews v DPP249, Lord Atkin went further and held out 
manslaughter as being the most difficult of all crimes to define. While the guilty mind in 
murder requires an intention to kill (malice aforethought), even if that intention is benign, 
manslaughter essentially turns on an absence of an intention to kill. The really difficult part 
about manslaughter, however, is establishing the factor which must still be proved, that of 
unlawfulness.  
 
A succession of cases over decades exposed the need to define just how evidence of the 
'HIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHRIPLQGVKRXOGXQGHUSLQJURVVQHJOLJHQFHXQWLOLQWKHFDVHRIR v 
Adomako250 established that the Defendant can be convicted of gross negligence 
manslaughter in the absence of evidence to his state of mind. In this case the Defendant was 
the anaesthetist during an eye operation on a patient. In the course of the operation the tube 
from the ventilator supplying oxygen to the patient became disconnected. The Defendant 
failed to notice the disconnection for some six minutes before the patient suffered a cardiac 
arrest, from which he subsequently died. The Defendant was charged with manslaughter. At 
his trial it was conceded on behalf of the Defendant that he had been negligent in the 
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tortious understanding of the word and medical evidence was called by the Crown that the 
Defendant had shown a gross dereliction of care. The judge directed the jury that the test to 
be applied was whether the Defendant had been guilty of gross negligence. The Defendant 
was convicted. 
 
Hearing the Appeal, the Lord Chancellor, Lord MacKay, referred to the opinion of Lord 
Hewart CJ in R v Bateman251 in underpinning his conclusion that the criminal law requires a 
fair and reasonable standard of care and competence in individuals in the position of Mr 
Adomako, according to the evidence required to establish liability in the civil tort of 
negligence. This, alone, creates a serious problem in the judicial process, for, as has been 
noted, in civil cases, the Claimant must persuade the Court that it has proved on the Balance 
of Probabilities the requisites for establishing liability, whereas in criminal cases, the 
Prosecution must persuade the Court that the case against the Defendant is proved Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt, by applying the evidence to the body of criminal law with all those 
characteristics special to it, that is, including the mens rea.   
 
As if the mischief iQ WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ ZHUH QRW FOHDU HQRXJK KRZHYHU WKH -XGJH
VXPPHGXS WKH3URVHFXWLRQ¶VWDVNDVWDNLQJ WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH WRUWDQG
applying an objective test in order to establish the crime. In words which were astonishingly 
unambiguous, the Judge directed the Jury that, in order to establish criminal liability on the 
charges in the Indictment, the Prosecution had to satisfy them that the matters simply 
necessary to establish liability in the civil tort of negligence had been proved. The only 
factor which went beyond this level was that the facts had to persuade the jury that the 
negligence (or incompetence ± WKH -XGJH¶V ZRUG RI WKH $FFXVHG went beyond a mere 
matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to 
amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment252.  
 
The Judge's observations on the application of civil liability massively outweigh that 
devoted to criminal liability; but, to summarise the principle in this case, the jury needs to 
consider whether: 
 
x the Defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; and  
x he was in breach of that duty; and 
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x the breach was so grossly negligent that it should be seen as criminal253. 
 
This third factor introduces into the civil test the criminal issues contained in the passage 
italicized above. Lord MacKay defined gross negligence as depending: 
 
«Rn the seriousness of the breach of the duty committed by the defendant in all 
the circumstances in which he was placed when it occurred and whether, having 
regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in 
DOOWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDVWRDPRXQWLQWKHMXU\¶VMXGJPHQW254 to a criminal act or 
omission255. 
 
7KHZKROHLVVXHRIWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VVWDWHRIPLQGKLVPHQVUHDIRUWKHFULPH, has therefore 
been put into the form of an objective test determined by the circumstances and grafted on 
to the evidential test required for liability in civil proceedings. However the opponents of 
Immanuel Kant might urge him to fall back into his former dogmatic slumber256, the logical 
WUXWKRIWKLVJUHDWWKLQNHU¶VSKLORVRSK\H[SRVHVWKHIDWDOIODZLQWKHREMHFWLYHWHVWZLWKWKH
direct consequence that the crime of criminal negligence cannot be sustained. 
 
 
The Catastrophic Failure of Criminal Negligence  
 
Kant identified the key characteristic of Truth as being something subjective. It may be 
beneficial to illustrate his, admittedly highly tortuously-argued, philosophy with a favourite 
anecdote which has been so oft-repeated as to arouse the suspicion of appearing apocryphal; 
nevertheless it serves the task well. Kant was attending a lecture by a materialistic 
astronomer on the topic of man's place in the Universe. The astronomer concluded his 
lecture with:  
 
So you see that astronomically speaking, Man is utterly insignificant.  
 
Kant replied, 
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Professor, you forgot the most important thing, Man is the astronomer.257  
 
Applying this in context, the underpinning issues of jurisprudence in the criminal law, so 
FORVHO\ DIIHFWLQJ WKH 'HIHQGDQW¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV Gemands that the jury wrestles with the 
objective test dictated by Adomako in finding the Truth, which opposes intractably the 
reasoning of Kant. Rather, the test of the timeless criminal element of mens rea must 
logically demand a subjective test, which reDGLO\ HQJDJHV ZLWK .DQW¶V SKLORVRSK\ 7KH
yawning gap between civil and criminal liability was, and remains, the burden of proving 
the essential elements. If the principle for establishing liability in Donoghue v Stevenson 
were to be applied in criminal proceedings, it would readily be identified that the core 
feature of the test is objective, while the determination of the mental element in a crime is 
subjective. This is the very reason why Judge Bender so forcefully ruled a consideration of 
a mere error of judgment out of the test for negligence in Passarello v Grumbine258: the 
objective test is the only thing that will do in negligence. To seek to translate this test from 
the civil to the criminal context renders its character unsuitable to the task and, thus, the 
conviction in Adomako should be rejected as being unsafe. The criminal practitioner would 
doubtless argue that the Adomako test is the only basis upon which criminal negligence can 
be established ± in which case criminal negligence must be fatally flawed.  
 
This can be illustrated graphically in the contrast between the cases of Hubble and 
Schröder. In R v Hubble259, in which the Defendant, Second Officer on the P & O Ferry 
Pride of Bilbao pleaded Not Guilty to three counts of Manslaughter alleged to have taken 
place between the 20th and 24th August 2006. The Prosecution had to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that, by his gross negligence, Mr Hubble, when officer of the watch, did 
not take sufficient steps to avoid the looming situation warned by the look-out, that he 
failed to proceed on the basis that there might have been a collision, and that he took no 
steps to stop or inform rescue services. As the evidence unfolded, it is possible that some 
carelessness may have been established on the level of the civil burden, the balance of 
probabilities, but what they heard was insufficient to persuade the jury that the Prosecution 
had discharged their burden in criminal law of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. 
Unable to reach even a majority decision, a verdict of Not Guilty was returned. 
 
In the case of Mr Hubble, the verdict gave the Defendant cause to breathe a sigh of relief. 
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The element of the yawning gap between civil and criminal liability in negligence, however, 
which gives growing cause for concern, was highlighted very starkly in the case of Captain 
Wolfgang Schröder. Judge Granade accurately identified the weakness in determining guilt 
in a criminal trial according to the standards demanded of a law whose modern origins are 
founded on a claim for compensation arising out of a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. This 
DSSUDLVDOVXUHO\XQGHUOLQHVWKHZLVGRPRI6LU&DUOHWRQ$OOHQ¶VYLHZRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI
a crime, which consists in some wrongdoing which directly and in serious degree threatens 
the security or well-being of society, and because it is not safe to leave it redressable only 
by compensation of the party injured.260 In the context of this work, though, this may be 
insufficient on its own, for it is necessary to identify the society concerned: is it the security 
or well-being of the society of the Port State or the society of the maritime society in which 
the Master enjoys their own security or well-being, in other words their human rights?  
 
,QPLPLFU\RIDVFHQHIURP7KH(PSHURU¶V1HZ&lothes, precious little word of caution has 
followed the application of the civil principles of negligence through Adomako and 
2¶&RQQRU to the criminal arena; but Judge Granade may have articulated a new argument in 
this context. 
 
She has not been alone in WKLV 6SHDNLQJ LQ WKH /RQGRQ 6KLSSLQJ /DZ &HQWUH¶V th 
Cadwallader Memorial Lecture in 2005, Epaminondas Embiricos took the part of advocate 
for the industry, making a valid point in a critical analysis of the EU Directive on Criminal 
Sanctions for Ship SRXUFH3ROOXWLRQZKHQKH FULWLFLVHG WKH  WHUP µVHULRXVQHJOLJHQFH¶ DV
being vague, subjective and ill defined.   When confronted with the task of criminal law to 
define clearly and specifically the rights and obligations of individuals towards Society, the 
term therefore fails to serve the purpose of the law even in its own name, and for such lack 
of clarity a Defendant could be convicted in circumstances which might be very damaging 
WRWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VKXPDQULJKWVZKLOHWKHFRQYLFWLRQKDGEHHQVHFXUHGE\an interpretation 
which, rather, suited the normative ethics of society within that jurisdiction. In the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVRID0DVWHU¶VSURVHFXWLRQIRUtheir behaviour in a pollution event, the vague 
notion of criminal negligence therefore would suit the local jurisdiction even though it was 
LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHJOREDOPDULWLPHFRPPXQLW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIIDLUQHVV 
 
If behaviour is to be the subject of control by criminal law, it is essential that the law in 
question is, at the very least, precise. The Courts must apply the definition of the crime 
according to the intention of the body that legislated it (in the case of the UK, of course, that 
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would be Parliament) and, so, they are presented with an exceptional problem when the 
Intention of Parliament is impossible to fathom in a given circumstance, such as with a term 
that is vague and whose defining principles were founded on decisions in civil proceedings 
whose process is different from that in question ± as we find in the situation in which the 
modern law of negligence, stemming from a claim for damages arising out of a bottle of 
contaminated ginger beer that must be determined on the balance of probabilities according 
to civil evidence procedures, has driven the criminal law in which criminal evidence 
procedures must deliver a verdict beyond reasonable doubt. This scenario takes us firmly 
into the realm of jurisprudence, which is the foundation stone of good governance. Kelsen 
expressed the Pure Theory of Law 261 in very simple terms as having the exclusive objective 
of accurate definition of its subject-matter. With such a reliable foundation, the judicial 
process can apply the defined law safely to any given problem scenario and draw a 
compelling conclusion, in the form of a verdict. 
 
Whoever makes the Master accountable in their jurisdiction in this emerging phenomenon, 
therefore, must respond to the challenge, posed by the global seafaring community, that 
criminal negligence fails to meet the basic demands of jurisprudence. As we have seen, the 
purpose of the criminal process is to punish the offender, whereas the purpose of the civil 
law of negligence is to compensate the innocent party, without any notion of punishment262; 
Drane and Neal263 DUJXHSHUVXDVLYHO\WKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIµSXQLVKPHQW¶QHFHVVDULO\LQYROYes 
the infliction of some sort of pain, which prima facie violates the fundamental right of 
freedom from pain. As a result, an assumption of the law of criminal negligence carries with 
it the obligation to establish the moral justification for making a crime out of negligence; in 
other words, the legal process must identify the criminal elements of the conduct which 
justify inflicting the pain of punishment rather than simply requiring the offender to pay 
damages. Drane and Neal argue that such moral justification can be established, upon 
proving three elements which are intimately intertwined: a moral theory, interests to be 
protected, and a convincing argument that those interests may be protected by 
criminalisation within the constraints of the moral theory 264.  If it cannot be justified, then 
the process cannot be defended. From this standpoint, they develop their argument which 
establishes the indispensable need for a moral justification to determine just where the 
boundary lies between a crime and a tort. Much of this justification is founded on the 
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emotional response by society which defines what constitutes a wrong which cannot be 
resolved by compensation to the innocent party but must be punished by the State. 
 
But we may take the Socratic approach a little further here and challenge just how society 
responds ± not to the consequences of the behaviour but to the criminalisation of that 
behaviour. The evidence indicates that the normative ethics of the risk society in Port States 
have driven the phenomenon, demanding criminal regulation of environmental protection; 
but just ZKDWGHWHUPLQHVWKHULVNVRFLHW\¶VFROOHFWLYHPLQGWRPDNHDFULPHRXWRIZKDWDW
most, would be a tort? Richard Epstein wrote a paper on the Tort / Crime Distinction as 
early as 1977265; he revisited the issue in 1996 in the light of the avalanche of American 
regulatory law that had taken place in the intervening years266. It was his clear observation 
that the expansion of criminalisation by the creation of regulatory offences on an industrial 
scale really did little to shape the opinions of ordinary people ± the very society for whom 
the moral justification of criminal negligence is made out267 ± as to what conduct should be 
legal or not. He pointed out the irony that it was only lawyers who saw legal opinions as 
formative influences shaping the underpinning moral judgments for criminalising some 
behaviour268 ,Q WKH ZLGHU VFKHPH RI WKH VRFLHW\ ZKRVH QRUPDWLYH HWKLFV GULYH VRFLHW\¶V
moral judgments, Epstein challenges the validity of the criminalisation phenomenon as 
serving society ± rather, he says, the phenomenon is more likely to undermine the views of 
ordinary people in society as to what should or should not be a crime269. 270His conclusion 
sums up the grounds for suspicion which Drane and Neal had shared: 
 
We need to worry about the line between the tort and the crime. But we also need 
to shrink both domains simultaneously271. 
 
Drane and Neal concluded that their examination of the moral justification for the tort / 
crime distinction merely served to expose the deficiencies in the theories underpinning that 
justification, and the exercise demonstrated that the boundaries between a crime and a tort 
have not been established. Certainly that supports the opinion of the global seafaring 
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community which responds to each case of criminal negligence which it confronts; criminal 
negligence, indeed, is neither one thing nor the other and it would be wholly wrong to 
inflict the pain of punishment rather than to compensate the innocent party; and this 
undermines the entire rationale for making a crime of the negligent behaviour272. As a 
result, WKH FDVH DJDLQVW &DSWDLQ 6FKU|GHU FDQ KDUGO\ EH MXVWLILHG DQG -XGJH *UDQDGH¶V
observations articulate a valid condemnation of criminal negligence.  
 
It should not be pUHVXPHGWKDWVXFKDSUREOHPDV&DSWDLQ6FKU|GHU¶VFDVHFRXOGQRWKDSSHQ
in an English Court. The test to be put to the jury for determining guilt in gross negligence 
manslaughter in Adomako ZDV UHILQHG E\ WKH GHFLVLRQ LQ 2¶&RQQRU WZR \HDUV ODWHU RI
course it still relies for its foundation on the civil case of Donoghue v Stevenson. Hard cases 
demand minute critical analysis of the legal principles involved, but the expression of 
judicial authority behind that analysis may trade infallibility for the refuge of a safe option ± 
an option, in this case, of seizing upon a principle founded in civil law as the cornerstone 
for a principle in criminal law. The underlying weakness in such unsafe law is analogous 
with a theory known to mathematicians for generations as the propagation and 
compounding of errors: Whenever calculations are done using imprecise numbers, then the 
numbers resulting from the calculations are also imprecise. This weakness is at the core of 
WKHVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\¶VGLVPD\RYHUWKHXQIDLUQHVVRI criminal accountability of the Master 
in twenty-first century society. What compounds the problem even more, is the 
exacerbation of the mischief at the hands of sovereign jurisdictions globally.  
 
Conclusions on Criminal Negligence 
 
7KH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDEility necessarily hinges upon their judgment, in which they have the 
discretion allowed in current law, as it has allowed for generations, to make decisions about 
what to do and when to do it. How they discharge the burden of their accountability will be 
determined by their awareness, or conscious assumption, of the risk that will follow. If they 
hold their belief in the consequences genuinely, then they will have discharged their burden 
in criminal law ± ZLWKWKHDVLGHRI/RUG%LQJKDP¶VZLVGRPWKDWthe more unreasonable the 
belief, the less likely it is to be accepted as genuine. 
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Had the Master of the Hebei Spirit been accountable by this standard, the reasonable 
likelihood is that his acquittal would have been secure. Had the Master of the Tasman 
Pioneer been tried by this standard (at least for the criminal damage of the deck cargo), the 
reasonable likelihood is that a conviction would have followed. 
 
The emerging conclusion, however, on the validity of the assumptions underlying the 
perception of the MaVWHU¶V FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ JLYHV IRUP DQG VXEVWDQFH WR WKH WKHRU\ RI D
flawed system of justice to which the Master has become exposed.  Criminal accountability 
for statutory standards of ship safety, and the maintenance of order and discipline on board 
the ship, evolving for some two hundred years, have been held blameless. The golden 
thread running through the analysis identifies the far more recent evolution of criminal 
QHJOLJHQFH DV WKDW ZKLFK KDV XQGHUSLQQHG WKH FXUUHQW SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V
criminalisation. Whoever makes the Master accountable in their jurisdiction, therefore, must 
satisfy the test for moral justification for criminal negligence, or abandon it. No persuasive 
argument for a moral justification has been conveyed to the author yet.  
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3.2 The Unchecked Mischief of Sovereign Jurisdiction273 
 
Overview 
 
Running through the whole problem of Criminalisation is a constant theme: 
 
z The lack of consistency within those Courts in the way in which the philosophies of 
different criminal jurisdictions address the accountability of the Master.  
 
z But these are the jurisdictions of sovereign states, and the basic right of a state must 
be preserved - the right to protect their laws from external influence.  
 
Whichever way the mischief is analysed, this remains the elephant in the corner, and not a 
scrap of progress can be achieved without resolving its presence, for it is this constant 
theme which has led to the tensions between Port and Flag States. This section therefore 
examines the nature of sovereignty and the relationship between sovereign states. 
Paradoxically, the analysis of the problem areas in sovereignty has revealed a possible 
VROXWLRQ WR WKH &ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ SKHQRPHQRQ E\ UHIHUHQFH WR WKH 0DVWHU¶V SRVLWLRQ DV DQ
organ of the Flag State. 
 
(i) The Character of Sovereignty 
 
If one is permitted to paraphrase Max Weber, it makes it a little easier to define a State in 
context as a community of people ± its Society - which is controlled by its management 
power having a monopoly of legitimate force over them. In a democracy the force of law is 
defined and limited according to the normative ethics of that Society, upon which no 
external power should trespass. Thus it can be established that the criminalisation of certain 
behaviour which characterises SocieW\¶V QRUPDWLYH HWKLFV LV D PDWWHU IRU WKDW 6RFLHW\¶V
conscience ± that is, a case which falls to be determined according to those laws will be 
WULHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKDW6WDWH¶VUXOHVRIMXGLFLDOSURFHGXUH&UXFLDOO\WKDWLVDPDWWHUHQWLUHO\
for their self-determination, which is the freedom cry that defines Sovereignty. 
 
Naturally, State Sovereignty has been guarded jealously with the evolution of the body of 
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law which regulates the relationship between States; this extends not just to the acts of 
States themselves but also the subjects of those States, with or without their State's 
authority.  The ageless work by Oppenheim on international law274 introduces an issue 
which, to parody countless epitaphs, has been forgotten but has never actually gone, that the 
notion of international law imposes the obligation on every State to take such steps through 
legislative management and control of its own subjects, and others residing in its own 
territory, so as to minimise the risks that they might commit acts which may cause physical 
injury to, or prejudice the rights of, other States, insofar as that injury or those rights have 
been defined and agreed between the States in question.  This transposes well to the case of 
the Master, who is to all intents and purposes a representative, an official, of the Flag State. 
7RWDNH2SSHQKHLP¶VSURSRVLWLRQIXUWKHULQWKLVFRQWH[WWKRXJKWKHEHVWZKLFKD6WDWHFDQ
do is to use due diligence in meeting its obligations to its fellow High Contracting Parties, 
by regulating and controlling its Flag State Masters with laws and standards, in practice the 
Flag State cannot prevent all injurious acts which a private person might commit against 
another State, such as a Port State. That, of course, is where the criminal process may have 
to regulate the process with a fair sentencing system. 
 
The crux of the sovereignty issue in this context demands absolute clarity about whether the 
person is to be regarded as a private person, that is, a person who is not cloaked with the 
authority of the State, or a person who does have such authority.275 The distinction arises 
because the State must take responsibility for official acts of administrative officials, or at 
least for acts conducted in their official capacity, even if unauthorised, and that 
responsibility is owed to the other State in question, whereas the State will not generally be 
responsible for the acts of private citizens acting in a private capacity. The concept is 
essentially simple because a State has no mind of its own but does have a legal personality. 
As such, it will act through the administrative organs of the State, on the authority of the 
democratic power. Therefore, the State can invest, for example, an individual with power, 
when they become an organ of the State, and their acts or omissions when acting officially 
in the capacity which the State has conferred upon them, amount to acts of that State, for 
which the State must be accountable and bear responsibility if, as a result of the conduct of 
that person, the interests of another State, or the citizen of another State, are damaged or 
compromised276. 
 
It was precisely this which led to the United States assuming the burden of responsibility 
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for the crimes of Commander Wilkes when he stopped and boarded RMS Trent on the high 
seas in November 1861. A State, therefore, bears responsibility for internationally injurious 
acts committed by such persons in the ostensible exercise of their official functions even if 
committed without that State's command or authorisation, or in excess of their competence 
according to the internal law of the State, or in mistaken, ill-judged or reckless execution of 
their official duties. A State's administrative officials are under its disciplinary control and 
all acts of such persons in the apparent exercise of their official functions or invoking 
powers appropriate to their official character are prima facie attributable to the state. This is 
well-illustrated by the Zafira case in 1925277 when the American-British Claims Arbitration 
Tribunal based the liability by the US for looting by the Chinese crew of a British supply 
ship attached to the American fleet upon the culpable lack of control by the officers.  
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(ii) Sovereignty: Causes and Cures 
 
The International Boundaries Research Unit at Durham University celebrated its 20th 
anniversary in 2009 with a Conference on the State of Sovereignty. Noora Arajarvi tackled 
the notion of sovereignty in international law as delivering legal impermeability ± that is, no 
foreign power has authority over the people. Summarising the wisdom of the German 
thinker Carl Schmidt, sovereignty allows a State to develop its own norms and values over 
which external forces have no prevailing voice. This introduces us to the dynamic tensions 
which international law places on a State in discharging its sovereign powers within its own 
jurisdiction. Oppenheim makes an assertion which has sometimes been lost amid twenty 
first century thinking278, that international law fundamentally comprises a body of rules 
which States Parties have voluntarily endorsed as the basis upon which they interact with 
each other; if one employs a simplistic analogy by reducing it in context to the private 
person, it is the same notion of self-regulation by a contractual agreement between 
individuals. In addition to binding States themselves, though, States can agree to make 
individuals within their sovereign jurisdiction subject to rights and obligations conferred by 
international law.  
 
If we apply this to the provisions of UNCLOS, therefore, we can draw conclusions on the 
obligations of the Flag State to others. Article 217 defines the obligations on Flag States to 
enforce the provisions of the Convention, stating inter alia that States must ensure that 
vessels flying their flag must comply with the Convention standards which the State has 
ratified. In reality, of course, this means that Flag State vessels must comply with Flag State 
regulations that must at least equal the Convention standards, for the prevention, reduction 
and control of pollution of the marine environment from those vessels, and the Flag State 
must pass enforcement measures to prevent or punish a violation of the regulations, 
irrespective of where that violation occurs. Crucially, Article 217 further compels the Flag 
State to carry out an immediate investigation of a violation of the minimum Convention 
laws, and where appropriate institute proceedings in respect of the alleged violation 
irrespective of where the violation occurred. If the Flag State fails to promulgate the 
necessary domestic legislation to ensure that its subjects, including the Master, comply, 
then the Port State concerned will take its grievance to the International Court of Justice or 
the International Tribunal, where the defending party will be the Flag State, not the Master. 
 
                         
278
 -HQQLQJV6LU5DQG6LU$:DWWVHG2SSHQKHLP¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZth ed 2nd impression, 
Longman, Harlow, 4; see also pp 16-17, 846-84 
 
 153 
In terms of law, this is entirely rational. A State which has allocated its flag to a vessel, 
extends its sovereignty to her, and the discharge of the duties arising out of that 6WDWH¶V
agreement with other States must necessarily be reposed in the person with the authority to 
manage the command of the ship. In this way the Flag State must logically have made the 
0DVWHU LWV UHSUHVHQWDWLYH LQ ZKRP LW KDV YHVWHG LWV FRQILGHQFH E\ YLUWXH RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V
Certificate of Competency. The Master thus becomes an organ of the State as understood by 
Oppenheim and, so the State must then bear the responsibility for the consequences of the 
0DVWHU¶V GHUHOLFWLRQ RI GXW\ WR WKH &RDVWDO 6WDWH ZKLOH H[HUFLVLQJ WKH RIILFLDO IXQFWLRQ RI
commanding that ship, even though they diGQRWKDYHWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶VVSHFLILFLQVWUXFWLRQRU
authorisation to carry out the act or omission in question. It is the very theory of liability 
ZLWKRXWEODPHZKLFKGHILQHVWKHPDVWHU¶VYLFDULRXVOLDELOLW\IRULWVVHUYDQW¶VQHJOLJHQFH 
 
For very good reasons, therefore, the Flag State defines in clear terms the standards which 
the command of a vessel must meet. In the UK, for instance, Section 47 Merchant Shipping 
Act 1995 empowers the Secretary of State for Transport to specify standards of competence 
to be attained and other conditions to be satisfied in order that a person shall be qualified to 
assume the position of Master of a UK-flag ship. With that power, the Secretary of State 
duly drafted the  Merchant Shipping (Training and Certification) Regulations 1997 which 
UHTXLUHVDSHUVRQ¶VVXLWDELOLW\WREHHYLGHQFHGE\WKHDZDUGRIa certificate of competency 
(or certificate of equivalent competency if their original certificate was awarded by a non-
UK authority). The final arbiter of such an award is the 6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VRZQH[SHUWLQ
the field, in the shape of the MCA. 
 
By the same token, the Flag State which awarded the Master their certificate can also take it 
away, or refuse to renew it. By no means need it be a Court. Section 61 of the 1995 Act 
provides that, if, after an inquiry, it appears to the Secretary of State (in fact, the MCA) that 
the Master is unfit to discharge their duties, whether by an event involving their serious 
negligence, or whether by reason of incompetence or misconduct or for any other reason, 
the persons holding the Statutory inquiry have the power to cancel or suspend any 
certificate issued to them under section 47, or just to censure them; theirs is a very wide 
discretionary power. 
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The Cause and the Cure 
In this way the State can manage and control the risk to which it is exposed when allocating 
its flag to a ship and, thus, it can satisfy itself that it can repose its confidence in the Master 
to protect its interests. Nathalie Horbach and Pieter Bekker illustrated the emerging legal 
risks to which the State is exposed in this context, in a paper published in 2003279, in which 
they emphasised the rapid evolution of international law in recent decades, particularly with 
regard to environmental protection, in order to mobilise all the forces of law, whether 
international or domestic, for the purpose of halting activities undertaken by one State 
which inflict environmentally injurious transboundary consequences on other States or 
territories beyond the jurisdiction of that State. This naturally casts focus on the Master who 
has been accredited to command the offending vessel to which the State has allocated its 
flag. 
 
The challenge, however, is to rationalise a link between the liability of the Flag State and 
the individual ± the Master ± arising out of the same law. Noora Arajarvi articulated the 
contemporary view among lawyers that international law cannot impose duties on 
individuals ± which, after all, is why conventions are codified in domestic law. In fact, this 
theory is flawed, to such an extent that it would be unsafe even to state it as a general 
principle without the qualification that there is nothing to stop a State from conferring 
directly on its citizens whatever rights it wants, including international rights and duties and 
make them, to that extent, accountable under the relevant body of international law, 
provided that the State has been clothed with such powers under its Constitution. In effect, 
the domestic courts within the State must give effect to the body of law contained in the 
treaty. 
 
This can be articulated most clearly by analysing the difference between the contrasting 
theories of monism and dualism. The monist approach sees the ratification by the State as 
bringing the treaty directly into force in the State's sovereign jurisdiction, so that it will 
come within the jurisdiction of its domestic Courts. By contrast, the dualist approach 
requires a treaty, even after ratification by the State, to be implemented into the State's body 
of law by domestic legislation before it can be enforced by the Courts. If a State embracing 
the dualist theory, therefore, ratifies a Convention but does not enforce it by domestic law, 
then the dualist assumes that its citizens cannot be clothed with rights or obligations under it 
and, of course, without the force of the domestic law the Courts cannot rule on it. This 
would not prevent another State which has ratified that Convention from pursuing the 
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defaulting State under the dispute resolution process stated in the treaty concerned; if the 
defaulting State's Courts rule that the citizen in question had not been accorded the relevant 
rights or obligations, that would not be an issue with which the complainant State would 
bother itself. 
 
An extreme example of a body of international law taking direct effect would even see the 
citizen prosecuted by a Court established by the treaty; and a recent example exists, in the 
Rome Statute, establishing the International Criminal Court. Under Article 25 the Court 
shall have jurisdiction over natural persons who are the subjects of those States which are 
parties to the Statute, and such a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the 
Statute.  
 
The critical issue in context is that, by extending the theory, provided that the Constitution 
so-permits, the Flag State in question has the power to make its Master accountable to laws 
which the State has agreed in obligations at an international level; as such, the aggrieved 
Port State has inherent rights against the Flag State with whom it had closed that agreement, 
and can refer its grievance to the United Nations if it is not satisfied that the Flag State has 
met those obligations. It is then for the Flag State to hold the Master accountable within its 
inherent jurisdiction by its very nature as sovereign controller of the vessel to which it has 
allocated its flag.  
 
Oppenheim supported this contention with the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig280, which stated 
that a State may expressly grant to individuals direct rights by a Treaty which it has ratified; 
the Opinion even went so far as to assert that such rights may validly exist and be 
enforceable without having been previously incorporated into domestic law281. From the 
SRLQWRIYLHZRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRWKH6WDWHLQDGHPRFUDF\WKLVODWWHUSRLQW
is open to argument, but the theory can be observed in the Rome Statute. 
 
In fact the evidence becomes ever more compelling with further analysis of current law. 
What has inconveniently been lost from sight in recent years, is the fact that a ubiquitous 
example of this is commonplace throughout the European Union. Crucial to the 
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achievement of the aims of the Treaty of Rome was Article 169 (Article 226 Treaty of 
Amsterdam), providing a mechanism for infringement proceedings to be initiated by the 
Commission against a defaulting Member State to ensure that the State concerned complies 
with its treaty obligations. In the course of addressing this, the necessity became clear to 
enforce Treaty provisions regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms owed to 
private individuals, who may in certain circumstances institute proceedings in order to 
secure their observation282. In the process of affording an individual their rights under the 
Treaty, the question naturally fell that such a private individual must also meet obligations 
LQRUGHUIRUWKH7UHDW\¶VDLPVWREHDchieved, notwithstanding the failure of a Member State 
to implement enabling legislation. Thus was born the principle of direct effect, which was 
developed in the European Court of Justice decision in the case of Van Gend en Loos283. 
 
Having decided that Treaty provisions could confer directly effective rights on individuals, 
the Court took the academic reasoning further and theorised that, whether or not the 
relevant Member State had passed legislation, European Community Law has the authority 
by virtue of tKDW6WDWH¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH7UHDW\RI5RPHRUPRUHUHFHQWO\$PVWHUGDPWR
impose obligations upon individuals residing in that State; as such it must also have the 
power to confer rights on them. The only overarching requirement logically must be that 
such rights must have been conferred expressly on them by the Treaty, as well as 
obligations defined and expressed in the same way, so that the Treaty can bind individuals 
as well as Member States. In essence, the Member State has signed up its subjects by its 
very act of ratifying the Treaty.  
 
A relevant precedent in maritime law would be ideal; and such exists. The Claimant, the 
Bowater Steamship Company Limited, a subsidiary of the mighty Bowater Corporation, 
was a UK-registered company which owned the Gladys Bowater, a fine British registered 
VKLSJURVVLQJWRQVGHVLJQHGWROLIWWRQVRIWKH%RZDWHU&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VZRRGSXOS
from their loading ports in Canada to their newsprint mills. In July, 1959, the virtually 
brand new Gladys Bowater sailed from Newfoundland with a full cargo of forest products 
for discharge in Buffalo. The officers and crew of the Gladys Bowater were British 
nationals, employed under British articles and serving under a British Master. On her arrival 
in Buffalo on the 3rd August, a strike picket appeared at the dock with a sign reading SS 
Gladys Bowater Unfair to Organized Labor, International Woodworkers of America. The 
longshoremen who had been engaged to unload her cargo promptly refused to do so. 
 
                         
282
 Fairhust, J and C Vincenzi, 2010, Law of the European Community, Pearson Longman, London, p189 
283
 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (Case 26/62) 
 157 
International WoodworkerV RI $PHULFD µ,:$¶ ZKRVH VHFUHWDU\ DQG FHUWDLQ RI ZKRVH
members were named as Defendants, was a trade union with members in the United States 
and Canada which had recently sought to organise employees of contractors in 
Newfoundland who were cutting timber for companies in the Bowater Group (not the 
shipowning company) and other companies in Newfoundland, but Bowater and their 
DVVRFLDWHV KDG QRW UHDFKHG DQ DJUHHPHQW WKDW DFFRUGHG ZLWK WKH ,:$¶V YLHZ DQG LQ WKH
absence of such agreement, the IWA had called a strike in December, 1958. 
 
In proceedings in the United States Court of Appeal284, Bowater sought an injunction to 
restrain unlawful picketing of their vessels. In addition, and most relevantly to the issue in 
this work, they advanced a claim under an obscure, 145-year old commercial treaty to 
regulate maritime commerce between the United States and Great Britain, which had been 
signed and ratified by both States Parties in 1815285.  Article 1 provided inter alia that: 
 
The Inhabitants of the two Countries respectively shall have liberty freely and 
securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, Ports and 
Rivers in the Territories aforesaid to which other Foreigners are permitted to 
come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said 
Territories respectively, « and generally the Merchants and Traders of each 
Nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for 
their Commerce but subject always to the Laws and Statutes of the two countries 
respectively. 
 
The Court observed that, under the American Constitution, and in accordance with Federal 
law, when the wording of a treaty is sufficiently explicit to permit its application without 
additional implementing statutes, and the States Parties intended it to be self-executing, all 
of which the Court found in this treaty, it can be enforced without domestic  legislation. The 
treaty explicitly conferred the defined rights and obligations not only upon the two States 
Parties but also upon the inhabitants of the two countries. In this case the Court held that the 
United States had to fulfil its treaty obligation of protecting the guaranteed freedoms in two 
ways: firstly, by not violating its treaty obligations and, secondly, by empowering the 
Courts to take whatever steps would be necessary to protect and maintain the rights and 
obligations of individuals, in this case to grant injunctive relief to prevent the Defendants 
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from acting contrary to the treaty. 
 
This clearly confirms the validity of the general position argued by Oppenheim, 
underpinning the issue relevant to this specific matter, so that it can be established that, 
while international law can bind a private individual, it most certainly will regulate the 
conduct of human beings and their institutions where that must be necessary for the State to 
observe its treaty obligations and to prevent individuals under its control from violating the 
6WDWH¶VWUHDW\REOLJDWLRQV+\SRWKHVLVLQJD OLWWOH IXUWKHUZKHQDQ LQGLYLGXDO LQTXHVWLRQLV
acting as an organ of the State ± the Master of the Flag SWDWH¶VYHVVHO must be so-doing in 
RUGHU WRPHHWWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶V7UHDW\REOLJDWLRQVWRRWKHUVLJQDWRULHVIRUZKLFKRIFRXUVH
WKH )ODJ 6WDWH KDV FRQILUPHG WKH 0DVWHU¶V FRPSHWHQFH LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK LWV WUDLQLng 
regulations - the obligation of accountability demands control by the management process, 
namely the Courts. The underpinning logic is unassailable, because a State ultimately is a 
mere political association of people who have sovereign control within a geographical area; 
it has no organic existence of its own and, so, when it undertakes rights and obligations with 
other States, those rights and obligations ultimately must be accounted for by the men and 
women in whom the State has conferred specific responsibility.286 
 
The argument is complete with the voluntary assumption by the Master of their rôle, as 
Master Under God of the ship registered in that Flag State. To paraphrase W B Yeats, no 
law, nor duty forced them into the job, they chose to be regulated by the maritime law of 
that Flag State and the criminal law on board that ship ± and the ship to which the flag has 
been allocated, is as much a part of the sovereign state as its soil, and deserves that 
protection. The Master cannot then pick and choose which rights and obligations they 
would like enforced. Most relevantly of all, for the Master, geography presents no obstacle 
to the principle. Oppenheim must be justified by logic in his opinion that, irrespective of a 
6WDWH¶VREOLJDWLRQVWRRWKHUKLJKFRntracting parties to a treaty, international law has no wish 
or power to prevent a State from exercising its sovereign rights to govern, by laws, the 
conduct of its own citizens, whether they be at home or abroad, since they remain under that 
6WDWH¶VSHUVRnal authority. For this reason, the citizen of a State may be accountable to it for 
DQ\PLVFRQGXFWFDUULHGRXWDEURDGDQGSURVFULEHGE\WKDW6WDWH¶VODZMXVWDVPXFKDVWKH\
must account for taxes in respect of their assets or earnings abroad, if that is what the 
6WDWH¶VOHJLVODWXUHHQDFWV287  
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Putting this in context, as the vessel is an extension of the sovereign territory of the Flag 
State, the Master remains under its personal control. 
 
In reality, there is the small matter of enforcement to address, when the ship is in some far 
WHUULWRULDOVHDDQGWKH6WDWH¶VSRZHUWRHQIRUFHLWVODZVGHSHQGVXSRQWKH0DVWHUEHLQJLQRU
returning to, their home territory or having some assets in the home territory over which the 
State can enforce its Judgment. That aside, all that is required, is the Will of the State, 
evidenced through the legislative process, to assert jurisdiction over its citizens abroad; in 
practice this varies particularly as regards the application of criminal law to their conduct 
and consequently the jurisdiction of their courts to try such nationals for their conduct 
abroad. Taking the United Kingdom as an illustration, very few acts committed by nationals 
abroad constitute criminal offences under its laws. Oppenheim suggests that the reason for 
this is because the procedure of criminal trials in the adversarial system involves the cross-
examination of witnesses as an essential feature of contested evidence, which would impose 
severe practical difficulties in relation to offences committed abroad. By contrast, other 
States, tweely described by Oppenheim as having different traditions and procedures, assert 
almost complete jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of their nationals abroad288. The 
practical difficulty for a State which seeks to assert criminal jurisdiction over one of its 
subjects who is beyond its geographical jurisdiction, is that it has two options: 
1. Either it explores the opportunities for extradition, if Treaty rights with the other State 
prevail; or 
2. It must patiently await the return of the citizen in question, before it can take effective 
steps to exercise its jurisdiction over them (as illustrated by the UK case of Ronald Biggs). 
 
Perhaps serendipitously, English law has evolved since Oppenheim's observation. Section 
108 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 addresses bribery and corruption of 
foreign officers, and extends the jurisdiction of English criminal law defining offences of 
bribery and corruption by public officials to cover offences committed wholly or partly in 
the UK and offences committed by UK nationals abroad3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQZDVPDGH
very clear that it matters not, whether or not the person being offered the bribe has any 
connection with the United Kingdom; neither does it matter whether the offending acts of 
offer or receipt of the bribe take place within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom; thus the application of the offence is global ± the only requirement is that the 
offender must come within the control of United Kingdom laws.   
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The effect of this provision opens wide the jurisdictional limits beneath which English law 
had hitherto slumbered, so that now the territorial boundaries are removed which confined 
the acts undertaken to the jurisdiction of English courts. Section 109 takes the issue beyond 
any doubt to individuals or legal bodies whether or not they are Government officers, 
providing for the offence being satisfied by UK nationals or bodies incorporated under 
English law who carry out the offending act anywhere outside the United Kingdom, if the 
act would, itself, have constituted a corruption offence had it been committed with the 
territory of the United Kingdom. 
 
The authority upon which this statute stands must have originated with the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURYDO RI WKH 2(&'¶V &onvention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Officials in International Business Transactions 1997289, Article 1 of which compels each 
State to pass laws, making it a criminal offence for any person within the jurisdiction of that 
6WDWH¶VOHJDOFRQWURO, intentionally to offer or give in any way any financial reward or more 
obscure financial advantage to a foreign public official, with the intention that the official 
either acts or refrains from acting as they should in accordance with their official duties 
with the objective that the offender achieves some advantage either in obtaining or retaining  
business, or with the objective of obtaining some other improper advantage in the conduct 
of international business. 
 
Article 4 crucially requires the State to take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in 
whole or in part in its territory. It goes a step further, to address those States which have 
passed laws to prosecute its citizens for offences committed abroad, requiring them to take 
measures to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery of a foreign public 
official, according to the same principles. 
 
This convention not just defines, but explores, the extent to which an international Treaty 
FDQGLFWDWHWKHVXEVWDQFHRID6WDWH¶VGXW\WRZDUGVLWVFLWL]HQVZKHWKHUWKH\DUHDWKRPHRU
abroad and, clearly, the basic principle of jurisdictional control could be translated to the 
case of a Master under the Flag State, whatever their nationality, for they remain an organ 
of that State. The globalisation of maritime business has witnessed a phenomenon in recent 
years in which a ship may be registered in State A, managed in State B with the Master a 
national of State C. The fact that the Master has a Certificate of Competency in State A 
does not mean that they must be DQDWLRQDORIWKDWFRXQWU\EXWWKHORJLFRI2SSHQKHLP¶V
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analysis leads to the conclusion that, once an alien enters into a sovereign state, they must 
necessarily be equal under the law to all others in the sense that everybody within that State 
must be regulated and controlled by that State, which, after all, is the key feature which 
characterises sovereign jurisdiction, the power to control individuals for whose behaviour 
the State must assume responsibility for the protection of its own people and its relationship 
with other states ± without such obligation, there would be little point in having a legal 
system and a judicial process to manage it. But with that equality of rights comes 
simultaneously equality of obligations, so that the alien must be accountable for their 
EHKDYLRXULQUHODWLRQWRWKHODZVRIWKHODQGHYHQWKRXJKWKHDOLHQ¶VVWD\PD\EHWHPSRUDU\
as long as they are in the StDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQWKH\RZHDOOHJLDQFHWRWKH6WDWHODZVLQVRIDU
as they are binding on them.  
 
The discussion, having turned to the alien, conveniently proceeds to the rights and 
REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH 3RUW 6WDWH $QG WKHUH¶V WKH UXE IRU PXFK RI WKH JOREDl maritime 
LQGXVWU\¶VFRQFHUQVWHPs from what they see as the incipient creep of criminalisation by the 
3RUW 6WDWH 2SSHQKHLP¶V FRPPHQWDU\ RQ DQ DOLHQ¶V GXWLHV WR REVHUYH WKH ODZV RI WKH
sovereign state in which they find themselves, underlays the rationale for the prosecution of 
VR PDQ\ RI WKH 0DVWHUV ZKRVH FDVHV KDYH EHHQ VWXGLHG LQ WKLV ZRUN :KHQ 6RFLHW\¶V
normative ethics demand the criminalisation of conduct which has led to wrongs such as 
pollution, then the Port State will enforce the laws which its Society has demanded.  
 
International law goes further still: Article 218 of UNCLOS states, inter alia, that when a 
vessel is voluntarily within the jurisdiction of a Port State, that State may undertake 
investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any 
discharge from that vessel outside the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that 
State in violation of international law. There is a qualifying ± even, rather, a clarifying - 
proviso, though, in that no proceedings pursuant to such a violation shall be commenced in 
the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of another State unless requested by that 
State, the Flag State, or a State damaged or threatened by the discharge violation, or unless 
the violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution in the territorial sea or exclusive 
economic zone of the State instituting the proceedings. 
 
But while the Port State will enjoy all the privileges which are the gift of sovereignty, it 
must also comply with its REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ 3URIHVVRU 0XNKHUMHH¶V
assertion290 that prima facie a state enjoys its sovereign prerogative to enact a law that 
                         
290
 Mukherjee, op cit p3 
 162 
criminalises the act of an accidental oil spill, and criminalises the seafarer who allegedly 
caused the oil spill must logically lead to the conclusion that an alien ± WKHVKLS¶V0DVWHULQ
this case ± PXVW EH KHOG DFFRXQWDEOH LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH ORJLF RI 2SSHQKHLP¶V
argument. That being said, Mukherjee theorises that if that state is a party to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) or MARPOL, any national 
law that is in conflict with those conventions is invalid, and national courts should so hold.  
 
Not only is this theory sound but it is supported by the authority of the Vienna Conference, 
which came into force in 1980. Article 27 prohibits a State Party from invoking the 
provisions of its own domestic laws as justification for its failure to perform a Treaty. The 
logical deduction is that, where a 6WDWH¶VGRPHVWLFODZLVLQFRQVLstent with that contained in 
a Treaty which it has ratified, the Treaty law must prevail. In its ruling in the case of 
Internationale Handelgesellschaft291 the European Court of Justice clothed the concept with 
certainty in stating the principle that the law stemming from the Treaty (in this case the 
Treaty of Rome), an independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be 
overridden by rules of national law, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law. Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect 
within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either 
fundamental principles as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a 
national constitutional structure. 
 
But what if the law at European Community level is inconsistent with bodies of 
international law which have been ratified by Member States? In the well-known 
INTERTANKO case292, the Claimants  applied to the High Court of Justice in London for a 
judicial review in relation to the implementation of European Council Directive 2005/35, a 
measure on ship-source pollution; perhaps the most essential feature was in Article 4 of the 
Directive, which states: 
 
Member States shall ensure that ship-source discharges of polluting substances 
into any of the areas referred to in Article 3(1) are regarded as infringements if 
committed with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence. These infringements 
are regarded as criminal offences by, and in the circumstances provided for in, 
Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA supplementing this Directive. 
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The penalties for infringements imposed liability much stricter than that in UNCLOS and 
MARPOL, clearly criminalising the Master in a way not provided in the Conventions. 
  
The High Court referred the case to the European Court for a preliminary ruling. Central to 
the issue was the point that, while the European Community was a valid party to UNCLOS, 
only States Parties could ratify MARPOL, which does not permit endorsement by 
international bodies; in these circumstances, which should prevail, Community law or 
international law? 
 
Article 300(7) of the European Treaty293 binds Community institutions to those international 
agreements which the EC has signed, as a result of which the relevant international 
convention must have primacy over secondary Community legislation; as always, in the 
event of some inconsistency, the provisions of the international convention must prevail. In 
the case of the referral on UNCLOS, however, the Court held on terms which are very 
relevant to the position of the Master294: 
 
«LQGLYLGXDOV DUH LQ SULQFLSOH QRW JUDQWHG LQGHSHQGHQW ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRPV E\
virtue of UNCLOS. In particular, they can enjoy the freedom of navigation only 
if they establish a close connection between their ship and a State which grants 
its nationality to the ship and becomes the ship's flag State. This connection must 
be formed under that State's domestic law. 
 
In effect, therefore, even though the European Community is a signatory to UNCLOS, it is 
the relationship between the Master and their Flag State which is pivotal; the Master is the 
representative of the Flag State, and must observe its laws. 
 
With regard to MARPOL, the Court observed that the Community is not a  Party and neither 
has it apparently assumed powers under the European Treaty to exercise the powers 
previously exercised by Members States which have signed up to it295. As a result, even 
though all the members of the Community had signed up to MARPOL, the Community is 
not bound by it296 and the mere fact that Directive 2005/35 has the objective of 
incorporating certain rules set out in that Convention into Community law does not give the 
European Court the power to review the Directive's legality in the light of the Convention. 
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It would be pertinent at this stage to remind ourselves of the purpose of international 
HQYLURQPHQWDO ODZ IRU 3RUW 6WDWHV 7KH ZRUOG¶V RFHDQV FRQVLVW RI RQH HQRUPRXV
interconnected body of seawater, separated by continents into several ocean basins and 
marginal seas. The influence of man over the oceans has had appalling consequences, 
however. Pollution kills marine life both directly, in poisoning, suffocating and drowning 
marine life, and indirectly, by starvation as it interrupts the food chains. With the emerging 
realisation of the threat to marine species, Port and Coastal States particularly had a vested 
interest in moving forward with an agenda for some international legal framework that could 
respond to perceived risks. While MARPOL was being implemented and enforced with an 
ever-JUHDWHU OLVW RI DPHQGPHQWV ( - 0ROHQDDU¶V DQDO\VLV297 identifies a key cause of the 
problem, namely increasing numbers of substandard ships and estimates of amounts of 
pollutants entering the oceans through operational and accidental discharges, which forced 
the wider community to confront the uncomfortable conclusion that Flag States were simply 
failing to achieve the objective for which international law had made them responsible under 
Convention provisions. The frequency and ever-growing effects of marine pollution left Port 
and Coastal States increasingly dubious of the will or the power of Flag States to meet the 
objectives with which their obligations under international law had charged them298. As a 
result, Port State jurisdictions strengthened their attitude towards those responsible for the 
offending pollution events, and the focus of the prosecution process fell on the Master, in 
order to address the normative ethics of the judicial process which was intended to protect 
their environment. Putting the Master on Trial was their solution: all they had to do now was 
find some lawful authority for that solution. 
 
While Article 194(1) UNCLOS categorically clothes the Port State, as any other, with the 
authority to take all measures (which, at least, are consistent with the Convention) to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, Professor Mukherjee 
points out that the Port State is not permitted to imprison a Master for polluting the marine 
environment except where wilful and serious negligence has been proved. Article 230(2) of 
81&/26WKHUHOHYDQWSURYLVLRQVSHFLILFDOO\TXDOLILHVWKH3RUW6WDWH¶VHQIRUFHPHQWULJKWV
against foreign vessels299 by permitting only fines to be imposed by its Courts against 
foreign-Flag vessels where there have been breaches of its domestic laws or applicable 
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international rules and standards, and, further, the Port State is obliged to observe the 
$FFXVHG¶VULJKWVXQGHUVXEVHFWLRQ That being said, the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Mangouras v Spain has a chilling note on the approach to the 
criminalisation of the Master, even in the context of their own human rights: 
 
The Court could not disregard the growing and legitimate concern both in 
Europe and internationally about offences against the environment. It noted in 
WKDWFRQQHFWLRQ WKH6WDWHV¶SRZHUVDQGREOLJDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKHSUHYHQWLRQRI
marine pollution and the unanimous determination among States and European 
and international organisations to identify those responsible, to ensure that they 
appeared to stand trial and to punish them300. 
 
Many would say that the effect of the decision in INTERTANKO leaves Port States with the 
comfortable illusion that they could justify criminal regulation of the Master under 
European law even if it is inconsistent with the body of international law, which should, in 
fact, prevail. The decision in the Mangouras case only serves to perpetuate the illusion and, 
as an inevitable consequence, sets Port States on a collision course with Flag States. The 
conclusion must be drawn that the administration of justice in the context of European law 
exposes it to a clash of irreconcilable differences with key elements of legal theory, 
concisely summed up by the Law Commission in its 2010 consultation paper: 
 
7KH FULPLQDO ODZ« VKRXOG QRW EH XVHG DV WKH SULPDU\ PHDQV RI SURPRWLQJ
regulatory objectives301. 
 
Just how a reconciliation can be made between the two remains a challenge.  
 
Naturally, the structure of the legal system must give transparency to the judicial process, so 
that Justice is manifestly seen to be done. The response of the international maritime 
community to the prosecution of the Hebei Two highlighted some obfuscation on the part of 
the South Korean system in revealing this. But it is difficult to justify the convictions on 
these grounds in the cases of Captain Schröder and Captain Laptalo. These prosecutions 
were not founded on matters which were the subject of environmental law, but criminal law 
within the Port State.  In the case of the former, criminal liability was held by the 
application of civil criteria in the tort of negligence. In the case of the latter, criminal 
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OLDELOLW\ZDVKHOGE\WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH&RPPRQ/DZUXOHRIWKH0DVWHU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\
for his vessel, without any evidence against the Master whatever. 
 
Such prosecutions pose a critical question which inevitably must be resolved, as to how we 
distinguish between offences for which the Flag State is accountable to the Port State and 
those which raise the question as to whether the Master must be accountable without 
incriminating the Flag State. An essential factor must be to identify the key element in the 
distinction. By reviewing the case studies in this work, contrasting those of the Zim Mexico 
III and the Coral Sea with the Hebei Spirit and the Sea Empress, the distinction can be 
IRUPXODWHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKH0DVWHU¶VDFWVRURPLVVLRQVLQWKHFRXUVHRIDFWLQJDV0DVWHU
under the Flag State authority. It would be logical to draw the analogy with the law of 
vicarious liability ± in which case the Flag State would be responsible even for the personal 
negligence of the Master. In respect of those criminal offences which are personal to the 
Master as a result of their intent and which are not associated with any body of international 
law to which the Port State and Flag State are parties, though, the current law must 
necessarily expose the Master to liability within the Port State jurisdiction without any Flag 
State protection. In this respect the Master of the Coral Sea would, for example, still have to 
face the full rigour of the Greek criminal process. In synthesising a solution to protect the 
0DVWHUDJDLQVWFULPLQDOLVDWLRQZHFDQLGHQWLI\WKHNH\LVVXHDVWRMXVWKRZWKH3RUW6WDWH¶V
jurisdiction must be respected against possible compromise, if there is to be some protection 
for the Master by their Flag State - and that can be very subjective indeed to the Port State. 
 
UNCLOS Article 3 clearly defines the right of every State to establish its sovereign 
jurisdiction up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines 
determined in accordance with the Convention. The question arises, then, of just how Port 
State jurisdiction can apply concurrently with, or take precedence over, Flag State 
jurisdiction of ships in territorial waters. In the 2005 United States case of Spector v 
Norwegian Cruise Line302, the United States Supreme Court considered whether domestic 
American legislation, in this case the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, applied to 
foreign-flag cruise ships in American territorial waters. 
 
The Act itself did not contain a specific provision making its application mandatory to 
foreign-flag vessels in US waters. The issue arose over the meaning and effect of the Clear 
Statement Rule, which was defined as a rule of international law that the law of the Flag 
State ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship. As a result, it was argued that, under 
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the Clear Statement Rule, without a clear indication of congressional intent, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act could not apply to foreign-flag vessels in United States territory. 
 
The Lower Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, had ruled that the Act did not 
apply to foreign-flag ships because it did not contain a specific provision mandating its 
application to foreign-flag vessels in US territorial seas. Of the eight Justices, five disagreed 
with that and held that cruise ships of whatever flag were prima facie bound by a statutory 
definition of what was readily achievable for public accommodation and specified public 
transportation303. 
 
But then the difficulties started. The majority concluded that the standard required by the 
Act would be inconsistent with international law, particularly the provisions of SOLAS 
which address construction and the safety of life at sea, which would place foreign-flag 
ships in violation of the domestic law as soon as they entered US territorial waters, 
obviously causing chaos to merchant ship operations, as a result of which the requirements 
would not be readily achievable, which was a key feature of the Act. But three of those five 
Justices fell out with the others on the application of the Clear Statement Rule, which, they 
believed, required that neither the Act in question, nor, indeed, any other Act which did not 
have a specific maritime application, could apply to the internal order and discipline of a 
foreign-flag ship without a clear expression of intent that Congress meant that to be the case 
when it passed the Act in question. In the resultant row four Justices concluded that the 
Clear Statement Rule merely raises the assumption that Congress does not intend that its 
statutes should have effect beyond its territorial boundaries. 
 
In the sub-plot of the discord between the five judges in the majority, the other two Justices 
felt that the Clear Statement Rule should only be invoked where a statute is inconsistent 
ZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶&RQYHQWLRQREOLJDWLRQVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ and, thus, the Rule 
has no application when there is no such inconsistency. 
 
In a magnificently complicated decision, it was, at least, possible to identify the key point of 
the Appeal that the Clear Statement Rule did not invalidate a domestic law which regulated 
the internal order of a foreign-Flag ship in United States territorial waters; but that the 
standard which the Act provided must be readily achievable, and what was readily 
achievable had to be defined so as to avoid conflict with SOLAS. 
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The Court did assist with a further ruling that, with respect to any provision within the Act 
which may affect the internal affairs of a ship, a clear congressional statement that such a 
provision applies to foreign-flag ships is required, and instructed the lower court to examine 
whether the Petitioners' claims under the Act might have an impact on the internal affairs of 
the RHVSRQGHQWV¶VKLSV 
 
This, at least, may shed a little light on the dynamic tensions in which the laws of Flag State 
and Port State overlap and, in that event, which should prevail.   
  
In fairness, the United States legislature is aware, only too keenly, of the limitations of its 
jurisdiction. In June 2009, a Bill was introduced with the express purpose of assisting in the 
defense of United States-flag vessels against piracy and to ensure the traditional right of 
self-defense of those vessels against piracy. 
 
This, the United States Mariner and Vessel Protection Bill, was designed to sanction the use 
of maritime safety teams and security teams to defend US-flag ships in international waters. 
It specifically provided that the owner, operator, time-charterer or Master of a vessel would 
not be liable for damages brought in any American Court in a claim arising out of the use of 
reasonable force unless the Defendant was grossly negligent or engaged in wilful 
misconduct. It is noteworthy that the Bill restricts itself to establishing defences to 
proceedings in the jurisdiction of United States courts and assiduously avoids falling into 
any trap laid by jurisdictional conflicts. A cynical commentator might question the value of 
such a Bill, and point mutely to the fact that it has never actually managed to make it to the 
Statute Books304. 
 
While the core of the problem lies in the undoubted target of the Master by Port State 
management control, any solution to the problem must first overcome the crisis of 
confidence which the Port State so frequently harbours against the Flag State if the 
international system of law is to prevail and deal with the Master as the Master had 
originally undertaken when assuming command of the vessel. 
 
The evidence for such feeling is no novelty and can be discovered between the lines of the 
2(&'¶V &RQYHQWLRQ RQ &RPEDWLQJ %ULEHU\305, in which Article 3 requires that States 
punish offenders who bribe a foreign public official with effective, proportionate and 
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dissuasive criminal penalties. The Convention rationalises the sentencing with guidelines in 
place for punishing offenders who are convicted of bribing public officials within the 
6WDWH¶VGRPHVWLFMXULVGLFWLRQ ,I WKHRIIHQGHULVa person, then, whatever punishment those 
guidelines recommend, they should be held in custody, wherever they are, in order to enable 
effective mutual legal assistance and extradition may be necessary between States in order 
to allow the concept behind the Convention to be achieved and effective prosecution to be 
conducted according to the terms agreed. The underlying concern, clearly, is one of trust in 
the prosecuting State to observe its Convention obligations and deal with convicted persons 
as the Convention intended.  
 
This crisis of confidence consists not only of doubts in the prosecution of offenders but also 
of doubts in the process of investigation. In 2008 Nicholas Purnell wrote an article in 
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly which concentrated on criminal 
investigations and trials concerning UK and European corporations taking place in foreign 
jurisdictions, principally the United States306. Purnell's particular concern focused on the 
emerging solution taken by the American administration when confronted with cross-border 
investigations307.  
 
The evidence researched by Purnell underpins the conclusion that the United States 
Department of Justice has become increasingly frustrated that foreign nationals resident 
outside their jurisdiction have broken American laws which were put in place to protect 
their own people. Even when confronted with the evidence, the investigating authorities 
abroad have failed to meet consistency with American demands for justice, which has 
resulted in a crisis of confidence in the international process. As a result, Purnell finds that 
the US Department of Justice has taken an increasingly aggressive position in demanding 
the extradition of such foreign nationals to face prosecution in the United States under 
American criminal law. The statistics appear alarming: in the period between 1999 and 
2006, while the US Department of Justice prosecuted 84 American nationals for cartel 
crimes, 27 foreign nationals from nine different countries were extradited from European 
countries (including the United Kingdom) and were tried in the United States under their 
criminal process308. 
 
Applying that to the Criminalisation project, we need to have a statutory definition of 
crimes, which are consistent with a common understanding of fairness both in their 
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character and in their application in the process of justice, within the concept of 
jurisprudence. This demands some consensus on the pattern and process for resolving 
criminal disputes, involving the admissibility of evidence and the system of prosecution. 
+RZHYHU GLYHUVH WKH ZRUOG¶V FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHPV PD\ EH WKH RQH FRUH LQDOLHQDEOH
feature essential to all of them was described in Woolmington v DPP in 1935309, in terms 
which have never been improved, that, no matter what the charge or where the trial, the 
principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the Defendant is an indispensible part 
of the process and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. Wherever the 
prosecution is to be conducted, there must be confidence in the heart of both Port and Flag 
State that the process of law will be carried out. The discomfort in an analysis of 
jurisprudence in the contemporary system, however, undermines confidence in the system 
which international law has developed for the creation of strict liability offences of 
violations of environmental law. Professor Mukherjee underlines the theory310 that such 
offences, which do not have a mental element, are not criminal in any real sense311, but they 
most certainly have been embraced as such within the sovereign jurisdictions of States 
around the world. Viscount Sankey in Woolmington v DPP describes the danger with 
clarity: 
 
If at any period of a trial it was permissible for the judge to rule that the 
prosecution had established its case and that the onus was shifted on the 
prisoner to prove that he was not guilty and that unless he discharged that onus 
the prosecution was entitled to succeed, it would be enabling the judge in such a 
case to say that the jury must in law find the prisoner guilty and so make the 
judge decide the case and not the jury, which is not the common law312.   
  
The miracle cure would be to introduce this as a foundation principle of justice throughout 
the sovereign jurisdictions of the maritime world. 
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Section Four: A New Approach 
 
The research questions in this work FKDOOHQJHG WKH JOREDO YLHZ RI MXVWLFH IRU WKH 6KLS¶V
0DVWHUH[DPLQLQJWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHLUDFFRXQWDELOLW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRI-RKQ6WXDUW0LOO¶V
understanding of justice, as a single principle, founded upon the moral rules of society, 
against which we judge all actions. Within that very wide understanding, society ± mainly 
Port State society - has evolved the notion of criminal accountability which has taken form 
in this work as the Mischief ± clothed with all the negative characteristics which that noun 
implies, and which lieVDWWKHYHU\URRWRIWKHJOREDOPDULWLPHFRPPXQLW\¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI
WKH0DVWHU¶VFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ 
 
From where we stand in this new Millennium, we can emphatically answer the secondary 
UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVIRULWLVDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHPDULWLPHFRPPXQLW\¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIDQHJDWLYH
phenomenon of criminalisation is justified, in so far as it offends our understanding of 
criminal justice.  
 
It is also apparent that this has been an emerging problem for some time; not long past, but, 
rather, the recent past. We have seen that the Master has been criminally accountable for 
generations, within the parameters of justice which the maritime community had accepted 
to be fair; but the phenomenon before us today has been formed and moulded by the 
normative ethics of contemporary societies globally ± some of them having conflicting 
approaches, and conflicting interests, resulting in convictions and sentences which trespass 
upon every concept of justice which is upheld by those peoples making up the maritime 
community who send their Masters down to the sea in ships, and do business in great 
waters. The very diverse case studies of Captain Schröder, Captain Laptalo and Captain 
Chawla underpin such a conviction with compelling persuasiveness. 
 
The secondary research questions have given validity and justification to the primary 
question, examining the character of this mischief called criminalisation. But the answers to 
these questions do not go far enough. This work has as its fulcrum the analysis of solutions: 
options for the effective patterns and processes of dispute resolution in which the Port State 
can expect some redress for an alleged act or omission on the part of the Master of a 
foreign-flagged vessel. International law imposes the duty upon every state to exercise due 
diligence to prevent its own subjects and such foreign subjects as live within its territory 
(which includes its ships), from committing injurious acts against other states. This duty ± 
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to procure satisfaction and reparation for the wronged state as far as possible ± may be met 
by trying the accused and then, after due process of law, punishing offenders and 
compelling them to pay damages where required. In a number of cases international 
tribunals have held that the non-execution or remission of a sentence on the culprit 
constitutes a denial of justice to the injured person313. 
 
This argument develops logically from the conclusions, drawn, so far, from the research 
analysing contemporary concepts of fairness and proportionality in addressing the criminal 
accountability of the Master, exposing the mischief of criminal negligence as a monster of 
injustice that, in hardly a generation, has been bred, nurtured and now firmly protected by 
the concept of sovereign jurisdiction. Despite the wisdom of Lord Bingham314, the monster 
created by Lord Hewitt315 and laboured on by Lord MacKay316 lives yet. 
 
While the concept of the regulation of obligations between States has been analysed in 
contemporary literature, no solution has been found, or even attempted, to resolve the 
discord between the Flag State and the Port State, which has led to conclusions being drawn 
within the maritime community that the problem is intractable. But from this mischief, not 
eYHQ WKH)ODJ6WDWHV WKHRUHWLFDOSURWHFWRUVRI WKH6KLS¶V0DVWHUFDQGLVWDQFH WKHPVHOYHV
for they are, themselves, the prosecuting bodies within their own jurisdictions. Captains 
Schröder, Laptalo and Chawla were all convicted in states that have significant maritime 
profiles; in essence it is all down to priorities in the normative ethics of the convicting state. 
  
A solution necessarily compels the synthesis of a new approach.  
 
The simple solution on a transnational basis would engage all states in a common process 
for dispute resolution by adoption of a standard under new international law, thus taking 
IXUWKHU WKH SKLORVRSK\ LGHQWLILHG LQ WKH ,02¶V *XLGHOLQHV IRU WKH )DLU 7UHDWPHQW RI
Seafarers. The problems which taxed the IMO would present difficulties with this solution 
in promulgating new international law for the criminal prosecution of the Master, for such 
would trespass on the sovereign rights of states to define the processes within their own 
legal systems, which they have the right to protect against external influence.  
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The promulgation of new international law would, in any event, be extremely expensive, 
time-consuming and uncertain. By comparison, research has shown that international 
obligations are already in place to deliver a cost-effective solution which compels Flag 
States to meet the obligations to which they are already committed, and Port States to co-
operate in that process, in order to resolve a solution. That process will result in 
submissions on the process for determining liability.  Having established that, a rational 
argument then should be made for a uniform legal order, regulating criminal penalties for 
the fair accountability of Masters for crimes which the process had determined their guilt. 
 
A new approach also involves the evaluation of evidence of trends in the contractual 
relationship between the Employer and the Master, in order to explore an approach which 
draws on the combined strengths of WKH 0DVWHU¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH )ODJ State which 
accredited them and with their employer, the shipowner, who put them there. This will rely 
significantly on the conclusions drawn in this thesis on the historical evolution of the 
contractual relationship, the commercial risk managed by the Master and the rôle of the 
Master in the study of compulsory pilotage.  The purpose of this approach justifies the faith 
in the Master-Owner relationship, restoring that paternal protection which has been 
perceived to have eroded in recent years. But the re-confirmed relationship with the Flag 
State will then serve as the medium for the resolution of disputes with Port States, relying, 
of course, on the relationship between states in the international context.  
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4.1 The Options for a New Approach 
 
Overview 
 
Building on the relationship between Flag State and Port State which has been explored in 
this work, the arguments in developing management control by Flag State are analysed as 
the starting point of a solution, for which models are offered in five options for dispute 
resolution. The key issues of regulation by the UN Charter, giving rise to actions 
commenced in the ICJ or ITLOS, are analysed and compared with Arbitration, which is put 
in a light somewhat more accurately than that in which it is frequently conveyed, by the 
example of the Alabama arbitration. Both of these methods of dispute resolution are 
regulated by principles of law, which simply may not serve the priorities of the parties 
involved, thus an option is discussed in Mediation as a tried-and-tested method for 
resolving intractable disputes.  The Chapter on Sovereignty identifies a realistic solution 
which needs no new body of international law, for the Master must be accountable to the 
Flag State which accredited them to that position in the first place. In terms of the legal 
process, though, focus is placed on a solution in a model guide on sentencing. Ultimately, 
the solution of traditional litigation is highlighted, with its key feature depending on the 
Master-Owner relationship, conveniently developing the argument in the final option for a 
new contractual regime, based on a Convention format that can be implemented through 
Flag State jurisdictions. 
 
Passage-Planning a Solution 
 
Essentially, the solution can be planned with suspiciously simple logic, by the extension of 
existing laws and minimum effort on the part of the international community. The key 
Convention requirements are established by UNCLOS317, with the fundamental principle of 
co-operation between States enshrined in Article 197, to develop international rules, 
standards, practice and procedure, not with the intention to criminalise the seafarer but to 
protect and preserve the marine environment. 
 
                         
317
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
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Part XII Section 6 of UNCLOS specifically addresses Enforcement, Article 217 compelling 
Flag States to ensure compliance by their vessels with international rules and standards, and 
with their domestic laws put in place to meet their Convention obligations.  Crucially for 
this work, Flag States shall provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, 
laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs. 
 
While this provision alone would plead a compelling argument to redress the ill of Port 
State intervention in the business of management control by the Flag State, the 
criminalisation process is complicated by other passages in the Convention. Article 97 
addresses penal jurisdiction in matters of collision or any other incident of navigation, 
VXUHO\ WKH EURDGHVW UHJXODWLRQ RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V DXWKRULW\ ZKHQ LW FRPHV WR WKH RIIHQGHG
interests of a Port or Coastal State. Encouragingly, Article 97.1 establishes that no penal or 
disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against the Master except before a Court or 
Statutory Authority either of the Flag State or of the State of which the Master is a 
National318. The ship cannot even be seized by another State without the order of the Flag 
State319. Disappointingly, however, the Article emphatically requires the vessel to be on the 
high seas at the material time, that is, in international waters beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Port or Coastal State. 
 
Under Article 220, where there is compelling evidence that a vessel navigating in a Coastal 
6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQMXULVGLFWLRQWKHWHUULWRULDOVHDYLRODWHGZKDWHYHUODZVWKDW6WDWHSXWLQWR
place in accordance with this Convention or applicable international maritime 
environmental laws, then that State may undertake physical inspection of the vessel relating 
to the violation and may, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including 
detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws320. This emphatically supports the 
application of the clear statement rule, which was doubtless intended in meeting Member 
6WDWHV¶SULRULWLHVLQWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQSURFHVVDVDSUHOXGHWRWKHSURVHFXWLRQRIRIIHQGHUVDV
part of the solution to the problem of responding to real and perceived risk. The difficulty 
naturally arises where the normative ethics driving the jurisprudence in that sovereign 
jurisdiction embrace the solution of criminal negligence in order to meet more easily the 
threats of increasing numbers of substandard ships and pollutants entering the oceans 
through operational and accidental discharges. 
 
While genuflecting, however cautiously, to the principle of the need to observe the 
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sovereign rights of the Port State as the foundation for Article 97, the academic argument 
for upholding management control by the Flag State enjoys compelling logic. Ratification 
of a Convention by a Flag State certainly regulates the conduct of a Master who has 
YROXQWDULO\VXEPLWWHG WR WKDW6WDWH¶V laws and obligations by reason of their Certificate of 
Competency; they must be accountable as an organ of the Flag State ± the key question is 
how the pattern and process of the law is to be applied. 
 
The solution to this question follows two stages: 
 
1. In addressing the claims or grievances of a Port State, the Flag State must assume 
responsibility for Masters conducting activities in the course of their duty as representative 
of the Flag State; thus meeting the objective for which the Convention had been intended in 
regulating the relationship between the parties. 
 
2. 7KH )ODJ 6WDWH ZLOO WKHQ LQYHVWLJDWH WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ E\ UHDVRQ RI WKHLU
SRVLWLRQWKDWLVZKHWKHUWKH0DVWHUZRXOGEHOLDEOHXQGHUWKH6WDWH¶VGRPHVWLFUHJXODWLRQ
or, indeed, whethHU WKH\KDGFRPSURPLVHG WKH)ODJ6WDWH¶V&RQYHQWLRQREOLJDWLRQV WR WKH
Port State and such obligation had been extended directly to the Master by the Flag State. 
 
7KH JHQHUDO FRQFHSW RI )ODJ 6WDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU FRQIOLFW UHVROXWLRQ RI D 3RUW 6WDWH¶V
grievance, when analysed in these two clear stages, presents four areas of hazard which 
have to be addressed: 
 
1. :KHUH WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V SURFHVV RI GLVSXWH UHVROXWLRQ LV LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH
0DVWHU¶V ULJKW WR -XVWLFH WKLV LV PRVW PDQLIHVW LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ LQ which the Master must 
FRQIURQWWKHLQLTXLW\RIµFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFH¶ 
 
2. Where the Port State lacks confidence that reliance upon the Flag State will 
GHOLYHU D UHVROXWLRQ ZKLFK LW ILQGV DFFHSWDEOH PRVW FOHDUO\ SHUFHLYHG LQ WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V
inability or reluctance to conduct criminal proceedings against the Master; 
 
3. :KHUH VRPH LQFRQVLVWHQF\ SUHYDLOV EHWZHHQ WKH 6WDWHV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH
application of UNCLOS or the application of the clear statement rule in a particular case; 
 
4. Whether conducted by the Flag State or the Port State, how inconsistencies in 
sentencing may follow a conviction after a fair trial. 
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The starting point for the quest for a solution demands an analysis and understanding of the 
priorities of the States Parties. The Port State clearly identifies priorities in 
 
x Managing the risk arising out of the casualty; 
x Securing financial compensation; 
x Obtaining the justice demanded by the normative ethics of its People; 
x Deterring or preventing repeat offences. 
 
By comparison, the Flag State has priorities which are likely to coincide with those of the 
Port State only by mere chance: 
 
x To protect its sovereign possession in the asset which the shipowner has confidently 
placed under its jurisdiction; and which other shipowners having invested in its flag will be 
watching closely; 
x To minimise the financial consequences of any Convention claims which the Port 
State may demand; 
x To protect the human rights of its representative, the Master; 
x To obtain the justice demanded by the normative ethics of its People. 
 
The solution inevitably demands some compromise by both sides in the achievement of 
their respective priorities, but whichever way the passage of this solution is planned, it must 
overcome the four hazard areas if the criminalisation of the Master is to be contained within 
tolerable limits. 
 
By relying on existing international law, the logic of a solution by settlement between 
States Parties becomes unassailable. Under the existing regime, the Port State is entitled to 
rely upon the Flag State to meet its commitment under Article 139 to ensure that vessels to 
which it has allocated its flag are effectively controlled in order to meet the obligation to 
protect the marine environment of the high seas. In theory the idea of extending this to the 
3RUW6WDWH¶V territorial waters is simple and compelling; after all, the Port State could pursue 
the Flag State in litigation under the United Nations charter if they could not find a solution 
by negotiation. 
 
The first hazard arises where the Port State lacks confideQFH LQ WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V ZLOO RU
ability to deliver a resolution which meets its normative ethics. The second arises out of the 
abandonment of the clear statement rule with the result of ousting the sovereign jurisdiction 
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of the Port State. 
 
What we need is a method of dispute resolution that can rise above both of these hazards. 
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Option 1: Rely on International Obligations between the States 
 
This option necessarily arises in the circumstance, either that the Port State has broken its 
obligation to the Flag State, for example, by criminalising the Master in a strict liability case 
in breach of UNCLOS and MARPOL; or that the Port State complains that the Flag State 
must stand liable as the Master was acting as its representative, or instrument, by which the 
Port SWDWH¶V ULJKWV KDG EHHQ LQIULQJHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH
relevant Treaty. 
 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter gives pre-eminence to the principle that disputes 
must be settled peacefully, leaving the choice of means to the parties. (If the parties cannot 
agree on a forum, arbitration is obligatory.)  
 
As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice 
µ,&-¶ LV UHJXODWHG E\ &KDSWHU ;,9 RI WKH 81 &KDUWHU $OWKRXJK WKH FKDUWHU GRHs not 
HPSOR\ WKH VSHFLILF ZRUGV LW VHHV LWVHOI DV D µZRUOG FRXUW¶321. The ICJ has a dual 
jurisdiction, the relevant one to  this work being to decide, in accordance with international 
law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it by States ± which the ICJ defines as a 
disagreement on a question of law or fact, a conflict, a clash of legal views or of interests. 
As a general rule the ICJ does not have jurisdiction to hear disputes unless both parties have 
agreed to submit to its jurisdiction on the matter. UNCLOS, however, provides an 
H[FHSWLRQ:KLOH$UWLFOHRI81&/26HPSKDVLVHVWKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWWRDJUHHDWDQ\WLPH
to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention by any method of negotiation or alternative dispute resolution, if this is 
unsuccessful and no settlement has been reached, then Article 286 provides that a claim 
may be submitted to the ICJ by a party unilaterally. All that is necessary, is that both parties 
are signatories of UNCLOS. 
The ICJ does not bask in the warmth of universal acclaim. In its dispute resolution function 
it does not permit access by bodies other than States who have signed up to the UN Charter. 
This may be inconsistent with the human rights of the Master who should naturally be 
entitled to join as a party, and therefore be heard, in proceedings in which they will be 
accountable for their conduct. A compromise solution theoretically enables the UN General 
Assembly and the Security Council to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ on any question 
                         
321
 The modest terminology in the text of its website, however, mirroring the UN Charter, reveals 
refreshingly how it sees its powers and function: see http://www.icj-cij.org (last accessed August 2011) 
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of international law, while other non-State parties, such as the IMO, may do so in respect of 
matters falling within their specific competence322. For the representation of the Master, 
though, this solution is unavailable; in any event, the likelihood that the awesome majesty 
of the Security Council would be troubled to gaze upon some trifling maritime dispute is 
not a realistic contingency. 
 
That being said, a case submitted to the ICJ inevitably suffers from two major ills, of time 
and cost. From the 22nd May 1947 to the 9th August 2011323, just 151 cases were entered in 
the General List, which conveys something of the huge complexity in being a party to 
proceedings in the ICJ. The most recent example is that involving an extremely serious 
dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua324, potentially leading to armed conflict. 
Proceedings were commenced in the ICJ on the 18th November 2010; an Order for 
Directions made by the Court on the 5th April 2011 fixed the 5th December 2011 and the 6th 
August 2012, respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by the Republic of 
Costa Rica and a Counter-Memorial by the Republic of Nicaragua. As for the remainder of 
the case management, the Court directed that: 
 
The subsequent procedure has been reserved for further decision. 
 
,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHOLNHO\GDWHIRUDILQDOGHFLVLRQLQWKHFDVHLVDQ\ERG\¶VJXHVVDQGWKH
written Judgment may not be published for a considerable time after that. In a particular 
FDVHLQZKLFKWKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXntability must be thrashed out between the States Parties, 
such a time-scale would be utterly unthinkable. 
 
7KHUHLVDUHDODOWHUQDWLYH7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDOIRUWKH/DZRIWKH6HDµ,7/26¶ 
 
ITLOS widens the choice of forum, not only for UNCLOS disputes, but for any dispute 
concerning the law of the sea, the protection of the marine environment or the conservation 
of marine living resources.  
 
It is now open to States, should they desire to do so, to take marine disputes to ITLOS, 
rather than to the ICJ. A recent case study can be found in the matter of the Louisa325. 
According to the Application instituting the proceedings in ITLOS, Saint Vincent and the 
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Grenadines, as Flag State of the Louisa, has claimed that, in February 2006, Spain seized 
the Louisa and her tender, the Gemini III, on a patently false allegation that she had violated 
6SDLQ¶V historical patrimony or marine environmental laws. Moreover, Spain, as the 
offending State, had failed to advise Flag State of the seizure of the vessels and, according 
to the claim, rejected all efforts to rectify the lawless seizures. Spain then imprisoned the 
crew for various periods of time and, although they had subsequently been freed, continued 
to hold the vessels without bond, the effect of which is that their value has now diminished, 
even to nothing.  
 
The proceedings were filed on the 26th November 2010, and followed by a directions 
hearing with (for international tribunals) lightning speed on the 12th January 2011 when 
time limits were given for filing pleadings. Sadly the system stumbled at the hand of the 
Claimants themselves when, on the 28th April 2011, they had to ask for an extension of time 
for filing their Memorial, which had a knock-on effect for the management of the case, with 
the consequence that Spain would not have to submit its Counter-Memorial until the 10th 
November 2011, which, effectively would put back the time-limit for a final rejoinder, 
closing the pleadings, to March 2012. Even so, the time advantage remains clear over that 
of the ICJ. 
 
Unlike cases brought in the ICJ, the proceedings before ITLOS will enjoy the expertise of 
21 judges with recognised competence in maritime law. In the wider sphere, where a case is 
brought by consensus, the range of potential parties may include non-member States, 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV1*2¶VDQGSULYDWHSDUWLHV7KLVPD\SUHVHQWUHDORSSRUWXQLWLHV
for justice in marine environmental cases, because it offers the possibility of creating a 
judicial process capable of accommodating the broader conceptions of participation already 
apparent in international law-making326. 
  
Whether the tribunal be the ICJ or ITLOS, the source of law upon which the decision is 
based, will be founded on the international treaties and conventions in force, international 
custom, the general principles of law and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the 
opinion of academics acting as expert witnesses. As a cautionary tale, the classic North Sea 
Continental Shelf case between the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark327 
demonstrates the rôle to be a very narrow one, involving the applicability of conventions 
and customary international law.  
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This option relies on, and develops, the concept of the regulation of relationships by 
international law. The Port State complains that a pollution event has been caused by a 
vessel to which the Flag State has allocated its flag and, therefore, the convention 
provisions binding them will form the basis upon which their priorities can be met. The 
determination is made on that liability and, in the event of a finding for the Port State, the 
Flag State must pay compensation. It is then for the Flag State to deal with the conduct of 
the Master according to its own law, following the procedures of its sovereign laws.  
 
The advantage is that no new laws are necessary; international law permits this to be 
implemented immediately. At the most, it requires only a memorandum of understanding 
for Port and Flag States to confirm their intentions to pursue this.  
 
By the same token, of course, tKLV PHPRUDQGXP RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ OLPLWV WKH 3RUW 6WDWH¶V
options by relinquishing its powers to prosecute the Master in criminal proceedings. In 
essence, the Port State must put its faith in the Flag State to ensure that justice is seen to be 
done against tKH0DVWHU LQ LWV RZQFULPLQDOSURFHVV*LYHQ WKH3RUW6WDWH¶V DSSUHKHQVLRQ
that the Flag State in question may not have the financial means, or the structure in place to 
obtain such means (whether by insurance, or recovery from the shipowner concerned), or 
even the will, to comply with the Order of the tribunal awarding compensation within a 
reasonable time-frame, this option faces the hazard that it will fail through lack of 
confidence between the parties.   
 
It might, however, form the basis for a new approach, by development with a second option.  
  
:KLOH WKH NH\ LVVXHV ZLOO EH RI H[WUHPH LQWHUHVW IRU WKH 6WDWHV 3DUWLHV WKH 0DVWHU¶V
accountability, as the organ of the Flag State, may not be addressed at all until after the 
international process has concluded, hanging over them like the Sword of Damocles.  
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Option 2: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The whole structure of international regulation relies on consensus: not just in ratifying 
terms, but also in resolving problems. For this reason, the UN sets a lot of store by 
arbitration as an alternative to the Court process. Indeed, if the parties cannot agree on a 
forum, arbitration is obligatory; for example, the 1991 Antarctic Protocol refers all disputes 
to arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise, and some Arctic equivalent may well 
follow suit. 
 
It is unwise to enthuse too highly about arbitration in the context of this work. States are 
justifiably reluctant to resort to adjudication where the rules of customary law are 
themselves unsettled, and an underlying consensus on what they should be is not yet fully 
established. In these circumstances a judicial or arbitral award might establish precedents 
with unwelcome implications for the parties ± and the international maritime community. 
 
This may best be illustrated by the horror story of the arbitration of the Alabama case328. In 
May 1871 the Geneva Conference was established to arbitrate an international dispute 
involving a claim by the United States against Great Britain for compensation for the 
consequences of Britain's naval contribution to the Confederate war effort in the War for 
Southern Independence. The demands made involved incredibly inflated figures, exceeding 
WKH%ULWLVKQDWLRQDOGHEWDQGGHVSLWHUHMHFWLQJPXFKRIWKH8QLRQ¶VFODLPWKH$Ubitration 
panel even managed to offend the Rules of Natural Justice before, embarrassingly, it made a 
final award against Britain of $15,500,000: a staggering amount which even exceeded 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFODLPVLQUHVSHFWRIWKRVHGDPDJHVZKLFKKDGQRWEHHQWKUown out, and the 
Senate had to pass a Bill to create a commission to adjust the compensation due to 
claimants that would be discharged out of the indemnity fund awarded by the Conference; 
even then a residual balance was used for purposes never contemplated by the arbitration329. 
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 The iniquity of this decision can hardly be understated. It must be remembered that the Conference was 
obliged to make its award solely on findings of law based on the evidence before it, nothing else. It was 
entirely immaterial whether or not Great Britain was committed to the belligerent whom she believed to be 
in the right. Moral concerns were irrelevant - or, rather, should have been, because the facts demonstrate 
that, notwithstanding its consensual foundation in the 1871 treaty, the Arbitration offended the rules of 
natural justice: that the Tribunal should be impartial. Of the Arbitrators, one was a Brazilian; of whom it 
was alleged that he thought more of the goodwill of the United States than of Britain. The second was a 
Swiss, who had no knowledge of the subject matter of the case: Switzerland possesses no seaboard and he 
sought no grounding in the maritime matters that were being argued. Despite these assertions, the Author 
KDVQRWIRXQGDQ\HYLGHQFHWKDWZRXOGFRQGHPQWKH7ULEXQDO¶VLPSDUWLDOLW\DVUHJDUGVGHWHUPLQing liability. 
The real problem lay with the Italian Arbitrator. After the award was made, Lord Selborne protested on 
behalf of the British Government at the size of this gross award of damages, to which the Italian replied: 
You are rich, very rich. 
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There can be no certainty that such an outcome would not happen today, in a world in 
which the normative ethics of society in matters involving the marine environment have 
GHYHORSHGDQGHYROYHGWKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUµFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFH¶LQVXFKDFDVH 
 
While arbitration is often viewed as a form of alternative dispute resolution, because of the 
consensual nature of its implementation (it is, effectively, implemented by contractual 
agreement), its outcome is entirely out of the control of the parties. And it has teeth, in the 
form of an Award which can be enforced: something which will appeal to the winner, and 
dismay the loser. 
 
Pure forms of alternative dispute resolution require that consensus to apply even to the 
outcome of the process ± that is, the whole experience is controlled by the parties 
themselves, from the scope of the dispute to be addressed, to the final settlement. While 
alternative dispute resolution takes a number of forms, the flagship is Mediation. 
 
Mediation remains fairly new to the litigation process in many parts of the world. Its birth 
was a matter of necessity rather than choice, as the cost of litigation in terms of money, time 
and uncertainty escalates out of acceptable terms to the parties, leading them to consider a 
new approach. Its application in the twenty first century world has evolved from experience 
in the United States in the last quarter of the preceding century, where the legal process had 
led the world in the arena of expensive litigation. In fact, while the English legal system has 
been grinding away for centuries, the idea of modern mediation was conceived by Britain in 
dramatic circumstances in 1862, during the War between the States. It was never put into 
place, though, for politics got in the way, and the Civil War dragged on for another two and 
a half years, with the loss of 620,000 lives. It is a tragic example of how a positive and 
flexible approach to resolving a dispute could have been explored but for the will to grasp 
the nettle, and the consequences that flow as a result of a failure to mediate a solution. 
 
 
 
Mediation - American Success 
                                                                      
It was HQWLUHO\LPSURSHUWRWDNHLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQDSDUW\¶VPHDQVZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHDUELWUDWLRQRID
civil claim, and such an outrageous comment renders the Award unsafe, leading fairly to the conclusion 
that Britain was, indeed, denied that basic right of natural justice, to be tried by an impartial tribunal.  
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Litigation costs have an endless capacity to escalate out of control. Nowhere has this been 
more keenly felt, than in the United States in recent years, where they tackled the problem 
head-on, and found the solution: let the parties keep control of the situation and explore a 
settlement - not with a judge who will rule between them, but with a trained neutral person 
who will guide them. Mediation has been a feature of litigation in the United States for 
some forty years now - a feature which has been found time and time again to be a cost-
effective alternative to litigation. Even in those apparently intractable cases which have 
gone to judgment and subsequently been appealed, current statistics show that 54 per cent 
of those are then successfully mediated before the appeal hearing330.  
 
0HGLDWLRQ¶V VXFFHVV VWRU\ LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV KDV EHHQ VR FRPSHOOLQJ WKDW LW KDV EHHQ
embraced by the British government as a vital tool in modernising the Courts system in this 
country, and procedural rules have been in place since April 1999 actively encouraging the 
use of Mediation and ADR in every civil case. It is a fact that in the year to May 2000 the 
number of cases in England which were mediated as an alternative to going to Trial 
increased by 140 per cent. 
 
The Key to the Success of Mediation  
The application of Mediation in the international context, readily embraces the idea of 
dispute resolution without boundaries: the parties need not be states which have signed up 
to any key treaties, and there are no rules of procedure limiting just how flexible a solution 
PD\EHUHDFKHGLQRUGHUWRPHHWWKHSDUWLHV¶SULRULWLHVUHVROYLQJQRWMXVWWKHHYHQWZKLFK
has taken place, but also establishing some future relationship which gives the parties 
FRQILGHQFH LQ HDFK RWKHU 7KH NH\ LV LQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ RZQ SRZHU WR UHDFK VRPH JXLGHG
settlement by negotiation. 
 
It works in this way. When people are unable to reach a solution to a problem themselves it 
makes sense to seek the assistance of a neutral person - the Mediator - who is especially 
trained and skilled in the process. By working with the parties, the Mediator helps them to 
clarify the issues that divide them and identify the matters on which they agree, which 
makes it easier to explore a solution, which will not be ideal for one party or another, but 
will be something with which all of them can live. In this way, the parties remain in control 
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of the negotiation.  
 
The Mediator, understandably, must guide the process by relying on their own expertise in 
the issues, and by exercising to the full their energy, patience and persistence. That really is 
all they have, for there are no rules in Mediation ± what the parties want, they get. The 
0HGLDWRU¶V IXQFWLRQ LV WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH QHJRWLDWLRQ E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH IRXQGDWLRQ RI
confidence. Without any issues of reliance upon precedence or legal regulation, confidence 
is essential for the Mediation to work, because the parties must have confidence in the 
process, and confidence in the Mediator to steer the process - and the parties - to a solution 
to their dispute. 
   
$W WKH FRUH RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ FRQILGHQFH LV WKHLU UHVSHFW IRU WKH 0HGLDWRU¶V QHXWUDOLW\ WKH
Mediator has no axe to grind one way or the other, and so the parties can rely on the vital 
commodity of confidentiality when they are discussing their position with the Mediator 
behind closed doors. This aspect of confidentiality is crucial to the process, because the 
0HGLDWRUPXVWNQRZZKDWWKHSDUWLHV¶SULRULWLHVDUH- what is important to them - if there is 
to be any hope of finding a solution. Very often they have kept very quiet about these 
priorities, which would otherwise betray some weakness in their case or their bargaining 
position, and they would not be at all thrilled if these were disclosed to the other side; but 
the Mediator will know what their needs are, and will skilfully keep this in mind without 
disclosing any confidences unless the party in question authorises him to do so. 
 
The pressures that build up in a dispute frequently force cases out of the hands of the 
parties, even if they did not want it to escalate; this can be particularly dangerous to their 
priorities when they have, want, or may need to have ongoing relationships of some sort, 
such as that between Port State and Flag State. Time is invariably an important issue, for 
they have a mutual interest in a relatively swift resolution, while litigation appears long, 
expensive, and risky for both, and the outcome is out of their control: experienced lawyers 
are aware that no case is really more than 80 per cent certain, so much can go wrong in the 
end. But both parties feel that they are being pushed into litigation by a whirlwind of 
accusations and arguments. Driving it all, of course, is the clash of the normative ethics of 
their respective societies, generating strong emotions, venting negative feelings which 
prevent them from looking objectively at ways to meet underlying interests and jointly 
solve problems. 
 
The resultant effect of these pressures forces a breakdown in communication between the 
parties, and lost communication is the mid-wife of Litigation. By comparison, the mediator 
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will help them to communicate, and guide them to recognise theLU RZQ DQG HDFK RWKHU¶V
legitimate priorities; from this foundation, they can clarify those areas of mutual agreement, 
and isolate the dangerous areas of disagreement, leading them to design options which 
reconcile and meet those needs, creating a solution which would be beyond the power of the 
court to impose, but which can be closed in the form of a binding agreement in which the 
parties can have confidence in the future.  
 
A Utopian Ideal? 
Experience in recent years of high level political mediation in the Middle East and Northern 
Ireland, and the growth of international trade ± and the damage caused when it is 
interrupted ± have opened opportunities for mediation, even in what have been viewed as 
intractable conflicts. Jacob Bercovitch331 characterises intractable conflicts as being driven 
by protagonists who have a strong sense of identity; by application in context, this 
associates the phrase with the classic Port State ± Flag State issue in which sovereign states 
harbour a grievance against each other, be it economic, political or, indeed, otherwise 
VHQVLWLYHVXFKDVWKHGDPDJHWRRQHSDUW\¶VHQYLURQPHQWRUWKHKXPDQULJKWVRIWKHRWKHU
SDUW\¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWKH0DVWHU7KHVXFFHVVIXOPHGLDWLRQRILQWUDFWDEOHFRQIOLFWVLQWKH
international arena, in which the antagonists reach a jointly acceptable outcome without 
assuring their political suicide with their electorate, raises the real option that a dispute 
arising out of an alleged claim by the Port State against the Flag State for the spill from one 
of its vessels, can be mediated without the cost of litigation and without the necessity for 
any new international law whatever. 
 
The question remains, however, as to how realistic the notion presents itself, in the context 
of this work. Realistic minds have expressed the opinion that the conflicts between Port 
State and Flag State arising out of a pollution event are unlikely even to allow them to agree 
on a mediation process, let alone to pursue it, when the prospect of a final solution is 
entirely dependenW XSRQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ ZLOO WR ILQG RQH DQG WR NHHS WR LWV SURPLVHV ± for 
mediation has no teeth. 
 
But that puts mediation in the context of being an alternative to an international tribunal. 
Mediation may be observed to offer an additional option, as a stage in the process following 
the breakdown of negotiations but before arbitration or litigation before a tribunal. After all, 
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it is a consensual, non-legal remedy, so if the parties cannot reach agreement, they can 
proceed to Trial. The UK Government has embraced this as a key part of the management 
of civil cases, and itself has published a commitment, on its own behalf, underlining a key 
REMHFWLYHWR« 
 
actively consider and attempt the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques 
whilst making going to court to resolve the dispute a last resort wherever 
possible332.   
 
In the light of this, mediation could be built into the option for a solution, as a means of 
facilitating some negotiated process, which, if unresolved, would enable the parties to 
proceed to the next step, of testing their case in Court. 
 
For the Master, however, this option only presents the opportunity of expediting a possible 
UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH GLVSXWH EHWZHHQ WKH RIIHQGHG 3RUW 6WDWH DQG WKH 0DVWHU¶V )ODJ 6WDWH
regarding their international commitments to each other.  If the States cannot reach a 
resolution under the existing regime, most likely because the Port State does not have the 
confidence that the Flag State has the means or the will to administer justice according to its 
obligations, then these options remain unresolved as solutions for the Master, whose 
criminalisation will continue.  
 
But then we have an option to consider, for a new court altogether. 
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Option 3: A new International Court? 
 
Options 1 and 2 address the opportunities for embracing and developing current 
international law, putting the dispute firmly in the arena for resolution between the Port 
State and the Flag State, rather than the prosecution of the Master in the jurisdiction of the 
Port State, to which they did not submit when contemplating their certificate of competency 
IURPWKH)ODJ6WDWH ,WZRXOGWKHQEHIRUWKH)ODJ6WDWHWRWU\ WKH0DVWHU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\
under its own system. Our analysis of Option 1, however, reveals serious issues with the 
acceptability of this by the Port State which apprehends that its key priorities will not be 
met. As a downstream consequence of such failure, Port State might argue, none of its 
priorities could be achieved, either in managing the risk already created by the casualty or 
by a repeat offence, or securing damages in compensation, or securing the justice demanded 
by its electorate, presenting two of the particular hazards identified above to successful 
resolution: 
 
x Where the Port State lacks confidence that reliance upon the Flag State will deliver a 
resolution which it finds acceptable; 
x Where the Port State asserts its right to sovereign jurisdiction, which likely will be 
articulated by its application of the clear statement rule in a particular case. 
 
7KH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V UHVSRnse must, equally, of course, ensure that their priorities are met, 
protecting its shipowners and the Masters under its sovereign flag, guaranteeing the justice 
which the maritime community demands and minimising the risk of damages owed to the 
Port State.  
 
If the conflict remains intractable, then a third option must be offered. 
 
A possible solution under this head has already been tried and tested in international law. 
7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW µ,&&¶ZDV HVWDEOLVKHGE\ WKH5RPH6WDWXWHDVD 
permanent tribunal for the prosecution of perpetrators of the gravest crimes of genocide, 
FULPHV DJDLQVW KXPDQLW\ ZDU FULPHV DQG WKH FULPH RI µDJJUHVVLRQ¶333. The ICC is 
emphatically independent of any body, be it a sovereign jurisdiction or the United Nations, 
which, at the very least, clothes it with impartiality. 
 
7KH ,&& LV QRW LQWHQGHG WR VXSSODQW D 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQ MXULVGLFWLRQ EXW WR DVVXPH WKH
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 broadly defined as an act of war lacking the justification of self-defence 
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prosecution of a case if that State does not deliver the judicial process demanded by the 
crime. While the ICC will not have jurisdiction in a case which has been or is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction, it can have jurisdiction if the 
investigating or prosecuting State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution. 
 
The attraction of this option can be identified with the compelling issue, already argued, 
that the Master owes direct accountability for the obligations of (for example) safe 
navigation and environmental protection agreed by Flag State in its treaty obligations. As 
such, it is incumbent upon the Flag State to enforce such accountability through its Court 
process. In default, a maritime equivalent of the International Criminal Court, on the 
precedent of the Rome Statute, will do so, assuring the Accused, wherever they may be, of 
consistency in prosecution and sentencing. 
 
The uncertainties in creating a model on this option are challenging: 
1 Any such treaty would have to adopt a process of prosecution which 
is acceptable to parties which practise the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems in any 
combination. This is heavily mined by hazards, not the least of which involve the conflict 
between the two systems in how evidence is managed and presented. 
2 The extortionate cost and time expended in getting a draft instrument 
to the stage of a ratified Convention might be seen as an incentive for revisiting other 
options. 
3 Once the treaty is in place, the management of the Court would have 
to be paid for, and parties would have to contribute judges with the expertise in which both 
the Flag States and the Port States had confidence. A comparison with the ICC characterises 
a few of the cost features which might prove difficult to resolve334. For example, as an 
independent body, most of the ICC funding comes from Member States, whose 
contributions are determined by the same method used by the United Nations, which 
URXJKO\FRUUHVSRQGVZLWKWKDW6WDWH¶VLQFRPH7KHWLPHOHVVGLIIHUHQFHRIYLHZEHWZHHQWKH
exporting (or Port or Coastal) States and that of the maritime (or Shipowning) States, with 
which the limitation rules under Hague-Visby, Hamburg and Rotterdam are so closely 
associated, could lead to pessimism over the likelihood of a consensus which would be 
necessary for ratification to succeed.  
Ultimately, the complexity behind this option is dogged by the very simple, and damning, 
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question which both parties could raise, and which the Author articulates: Why, ask the 
States, should we pursue this at all? Existing law is in place. Ultimately the rights of the 
Master against criminalisation come fairly low down in our list of priorities. Both parties 
have existing Convention obligations; we could apply to the ICJ or ITLOS.   
 
Ultimately, States will be persuaded to adopt such a solution on the basis that it resolves 
either a cost benefit issue, or a political issue. (To resolve both issues would be a bonus). 
Maybe, some encouragement can be derived from the Hebei Spirit case. In response to the 
South Korean Courts exercising their sovereign jurisdiction over Captain Chawla, the 
International Transport Workers Federation made a very public appeal to South Korea to 
allow the two Hebei Spirit officers found innocent of causing the oil spillage WKH,7)¶VRZQ
words) to return home335.  
 
Subsequently, the ITF joined BIMCO, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 
International Shipping Federation (ISF), INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, the 
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG), and the Hong Kong Shipowners¶ $VVRFLDWLRQ WR
deliver a joint protest to the South Korean Government expressing their deep dismay over 
WKHFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQRI&DSWDLQ&KDZODDQGKLV)LUVW2IILFHUFRQGHPQLQJ WKH&RXUW¶V
decision as unjust and in breach of their human rights. The one thing that they could not do, 
was to say that it had been coQWUDU\ WR 6RXWK .RUHD¶V VRYHUHLJQ ODZ ZKLFK QR GRXEW
increased the frustration of the maritime community336. 
 
In November 2008 the ITF made a statement at the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
International Maritime Organisation, supporting interventions which had by now been made 
to the South Korean Government by the Governments of India, Hong Kong and China. This 
statement deserves quoting in some depth because of the strength of the issues within it, 
with which it informs this work: 
 
³We sympathise with those in South Korea affected by the oil spill but are 
conscious that Capt Chawla and Chief Officer Chetan have been found innocent 
RIFDXVLQJODVW'HFHPEHU¶VVSLOO:HDFFHSWWKDWWKH.RUHDQ*RYHUQPHQWFDQQRW
interfere with the judicial system but call on them to do everything possible to 
enable the seafarers to be repatriated as soon as possible. Seafarers throughout 
the world and their representatives are deeply concerned at the unjust treatment 
of these men and condemn this as another blatant case of criminalisation of a 
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profession that is relied on for our tradH´337. 
 
This statement embraces the key problem which the global community had to confront, in 
WKDWWKH6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQMXULVGLFWLRQFDQQRWEHFKDOOHQJHGIURPRXWVLGHDQGPXVWUHIOHFW
the normatiYHHWKLFVRIWKDW6WDWH¶VVRFLHW\EXWVXFKDGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIFULPLQDOLVDWLRQZDV
nevertheless, presented as a threat to the character of the sovereign State by the global 
community which might have consequences in terms of trade and international relations 
that might be persuasive factors in influencing a change in the process of their sovereign 
law. 
 
However much of a threat the global maritime community sought to make of itself, it did 
not do much good, for the Master and Mate were imprisoned a month later ± only to be 
released on appeal, subsequently. Maybe, in this way, the South Korean people saw that 
justice was done and, conveniently, the maritime world saw the seafarers subsequently 
released ± a result, perhaps, achieved by compromise.  
 
The value of this study offers the option of an independent international court to resolve the 
issue by examining the facts and, if necessary, by the prosecution of the Master. But the 
issue will always be that of Jurisdiction. Current international law has expressed a great deal 
about jurisdiction, in the form of UNCLOS, and the respect for the sovereign State must be 
upheld. It is for this reason that this option falls into some doubt. Its synthesis, however, has 
proved beneficial, because it leads to another option, which builds on the current foundation 
of international law which respects sovereign jurisdiction. What is needed, is a consistent 
approach towards justice, which, to parrot the words of Hewart, LCJ, should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done338. Such consistency may 
be achieved in a code for sentencing; if that be the case, it need not necessarily matter 
where the Defendant is tried, and under which process of law. 
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Option 4: Submission to the provisions of UNCLOS or the Clear Statement Rule, but 
with a Model Code for Sentencing 
 
Existing international law offers accountability by the Flag State to the Port State, and the 
accountability of the Master to their Flag State goes far to embracing the validity of a 
structure of law enforcement against a Master by their Flag State of its domestic laws as 
well as its international obligations, wherever the act or omission has taken place. In this 
context, however, we are left with the supreme difficulty in current law of the defective 
HYROXWLRQRIFULPLQDOQHJOLJHQFHLQWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶VSURFHVVRIFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\RQH
of the key hazards identified in this work. 
 
To this extent, it may be argued that it matters not whether the hazard is confronted in a 
Flag State or a Port State Court. Moreover, the mischief of inconsistency in the way in 
which evidence is managed and presented in the conflicting adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems, so long a barrier to the effective administration of criminal justice internationally, 
pales into insignificance when compared with the risk that it will be used to underpin an 
REMHFWLYHUDWKHUWKDQDVXEMHFWLYHWHVWRIWKH'HIHQGDQW¶VPHQVUHD 
 
In this context the application of provisions under UNCLOS such as those in Articles 21 
and 27, or, much more to the liking, no doubt, of the Port State, the clear statement rule, so 
beloved in the priorities of the Port State, would have little practical advantage or 
disadvantage to the Master, while its preservation would, at least, meet the rights which 
inherently belong to state sovereignty in the judicial process, while conveniently disarming 
WKH3RUW6WDWH¶VSRWHQWLDOO\ LQIODPPDWRU\ ODFNRIFRQILGHQFH LQ WKH MXGLFLDOSURFHVVRI WKH
Flag State concerned. In this respect, UNCLOS need not be revised at all. With the 
abolition of the objective test in criminal negligence accepted globally, then the sovereign 
rights of Port States and Flag States could remain intact and their respective judicial 
systems respected. The essential leveller required in this case remaining to be determined is 
how the punishment will fit the crime. 
 
Some invaluable guidance has been given by the European Union in this context, which was 
severely tested by a case which was heard by the European Court of Justice in October 2007 
and affirms good precedent for the concept. The decision in the case of the Commission of 
the European Communities v Council of the European Union339 focused heavily on a 
constitutional conflict within the Union addressing the safety of maritime transport, but 
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clarified principles which, applied more widely, are crucial to this project. 
 
The philosophy in the Treaty of Amsterdam for judicial co-operation in criminal matters340 
VSHFLILHVSHUKDSVVRPHZKDWQDUURZO\IRUWKHWDVWHVRIVRPHWKDWWKH8QLRQ¶VREjective is to 
provide its citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and 
justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters, while defining the objective more closely to 
prevent and combat crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in 
persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, 
corruption and fraud. 
 
Nothing there about maritiPH VDIHW\ DQG QRWKLQJ RQ WKH 8QLRQ¶V SRZHU WR PDNH QHZ
criminal law. 
 
&HQWUDOWR WKHDUJXPHQW LQ WKLVFDVHZDV WKH&RXUW¶VREVHUYDWLRQLQ WKH-XGJPHQW WKDWWKH
common transport policy is one of the foundations of the European Union, with its primary 
objective to improve maritime safety and protect the marine environment. The decision 
supported the finding in the previous case of the Commission v The Council341 that although 
the general principle subsists that it is not for the European Community to legislate new 
criminal law or make rules of criminal procedure, which fall solidly within the jurisdiction 
of each Member State, nevertheless in the situation in which measures have to be put in 
place to deter the commission of serious environmental offences, those measures must have 
the common purpose of implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties within individual jurisdictions, and to this extent the law-making process within 
the European Community legislature has the right under the Treaty of Amsterdam to require 
Member States to implement such penalties in order to ensure that the rules which it lays 
down in the field of environmental protection are fully effective. It is submitted that the 
logic of the argument goes beyond this, for the philosophy of the European Union demands 
a harmonised process which establishes a level playing field across Europe; thus criminal 
punishment in one State must be consistent with that in another. 
 
7KH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQH[SRVHGWKHVXSUHPHGLIILFXOW\KRwever, in that the Community has 
the power to compel Member States to provide those criminal penalties, but has no power to 
tell the Member States how to do it. In other words, the power to determine the type and 
level of penalties to be applied  remains within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Member 
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State concerned, and on this occasion the European Community has no right to trespass on 
those rights which are so jealously guarded within the understanding of the word 
µVRYHUHLJQW\¶ 
 
This concept of international law can be transposed to the issue in context, to reveal the 
consequence that, while UNCLOS compels Port States and Flag States to implement 
regimes of criminal law for the protection of the marine environment, it leaves the 
determination and technicality of the punishment to the individual systems of the States 
concerned. 
 
In the case of the criminalisation of the Master, this presents an ultimate hurdle to a 
solution, for such sovereign rights must be respected. The solution, however, is revealed by 
logical extension of the argument in the ECJ decision: whoever shall have jurisdiction 
matters not, it is the determination of the type and level of penalty which is relevant to the 
Master; namely, the process of sentencing. And that can be harmonised very simply by the 
ratification of sentencing guidelines across the community of Port and Flag States. 
 
In this context a solution can be explored which has some precedent in the English legal 
system which, after all, enjoys the confidence of the maritime world; indeed, London 
remains supreme as the centre for dispute resolution thanks to the faith which is placed in 
English Admiralty Law. The precedent can be identified in the work of the Sentencing 
Advisory Panel and the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which have established rôles in the 
UK to encourage and develop consistency in sentencing in UK courts. The key feature of 
their work has involved the promulgation of guidelines in order to aid Courts in the 
complex decision-making process involved in sentencing. In the sphere of this project, 
sentencing should be uniform just as the accountability under international law is uniform. 
 
The Foundation of Sentencing: Culpability and Harm 
The academic theory in sentencing inevitably is a slave to the normative ethics in Society. 
While the strict liability offences provided in UNCLOS and MARPOL clearly are intended 
to deliver redress, it is axiomatic that the redress in question is a matter for resolution 
between the States Parties to the Convention concerned. How the normative ethics of the 
Society in whose jurisdiction the issue will be tried, will demand retribution is an entirely 
separate matter, which has already been acutely observed, not least in the case of the Hebei 
Spirit. 
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Seeking to punish the Master as the most convenient person to blame is, therefore, the 
prime function for the guidelines to avoid. Upon this foundation, the principles of 
appropriate sentencing can be built. 
 
As representative of the Flag State, the errant Master has behaved in such a way that the 
)ODJ6WDWH¶VFRQYHQWLRQREOLJDWLRQVWRWKH3RUW6WDWHKDYHEHHQEURNHQ,IWKH3RUW6WDWHLVWR
have jurisdiction in the prosecution of the Master, therefore, it must establish the culpability 
RI WKH 0DVWHU LQ WKH EUHDFK RI WKH 3RUW 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLgn laws which have been 
implemented, in theory at least, by virtue of its Convention rights and obligations with the 
Flag State.  
 
The Sentencing Guidelines Council published a helpful paper in 2004342 addressing 
overarching and general principles relating to the sentencing of offenders. The Council 
placed great faith in the wisdom of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which broadly compels 
the Court to take into account five purposes of sentencing when dealing with convicted 
offenders: the punishment of offenders, the reduction of crime (including its reduction by 
deterrence), the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, the protection of the public and the 
making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offence343. The application of 
those purposes in the context of the Master in fact underpins the relevance of all save the 
reform of offenders, which is not a matter with which the Port State is likely to concern 
itself. 
 
The overarching obligation on the Court is to pass a sentence that is fair and proportionate 
when considered with the seriousness of the offence. The seriousness of an offence is 
determined by two main parameters: the culpability of the offender and the harm caused or 
risked being caused by the offence. 
 
Culpability, or blameworthiness on the part of the offender, will be determined by such 
factors as motivation, whether the offence was planned or spontaneous or whether the 
offender was in a position of trust ± or responsibility. Such features manifestly lend 
themselves to considering the position of the Master in a casualty event and, thus, the 
relevance to the task in context is compelling. Culpability has been analysed by the Council 
to have four levels, which determine the seriousness attached to the mens rea of the 
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offender344 and can be paraphrased to apply specifically in this case as follows: 
 
1 The Master had the intention to cause harm, with the highest culpability 
when the offence itself was planned. The worse the harm intended, the greater the 
seriousness. 
2 The Master was reckless as to whether harm  would be caused, that is, 
where the Master appreciated that at least some harm would be caused but proceeded any 
way, giving no thought to the consequences even though the extent of the risk would be 
obvious to most Masters in that position. 
3 The Master had knowledge of the specific risks entailed by their actions 
even though they did not intend to cause the harm that resulted. 
4 7KH0DVWHUZDVJXLOW\RIQHJOLJHQFH6DGO\WKHZRUGµQHJOLJHQFH¶LVQRW
defined by the Council.) 
 
On the face RILWWKHODVWOHYHODURXVHVVXVSLFLRQVWKDWWKH&RXQFLO¶VDGYLFHLVXQVDIHLQWKDW
it perpetuates the mischief of criminal negligence. The Council proceeds to argue a relevant 
point, though, in that strict liability offences, in which culpability need not be proved for the 
purpose of obtaining a conviction, will still require the consideration of culpability in 
deciding sentence. When transposed to the wider concept of blameworthiness generally, this 
raises the fascinating argument that the objective test which is central to the defective 
concept of criminal negligence could yet play a rôle in sentencing. In R v F Howe & Son345, 
a case involving breach of health and safety law, the Court of Appeal gave a non-exhaustive 
list of particular aggravating and mitigating factors which might be relevant when deciding 
sentence. A deliberate failure by the offender to heed warnings would amount to an 
aggravating factor; as would a deliberate breach with a view to profit or a risk run 
specifically in order to save money. By contrast, steps taken to remedy the deficiencies after 
WKH\ZHUHGUDZQWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VDWWHQWLRQZRXOGDPRXQWWRDPLWLJDWLQJIDFWRU,QIDLUQHVV
KRZHYHUVXFKPDWWHUVKDYHSUREDWLYHYDOXHLQGHWHUPLQLQJ WKHRIIHQGHU¶VµLQQHUSRVWXUH¶
that state of mind which embraces consciousness and acceptance of the risk, even if it were 
QRWWKHSULPDU\FRQVHTXHQFHGHVLUHGE\WKHRIIHQGHU7KHWHVWIRUWKHµLQQHUSRVWXUH¶PXVW
necessarily be subjective, though, which renders an evaluation by the standard of 
negligence unsafe, yet again. This conclusion is underpinned by the guidance of the Health 
and Safety Executive346, which identifies a factor to be considered in sentencing which may 
indicate a higher element of culpability, if the offender deliberately or recklessly violated 
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the law, as opposed to breaching it as a result of carelessness, thus confirming the validity 
RI WKH DSSURDFKRIGHWHUPLQLQJ WKHRIIHQGHU¶V VWDWHRIPLQG ,Q FRQFOXVLRQ LW LV DSSDUHQW
that the same issues of the mental element apply in establishing liability as in sentencing 
DQGVROHYHOLQWKH&RXQFLO¶V$GYLFHPXVWEHGLVFUHGLWHG 
 
Harm must always be judged in the light of, and, therefore, must follow the determination 
of, culpability. The Council has analysed the parameter of harm to cover three types: 
 
1 Harm to the individual, who may suffer death, personal injury, psychological 
stress or financial loss; in other words, issues which are personal to the victim in question, 
and cause a particular impact which the Court should reasonably take into account when 
determining the seriousness of the offence. 
2 Harm to the community, which widens the impact from the individual considered 
above to the well-being or otherwise of the local society, or society at large. 
3 Other types of harm, which the Council had difficulty in characterising but, in the 
context of a pollution casualty, may describe the effect on wildlife and the marine 
environment but there may be human victims as well who suffer financially or 
psychologically as a result of the environmental damage or the suffering inflicted upon 
animals as a result of the casualty which gave rise to the offence. 
 
The Council embraced the notion that some conduct is criminalised purely by the normative 
ethics of society, in particular when public feeling is inflamed by the consequences of the 
behaviour, which can influence public perception of the harm caused347. The Council 
promptly dismissed this highly pertinent factor in 49 words, but the issue is emphasised, 
nevertheless, leading to the conclusion that sentencing has a natural affinity with the 
normative ethics of society, which may not be justified within the concept of jurisprudence, 
as this work has identified exhaustively. Mr Adomako may or may not have been negligent 
in the concept of civil law, but the concept was translated to the criminal scenario in order 
to meet the public demand for a criminal consequence for the harm caused. In these terms, 
the Master and Mate of the Hebei Spirit endured the same fate when the State Prosecutor 
secured a conviction on the criminal damage charge which entitled the Court to impose 
prison sentences. 
 
The art of compromise in this clash between jurisprudence and normative ethics does not 
lend itself lightly to finding a solution to the problem of sentencing the offender, which 
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suggests the need to reconsider the approach. Serendipitously, the Sentencing Advisory 
3DQHO¶VILUVWDGYLFHWRWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDODGGUHVVHGWKHLVVXHRIIRUPXODWLQJJXLGHOLQHVIRU
environmental offences348, with the overall aim to promote fairness and consistency in 
sentencing. The panel addressed its guidance in relation to five specific environmental 
statutes, one of which involved a maritime context in the Water Resources Act 1991, 
controlling, inter alia, pollution in coastal and territorial waters. In this work, aggravating 
factors were more particularised in determining the culpability of the offender, and the 
results can enhance and develop the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council for a more 
reliable approach to sentencing, as a model for the punishment of the convicted Master. 
Building on the foundation of the combined work published to date, the factors determining 
culpability may be described thus:  
 
1 The offence is shown to have been a deliberate or reckless breach by the Master of 
their obligations in law by reason of their responsibility, both as to Flag State law and such 
Port State laws which have been promulgated as a result of the authority and powers under 
UNCLOS and MARPOL; 
2 With reference to the conduct which led to the casualty event, the Master acted from a 
financial or commercial motive, whether of profit or of cost-saving on behalf of the Owner 
or Charterer; 
3 The Master failed to respond to advice, caution or warning from the relevant 
regulatory authority. The example begging to be cited in this instance is that of the Hebei 
6SLULW EXW WKLV PXVW DOZD\V EH WHPSHUHG ZLWK WKH 0DVWHU¶V XQLTXH GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SRZHUV
under the Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) Regulations 2002349, which do not 
render him unassailable but by his subjective decision he can give a good account of 
himself; 
4 The Master ignored Company Standing Orders (as in the case of the Sea Empress 
regarding the Master-Pilot exchange), or ignored the concerns expressed by others, not just 
those on the bridge or Port State Control but, for example, a voluntary pilot on board; 
5 The Master is shown to have had knowledge of the specific risks involved, 
apprehending the risk that a crime could occur as a result of their action and, nevertheless, 
proceeded to take that risk350. 
 
The harm to be considered in the light of culpability can equally be addressed with a model 
which relates to the actual or potential extent of the damage caused: 
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1 The pollutant spilled was noxious, widespread or pervasive, and / or liable to spread 
widely or have long-lasting effects, affecting the water column, the sea bed and or the 
coastline; 
2 Human health, animal health, or flora were adversely affected, especially where a 
protected species was affected, where a site designated for nature conservation was 
affected, or where the event took place in a pristine environment, such as the High Arctic, 
demanding increased awareness of the risk of damage; 
3 Extensive clean-up, site restoration or animal rehabilitation operations were required, 
again demanding increasing awareness of the hazards to effective clean-up such as the 
geography and weather hampering operations in the High Arctic; 
4 Other lawful activities were prevented or significantly interfered with, such as 
fishing, leisure and tourism351. 
 
Crime and Punishment 
 
The nature of the punishment can be addressed more clearly, by reference to the provisions 
in UNCLOS and MARPOL on the penalty for strict liability offences. The panel restates the 
general principle that individuals and companies should not profit from their offences, and 
it is important that the sentence takes full account of any economic gain achieved by the 
offender by failure to take the appropriate precautions; it should not be cheaper to offend 
than to prevent the commission of an offence. Conversely, the expense of any remedial 
action already taken by the offender might lead the court to reduce the level of the fine it 
would otherwise have imposed. In this respect, naturally, the focus travels from the Master 
to the shipowner or operator, raising the spectre of identifying the culpable party within the 
context of fleet Ownership ± necessarily associating the culprit with the ability to pay the 
fine and damages involved, for it would avail little benefit to the state prosecutor if they 
convicted the defendant operator but then discovered that they had no funds or assets with 
which to pay. In the circumstance in which much of the applicable law holds both the 
Master and the owner-operator accountable, it is not difficult to XQGHUVWDQGWKHSURVHFXWRU¶V
decision on a cost-benefit analysis to abandon the hunt for the owner and concentrate, 
instead, on the individual currently residing in custody in one of their cells.  
 
The level of the fine should reflect how far below the relevant statutory environmental 
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VWDQGDUGWKHRIIHQGHU¶VEHKDYLRXUDFWXDOO\IHOO7KHDVVHVVPHQWRIVHULRXVQHVVUHTXLUHVWKDW
the Court should consider the culpability of the offender in bringing about, or risking, the 
relevant environmental harm. This needs to be balanced against the extent of the damage 
which has actually occurred or has been risked. The level of the fine should be high where 
WKH RIIHQGHU¶V FXOSDELOLW\ ZDV KLJK HYHQ LI D VPDOOHU DPRXQW RI KDUP VXFK DV
environmental damage, has resulted froPWKHRIIHQGHU¶VDFWLRQVWKDQPLJKWUHDVRQDEO\KDYH
been expected. This might arise where damage (or more extensive damage) has been 
avoided through prompt action by the Port State authorities, or through some fortuitous 
element, such as helpful weather conditions, a frequent intervener in pollution cases and, in 
any case, over which the Master had no influence. Conversely, in a case where much more 
damage has occurred than could reasonably have been expected, the sentence, while giving 
weight to the environmental impact, should primarily reflect the contribution of the offender 
to the mitigation of the environmental damage352. This of course was an issue highlighted in 
the Hebei Spirit case once again, in which the Master took steps to avoid further spillage, 
although he was held more culpable still for what he failed to do in mitigating the spill. 
 
Such a model effectively serves the sentencing of the Master who has been convicted of 
offences whose origins may be identified in the relationship between Port State and Flag 
State, and managed by international laws which are designed to govern the safety of life at 
sea and the protection of the marine environment. There remains the issue of the Master 
whose accountability arises out of a breach of Port State laws which are not the subject of 
that relationship, such as the predicaments in which Captains Schröder and Laptalo found 
WKHPVHOYHV,QWKHFDVHRIWKHIRUPHUWKHPLVFDUULDJHRIMXVWLFHDURVHRXWRIWKH3RUW6WDWH¶V
employment of criminal negligence to convict him; while the latter was held accountable 
without any evidence of accountability whatsoever, other than that he was the Master of the 
vessel. In both cases, the convictions were secured by misuse of the application of the 
characteristics of a crime; how each sovereign state observes the application of those 
characteristics lays at the very source of this problem. No amount of sentencing guidelines 
could assist the Master who suffers such miscarriages of justice in establishing his guilt. If, 
however, the Master is so blatantly mistreated as in the case of Captain Laptalo, the Flag 
State and the Government of the State of which the Master is a citizen, would have the 
power to take up his cause with the Government of the Port State concerned. Such an issue 
would likely feature strongly in the list of priorities of the Flag State, as described above. 
How vigorously the Flag State would pursue a swift resolution may involve other 
complexities in the relationships between States, however. 
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Option 5: A New Approach To The Master-Owner Relationship  
 
The American case of Bowater v Patterson353 demonstrates the value of that option which 
has its foundation in the relationship between the Master and their employer. In this 
scenario the old paternal relationship is restored, and serves the Master and the shipowner 
alike, by giving them the power to determine their own rights and obligations, and, 
ultimately, their rights and obligations towards third parties, and the States which manage 
them. But they are not States Parties; they have no voice which will be heard by an 
international court. It is the age-old form of dispute resolution by litigation ± civil or 
criminal - which must guide them in this option, in the forum of the most appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
 
The starting point must be to examine the process by which litigation is resolved.  In the 
adversarial system, each party will present their case and protect their own interests in 
challenging the submissions and the evidence of their opponents. The issues of law 
involved will be argued and supported by the body of relevant evidence, that is, the 
evidence of non-expert witnesses on what actually took place as they saw or heard it, and 
the evidence of expert witnesses which assists the Court with informed opinion that enables 
it to reach a safe conclusion on the weight of evidence. 
 
The Judge manages the process on the foundation of the Rules of Natural Justice354 - the 
right to a fair hearing, free from bias - according to the law which is submitted and argued 
between the lawyers and, indeed, with the Judge as well, upon which he then draws his 
conclusion, by applying the law to the weight of evidence. 
 
That conveniently sums up the concept under the adversarial system, which differs from the 
inquisitorial system practised in jurisdictions which have followed the traditions of Roman 
law. In practice, litigation suffers from a number of characteristics that discourage its 
employment: 
 
1 The outcome is entirely out of the control of the parties - it must be, for the 
Rules of Natural Justice to prevail; 
2 Associated with (1), is the risk that no case can be considered 100 per cent 
watertight by any party; 
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3 The process is expensive, demanding the use of Counsel and, very often, 
expert witnesses; 
4 The process takes a long time to reach Judgment. 
 
Nevertheless, if the Port State has detained the vessel and arraigned the Master on criminal 
charges in excess of its authority and powers under UNCLOS355, then the option presents 
itself that the domestic Court of that jurisdiction should address the specific complaint, 
much as the Court did in Bowater v Patterson. 
 
Naturally the Master has the right to exercise that option but, given the discouraging 
features which tend to characterise Port State justice, the Master should be supported by 
their employer, the shipowner (or the charterer if she is bareboat chartered). This is the 
stage at which the Master-Owner relationship becomes so important in the process of 
H[SORULQJDVROXWLRQWRWKH0DVWHU¶VSUHGLFDPHQWDQGFRQYHQLHQWO\LQWURGXFHVWKHDUJXPent 
for a solution which focuses on the Master-Owner relationship. 
 
The point will not have been lost on the reader that the litigation in this option will 
FKDOOHQJHWKHDXWKRULW\DQGWKHSRZHUVRIWKH3RUW6WDWHLQLWVGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH0DVWHU¶V
accounWDELOLW\ 7KH LVVXH RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V GHIHQFH WR WKH SURFHHGLQJV LQ ZKLFK WKH\ DUH
arraigned must necessarily follow the patterns and processes required in the sovereign 
jurisdiction concerned. On the face of it, it would seem that all that could be offered by the 
owner to the Master in such a case would be the funding of the defence case. But the 
potential implications for the shipowner, should the Master be convicted, might, 
themselves, be severe, and it may be wise for the shipowner to support the Master in their 
defence, even if it were only to minimise the risk of some further action against themselves. 
 
As a result, with the incrimination of the owner both in criminal and in civil litigation 
DULVLQJRXWRIWKH0DVWHU¶VFRQGXFWWKHUHLVDVWURQJFDVHWRbe argued for the restoration of 
the paternalistic Master-Owner relationship; the legal solution will be found in the express 
and implied terms which regulate their relationship, and how those terms must protect and 
assist the parties in this bargain. Such a solution can only be explored having first analysed 
the issues of risk and responsibility in the twenty first century maritime world. 
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The Owner¶V2EOLJDWLRQ$ double-edged sword? 
  
The erosion of the Master-Owner relationship in recent years owes much to the risk which 
the shipowner assumes by associating itself with the Master in the situation giving rise to 
their criminal liability :LWK WKH SUHVVLQJ LVVXH RI FRUSRUDWH DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WKH 2ZQHU¶V
FRQFHUQ WR SULRULWLVH WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV RYHU WKH 0DVWHU¶V SUHVHQWV D VHULRXV
challenge to any option as being a viable alternative for the protection of the Master which 
would be acceptable to the shipowner. 
 
In the terms of the immediate present, such accountability has already been established as a 
threat in English law, with the development of the modern law on corporate manslaughter, 
inevitably precipitated by the failure of a successful prosecution against P & O Ferries 
following the Herald of Free Enterprise casualty.  In the light of the Law &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
report in 2000356 the Select Committee on Home Affairs and Work and Pensions set its face 
WRGUDIWLQJD%LOOWKDWUHIOHFWHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRHQDEOHmore prosecutions 
to proceed by tackling the difficulties created by the identification principle357. The new 
proposals were intended to change the basis of liability from the requirement of identifying 
the causal link from an individual Guilty of manslaughter to the controlling mind of the 
company, to liability founded on accountability for the way in which an organisation's 
activities are managed or organised by its senior managers358. In this way it was the 
intention of Parliament to close down the possibility that a shipowner could avoid criminal 
liability for corporate manslaughter, in the way encountered in the case of the Herald.  
 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was the result. The crime 
of corporate manslaughter is, broadly, committed when an organisation owes a duty to take 
UHDVRQDEOH FDUH IRU D SHUVRQ¶V safety and the way in which activities of the organisation 
have been managed or organised amounts to a gross breach of that duty and causes the 
SHUVRQ¶VGHDWK+RZWKHDFWLYLWLHVZHUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGE\VHQLRUPDQDJHPHQWPXVW
be a substantial element of the gross breach. The mischief of criminal negligence stalks 
through the statute, stating, as it does, that the Defendant organisation owes a relevant duty 
of care to the victim according to the common law of negligence ± clearly giving its support 
to the old ill as the common law of negligence, which is simply and conveniently nipped 
and tucked to fit a criminal process that must respond to the baying crowds for some 
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criminal accountability that meets their normative ethics, notwithstanding any irritating 
issues of jurisprudence that may get in the way.359 
 
For the shipowner, the serious issue is that there need no longer be a causal link between the 
IDWDOLW\ DQG WKH FRQWUROOLQJ PLQG RI WKH FRPSDQ\ QRZ WKH 0DVWHU¶V EHKDYLRXU PD\
incriminate them because the death must have been caused merely by a management 
failure; it need not even have been the sole cause of death, but if the Master, who, after all, 
plays significant strategic or regulatory compliance rôles in the management of the whole or 
a substantiaOSDUWRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVEHKDYHVLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHLUFRQGXFW
falls far below what could reasonably have been expected, then the shipowner will be guilty 
of the offence360.  
 
As if to remove any lingering doubt or loophole in the application of the 2007 Act, Section 
28 specifiFDOO\DSSOLHVWKHRIIHQFHWRWKH8.¶VWHUULWRULDOVHDDVZHOODVWRDQ\8.-registered 
ship anywhere in the world, whether or not any mishap occurred which led to the 
foundering of the ship. Overall, the drafting experts made a thorough job of ensuring that 
the Act would be applied vigorously to the maritime scenario; and there is no doubt that 
companies are understandably shy of exposing themselves any more than is absolutely 
essential to such a risk. TKH 0DVWHU¶V FRQGuct is not necessarily fatal WR WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
position ± but the potential for criminal litigation is obvious. For example, there is no doubt 
that Tasman Orient Line had excellent company standing orders in place in the case of the 
Tasman Pioneer361, demonstrating a management system which would successfully pass 
DQ\WHVWRIUHDVRQDEOHQHVVZKDWZRXOGEHRSHQWRLVVXHZDVKRZWKH0DVWHU¶VFRQGXFWLQ
that case may have incriminated the company.  
 
That being said, no current prosecution against a company in such circumstances has been 
concluded, giving rise to all sorts of interesting speculation, not the least being, for all the 
WKHRUHWLFDOREOLJDWLRQV DULVLQJRXWRI WKH FRPSDQ\¶VYLFDULRXV OLDELOLW\ IRU WKH0DVWHU WKH
0DVWHU¶V GLVFUHWLRQ VKRXOG SURSHUO\ SUHYail ± given the company standing orders, 
ultimately, the final judgment must be at the discretion of the Master362. 
 
For all that, the Master-Owner relationship presents a strong contractual bargain, which 
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contains rights and obligations which benefit both parties across the entire range of the 
activities which the company would wish to protect. The resultant picture shows a pattern of 
advantages to the relationship which far outweigh the risk to the company. And, after all, 
the spectre of vicarious liability has evolved as a sword which can be wielded against and 
by the employer. The historic case of Lister v Romford Ice363 underlines the general rule that 
the mere fact of employment will give rise to vicarious liability but, under the terms of their 
contract, the employee must be diligent and use reasonable skills while at work. This 
amounts to a general duty to take reasonable care while at work, which is owed to the 
employer, as opposed to any tortious liability to a third party who suffers loss as a result of 
WKHHPSOR\HH¶VQHJOLJHQFHAs a consequence, the Master may be sued by the shipowner for 
EUHDFK RI WKH HPSOR\PHQW FRQWUDFW LI WKH IRUPHU¶V QHJOLJHQFH OHDGV WR ORVV E\ WKH ODWWHU
whether in terms of civil damages or of a fine. While the shipowner would be insured 
against the quantum of damages, it could not insure itself against the criminal penalty of a 
fine; but as a claim in civil compensation against the Master, it may certainly be 
recoverable, and, thus, all the company need do is to ensure that, as part of the contract of 
employment, the Master has in place a policy of professional insurance. Even if they do not 
UHTXLUHLWWKH0DVWHULQWRGD\¶VPDULQHHQYLURQPHQWZRXOGEHZHOODGYLVHGWRFRQVLGHULW 
 
By identifying the areas where their interests coincide and clarifying where they clash, a 
foundation can be established upon which a solution can be explored for re-defining the 
critical terms of their contractual bargain and, in this way, restore some confidence in the 
idea of a paternalistic Master-Owner relationship, not to replace the options analysed 
previously, but to support the Master when confronted with the phenomenon of twenty first 
century criminalisation.  
 
Restoring the Bargain 
 
We cannot turn the clock back to the old Master-Owner relationship but we can cunningly 
redress the legal position by redefining the Owner and the bareboat charterer, with a 
solution which addresses their position with the operator, in the sense of the manager, and 
the resultant responsibility in their relationship with the Master. This is a matter of necessity 
if we are to resolve a solution involving the party whose ownership of the asset is at stake, 
for the process of identifying the true owner remains a very painful sore running through 
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marine litigation globally but, if we are to devise a solution which embraces a new approach 
to the Master-Owner relationship, this is an obstacle which must be overcome. 
 
In reality, the situation remains that the independent operator / manager will not accept such 
responsibility, and Regulation cannot impose such a thing lightly without offering the 
manager some justification in law, or else it will not be commercially feasible in a risk-
benefit analysis. 
 
As a result, we must conclude that the Owner must take ownership both of the asset herself 
and in the employment of the Master who is managing that asset. How they do that is a 
matter for them ± such a thing is feasible and desirable. But that needs strong legal 
regulation which is why a solution is dependent on a commercial contract of employment ± 
as has been seen, there is no other basis upon which shipboard order and discipline can be 
maintained, and that must extend to the Master, whose absolute discretion cannot be 
overruled, whether nor not the owner remains vicariously liable.  
 
The solution, therefore, must flow from the definition of just who must be the employing 
authority in this bargain. The purpose of the International Safety Management Code is to 
provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for 
pollution prevention. It defines the Company as: 
 
the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, 
or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of 
the ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has 
agreed to take over all duties and responsibility imposed by the Code364. 
 
Such becomes the Document of Compliance Company, and offers a new definition of the 
Owner in context; but the independent ship operator / manager will remain unhappy with 
this arrangement, and the Judgment creditor or the enforcing Port State court will be 
frustrated that there is no asset to be seized from such a party. As a result, the definition of 
the Document Compliance Company ill-serves the task in hand of defining the Owner for 
the purpose of a new approach. 
 
Just as the Owner must have its asset on the Balance Sheet, and insure her accordingly, or 
as the bareboat charterer takes out and maintains insurance cover, so the Owner ± the asset-
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holder whose investment is at stake - must ensure that the Master, in whose hands that asset 
has been placed, is protected, by a contract of employment; and insurance covering legal 
defence and damages for the Master will be a condition in that contract, even if the policy is 
to be taken out and maintained by the bareboat charterer. It is a simple expedient, but it is 
pivotal to the new approach. 
 
A contract is nothing more than an agreement made by the exchange of commercial 
promises, which is managed by terms that the parties have agreed, or have been imposed by 
the current law of that jurisdiction, and, as a whole, the agreement is recognised by both 
parties as a legal obligation. The essence of the contract is that it is a Bargain - the parties 
are free to make their own bargain and the terms of the contract must be decided by the 
parties to the contract. 
 
Whether or not the parties have endorsed a written contract, they will be bound by the terms 
from the moment when the offer is accepted. From that point, it is all down to how the 
parties meet the standard of duty which those terms have imposed upon them. If a party 
fails to perform an obligation agreed in the contract, that must necessarily amount to a 
breach ± the key factor, however is whether the party failed to perform because they had 
failed to meet the standard of duty promised: that is, the question to be satisfied is, was it 
their fault? In the non-marine case of Target Holdings v Redferns365, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson held that liability must be based on fault ± and it was this which established 
whether the Defendant should be liable for the consequences of that legal wrong in failing 
to perform the promise that had been made. 
 
The objective of this in the context of the Master-Owner relationship is to give the parties to 
a contract of employment the confidence that they can rely on the terms to regulate the way 
in which it is performed ± both by the employer and employee. In practice, the objective 
will be put to the test by the stresses placed on that relationship which has eroded in recent 
years, whether coincidentally or not, during the same period in which the criminalisation 
phenomenon has been seen by the industry to have been emerging.  
 
In consequence, the concept of restoring the relationship with a contract will be received 
with caution by both parties, unless six key factors can be assured: 
 
1 Certainty of rights and obligations ± the terms must be capable of clear and 
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unambiguous definition. 
2 The Master will have the confidence that the contract is consistent with ± and the 
Owner will support - their rights and obligations under Flag State and Port State laws. 
3 7KH2ZQHU¶Vapprehension RIFRUSRUDWHDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUWKH0DVWHU¶VFRQGXFW will 
not be exacerbated by such a contract. 
4 Both parties acknowledge that the terms preserve the contract as a fair bargain. 
5 A dispute over the contract can be referred to a cost-effective process of dispute 
resolution which ensures that the parties are on an equal footing, and is dealt with 
expeditiously, fairly, and in a way which is proportionate to the problem which has arisen. 
6 The Owner will transfer the risk on an indemnity basis, by way of a contractual 
condition that it will insure the Master against liability for financial penalties, including the 
costs of legal defence and expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred in avoiding or 
mitigating same, for the violation of Port State laws, unless the Master has been held liable 
of intent or recklessness in the casualty event366. 
  
It is axiomatic that the element of mutual trust must exist between the parties. On 
occasions this can be put sorely to the test by uncertain terms, or by a lack of confidence in 
the employment laws of the jurisdiction in which the contract is agreed; and, to grasp the 
nettle a little more strongly, the relationship can be tested by evidence of bad faith which 
FUHHSV LQ DV D UHVXOW RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ EHKDYLRXU XQGHU ZKDWHYHU SUHVVXUHV PD\ SUHYDLO
whether commercial or regulatory. Such issues have historically challenged the 
International Labour Organisation; so we may turn to them for some guidance.  
 
 
A Maritime Labour Agreement for the Master?  
 
Taken overall, the rational conclusion to be drawn from the loss of the Master-Owner 
relationship foresees that, far from supporting the Master who has fallen victim to the 
criminalisation process, the Master-Owner relationship can only get worse ± yet, the general 
principles of their contractual relationship have not changed in modern times. 
 
This itself raises the possibility of a solution, in re-defining certain of the contractual rights 
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and obligations of the parties in order to restore the confidence that each had previously 
reposed in the other, before the recent criminalisation phenomenon became manifest. 
 
The International Labour Organisation embraced enthusiastically the task of drafting an 
international format for the employment of seafarers, which forms a core part of the 
Maritime Labour Convention367. In the light of such a precedent, international rules 
unifying certain rules of law governing the employment contract for the Master must offer a 
VROXWLRQ E\ ZKLFK WKH 0DVWHU¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LV DGGUHVVHG E\ UHIHUHQFH WR SURWHFWLRQ E\
their employer. This does not infer that the employer must accept vicarious liability for the 
0DVWHU¶VFUiminal offences in all cases, but, rather, it must protect the interests of the Master 
who is confronted with three specific threats: 
 
1 7KHWKUHDWRIDEUHDFKRIWKH,02¶V*XLGHOLQHVRQWKH Fair Treatment of Seafarers 
in the Event of a Maritime Accident 2006; 
2 The threat of criminal punishment under domestic law which violate those rights 
and powers under UNCLOS; 
3 7KH WKUHDW RI D GHQLDO RI WKH 0DVWHU¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV WR OLEHUW\ DQG VHFXULW\ RI
person, and to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, at which they shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
a fair legal process. 
 
The general principles of employment law will be retained, as in that of any contract, in so 
far as it must be a voluntary arrangement, a bargain freely entered into by the parties. For 
flexibility, the effect of the rules could follow one of two options: 
 
1 A written contract of employment would meet the requirements in the same 
way as that for seafarers under the Maritime Labour Convention; or 
2 A body of rules would apply in much the same way as the Hague-Visby or 
Rotterdam Rules apply, adjusting the concept from the application of the jurisdiction of the 
Port of Loading to the jurisdiction of the Flag State, in which the critical terms will be 
specified in a written contract.  
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 This convention received full ratification in August 2012 
 211 
4.2 The Options: Recommendation and Conclusion 
 
We might learn something from Eastern philosophy. Sufi wisdom holds that deep intuition 
is the only real guide to knowledge. In the quest for knowledge and understanding, the Sufi 
scholar is challenged with the most engaging mental exercises which lay in the work of 
Idries Shah, author ± or, perhaps, collector ± of the delicious parables of an ancient Mulla, 
contained in The Exploits of the Incomparable Mulla Nasrudin368; just one example shines a 
light on the path to a conclusion for this project.  
"What is Fate?" Nasrudin was asked by a scholar.  
"An endless succession of intertwined events, each influencing the other."  
"That is hardly a satisfactory answer. I believe in cause and effect."  
"Very well," said the Mulla, "look at that." He pointed to a procession passing in 
the street.   
"That man is being taken to be hanged. Is that because someone gave him a 
silver piece and enabled him to buy the knife with which he committed the 
murder; or because someone saw him do it; or because nobody stopped him?" 
Let us put this in context. 
:KDWLVWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKH0DVWHU¶V&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ" 
- The current stage of an endlessly evolving process arising out of the constantly evolving 
normative ethics of societies intertwined with the global maritime community from which 
the Master comes, each influencing the other, but emerging in recent times as a mischief ± 
but a mischief perceived in different ways, depending on which side of the fence you are 
on.   
Put into terms of cause and effect, we are challenged with this: 
- 7KH6KLS¶V0DVWHULVRQ7ULDOIRUSROOXWLQJ3RUW6WDWHZDWHUV,VWKDWEHFDXVHWKH)ODJ6WDWH
made them their representative; or because the Port StaWHVDZWKH0DVWHU¶VQHJOLJHQFHDQG
attributed criminal guilt to the Master by reason of the effect, rather than the intent; or 
because the shipowner had not done enough to stop the spill, whether the Master was guilty 
or not?  
                         
368
 Shah, I, I985, The Exploits of the Incomparable Mulla Nasrudin, Octagon Press Ltd, London, p74 
 
 212 
This effectively adopts a Socratic approach to challenge the world view, upon which we can 
draw conclusions on the options which have been synthesised as possible solutions to the 
criminalisation of the Master. 
Those options have been scrutinised and, individually, have their respective advantages, and 
disadvantages. The Master would identify their priority in a solution which removes the 
scourge of criminal negligence and restores the Master-Owner relationship to give them the 
protection which vicarious liability affords any employee. In reality, none of these options, 
by themselves, would achieve that. But a new approach will offer a solution that can 
achieve a compromise to which all parties may agree ± an approach which adopts some of 
the options in combination.  
 
Plan A: The Preferred Approach 
 
The most forceful argument calls for a combination which brings the priorities of the Port 
State and Flag State together, as the keystone to a compromise solution, without any fresh 
treaty to contemplate. The Master remains the organ of the Flag State, and the Convention 
obligations under UNCLOS underline the Flag 6WDWH¶s obligations. As such, no new body of 
international law is necessary if the Port and Flag State are to resolve the issues arising out 
of a casualty. So much of the responsibility lays at the feet of the Flag State, which must be 
held accountable for the breach of treaty obligations to the Port State occasioned by its ships 
(the emphasis on the noun ships rather than Masters in UNCLOS is noteworthy), that 
dispute resolution between States Parties has a compelling attraction, and it would be for the 
Flag State to prosecute the Master for the breach of the international obligations for which 
the State has made its Master directly accountable. What the Flag State does in terms of its 
own regulation process can be achieved by its own domestic criminal justice process. The 
approach which underlines the obligation of the Flag State to the Port State for the acts or 
omissions of its vessels will also encourage the Flag State to regulate its shipowners to the 
standards acceptable to the global community of Port States. Those Flag States which fail to 
do so, may find themselves black-flagged and, thus, may lose their attraction for 
registration, if shipowners find their risk profiles compromised too far to make them 
financially viable for modern trading. This is nothing new, indeed, it is a key figure in the 
new EU Port State Directive. 
 
In addition to the issue of criminal accountability, the Port State will also demand 
compensation, for thH ZURQJ GRQH E\ WKH )ODJ 6WDWH¶V YHVVHO 7KLV FDQ EH HIIHFWLYHO\
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resolved by a process of civil compensation to be made by the Flag State, in order to put the 
aggrieved Port State back into the position it would have been, had the wrong not taken 
place. But with awesome inevitability, the hazard confronting a solution is that of the Port 
6WDWH¶V FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH )ODJ 6WDWH WR VHWWOH D -XGJPHQW RQ FRPSHQVDWLRQ DQG LQGHHG
delivering within a satisfactory time-scale. The solution in Option 1 presents itself as it 
enjoys a well-tried mechanism for dispute resolution ± save for the cost and the time. As the 
UN Charter espouses, arbitration may well assist in delivering a cost-effective decision on a 
dispute, but then the question of enforcement raises concerns of viability. Alternative 
Dispute Resolution offers a cost-effective non-legal remedy which aims to resolve the 
dispute by compromise; again, it lacks teeth for enforcement, but its failure would not be 
DQ\EDUWRSURFHHGLQJWRWULDORQWKH3RUW6WDWH¶VFODLPDQGWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶VFRXQWHUFODLPLI
the Master has been held in custody and the ship detained).     
 
But the Flag State needs redress against its own wrong-doers, as well, for it must hold to 
account those within its responsibility and therefore management control who have actually 
EHHQUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHZURQJJLYLQJULVHWRWKH3RUW6WDWH¶VFRPSODLQW$JDLQRXUUDQJH
of options offers a solution, for such redress finds its characterisation in the Master-Owner 
relationship. However much we rail against the injustice of the concept of criminal 
negligence, it is possible that what we view as a mischief against the Master can be turned 
to advantage, for the answer may lie in the way in which the UK has embraced criminal 
negligence in the context of corporate accountability, and the liability attaching to the 
0DVWHU¶V HPSOR\HUV WKH VKLSRZQHU, which keeps the Master personally removed from 
criminal liability for the corporate offence. The general principles of liability involve a 
gross breach of duty of care and senior management failings as a substantial element of 
breach, generally (but not necessarily) involving systemic failures. By taking the guidance 
for the current law of corporate manslaughter, we can suggest a solution which makes the 
shipowner accountable to the Flag State.  
 
The shipowner owes a relevant duty of care to a potential victim, be it in the jurisdiction of 
the Port State or Flag State; such duty must have been broken as a result of the way in 
which the activities of the organisation were managed or organised. This management 
failure, therefore, must amount to a gross breach of the duty of care by such persons who 
SOD\DVLJQLILFDQWU{OHLQWKHZKROHRUDVXEVWDQWLDOSDUWRIWKHVKLSRZQHU¶VDFWLYLWLHVZKLFK
includes those activities necessary for compliance with statutory regulation, and clearly 
covers the position of the Master. 
 
In this respect, the shipowner finds itself vicariously liable under the criminal law for their 
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0DVWHU¶VQHJOLJHQFH7KHLVVXHKDVQRWEHHQWHVWHGXQGHUWhe Corporate Manslaughter Act 
2007 but, if the company were to challenge its criminal liability under this Act on the basis 
of the failure of the Master as a senior manager, it possibly might seek to rationalise such an 
argument on the statutory provision RIWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQXQGHUWKH5HJXODWLRQV
and underpinned further by the logic of the nautical fault defence in Article IV (i) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules369DIWHUDOOLWZDVWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQZKLFKKDGJRWWKHPLQWRVXFK
trouble.  
 
Once thHVKLSRZQHU¶VFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\KDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWKHZD\DKHDGQRZOD\DJDLQVW
them by Claimants for determination of civil liability for compensation. The options reveal 
a solution both for the Claimant and Defendant at this stage, in that, as a crucial step in the 
civil procedure system, the process of alternative dispute resolution can offer very real 
advantages, as a compromise which, if successful, binds the parties in an agreement which 
preserves priorities in a non-legal remedy which looks towards a successful future 
relationship. If, however, no compromise can be reached, then the parties have lost nothing 
at the negotiating table and the litigation process can proceed to Trial and Judgment in the 
traditional way. 
 
The final head of this approach naturally involves some fair regulation of the Master-Owner 
relationship. Restoring the bargain in which they have confidence is essential ± whether it is 
self-regulated, in the form of a voluntary bargain unfettered by statutory terms, or whether it 
is regulated by terms imposed by a new maritime labour agreement may depend on just how 
both parties feel their confidence in the other to be justified. 
 
 
Plan B: The Alternative of Management Control by Port State or an International 
Tribunal 
 
In the scenario in Plan A the Port and Flag State have confronted the problem that one of 
the Flag SWDWH¶VVKLSVKDVLQIULQJHG3RUW6WDWHLQWHUHVWVWKLVUHTXLUHVWKDWMXVWLFHLVVHHQWR
be done, which the Port State can expect the Flag State to carry out, if it is to observe its 
obligations and resolve the problem. That much is simple; the complexity arises when the 
3RUW6WDWHORVHVFRQILGHQFHLQWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶VZLOORUDELOLW\WRPHHWWKRVHREOLJDWLRQV7KLV
is where the existing process, highlighted in Option 1, demands an international tribunal in 
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order to resolve the dispute between the States Parties, whose burdens of time and cost 
might prove unacceptable.  
 
Notwithstanding the confidence - or lack of it - LQWKH)ODJ6WDWH¶VMXGLFLDOSURFHVV it must 
be expectHG WKDW WKH 3RUW 6WDWH¶V SULRULW\ WR SUHVHUYH VRYHUHLJQ MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU FULPLQDO
activity which damages their interests ± undeniably enshrined in UNCLOS ± will inevitably 
prove a major GLIILFXOW\WRWKHVKLIWLQJRIWKH0DVWHU¶V7ULDOSURFHVVWRDQRWKHUMurisdiction, 
particularly when compounded by skepticism over the Flag SWDWH¶VZLOORUDELOLW\WRWU\WKH
0DVWHU¶VFULPLQDODFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGVHHMXVWLFHGRQHA new international court would offer 
a solution to this problem which is independent of the States Parties; and while there are 
advantages with impartiality and an assured consistency in prosecuting and sentencing, the 
key protagonists, the States involved, may see this option merely as moving the 
management process out of their control, and moving it very expensively, for such tribunals 
must be paid for. Meanwhile, unless the international court were to embrace the issues 
involving the abolition of criminal negligence as the chief ill of criminalisation, the Master 
might see it as not necessarily making it any fairer, but certainly making it much longer. If 
such issues present themselves, there has to be an alternative option which the Parties can 
adopt. 
 
If there is to be a cost-effective solution which preserves sovereign jurisdiction, and the 
Flag State concerned does not enjoy the confidence of the Port State to administer justice, 
then VXEPLVVLRQ WR WKH 3RUW 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ XQGHU WKH &OHDU 6WDWHPHQW 5XOH RIIHUV D
compromise solution provided that the process of Criminal Justice is protected by a model 
code of sentencing which is adopted and observed by both Port and Flag States. In effect, 
therefore, it would matter not to the Master in whose jurisdiction they were to be held 
accountable. 
 
7KHULVNWRWKH0DVWHULVWKDWWKH3RUW6WDWH¶Vcriminal process submits to the disagreeable 
normative ethics of its society and ignores the model code of sentencing. In this case, the 
PLVFKLHIRIWKH0DVWHU¶VFULPLQDOLVDWLRQZLOOQRWKDYHEHHQUHVROYHGDWDOO 
 
But The Golden Thread Remains  
 
The key factor underlying these solutions, is one of compromise, in the approach to 
protecting the Master from criminalisation. In all the scenarios, however, the golden thread 
 216 
remains, that the emerging phenomenon of criminal negligence against the Master is at the 
very core of the mischief, and in this the approach must be inflexible and unyielding. The 
general principles of criminal accountability envisaged in the modern law of criminal 
damage demonstrate the wisdom of preserving the subjective test for the mental element. 
By contrast, unless the strange civil-criminal hybrid of criminal negligence, with its 
iniquitous evidential baggage of the objective test developed in civil proceedings, is 
removed against the Master, any option, any new approach, will simply shift the way in 
which the mischief is applied. They might as well shift the deck-chairs on the Titanic.     
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The Final Word of an Optimist 
 
We started this thesis with a challenge, to make out a compelling argument for a new 
approach to criminalisation, which would meet the interests of justice both for the Master 
and the State. So the golden thread of criminal negligence, running throughout this entire 
work, is the mischief which characterises the phenomenon of criminalisation which has 
been emerging for some time. It is not an ill which is alien to the Flag State or monopolised 
by the Port State, but, the reality in searching for a new approach demands compromise, in a 
consensus which meets, at least in part, the priorities of the key players in global shipping.  
 
But such a consensus is dwarfed by a more pressing issue, still; it is a monster of Biblical 
character which rises up and then consumes everything else, and has been the subject of 
some analysis in this work: for it must address a solution for the Master in a situation in 
which the sovereign jurisdiction is actually in dispute. It is the monster lurking in the High 
Arctic, currently lacking any treaty, indeed lacking any consensus upon which a treaty 
could be based. To the Master, who is found in the maelstrom of outrage following a spill 
which is far out of reach of a prompt and efficient response and exposed to the violence of 
Arctic storms, the Master who is the prime and chosen target of Port and Coastal States 
Parties all claiming sovereign jurisdiFWLRQ RYHU WKH 0DVWHU¶V EORRG the support and 
protection of their employer - the shipowner - will be a paramount issue for them; hence, 
the approach which restores confidence in their relationship. Paradoxically, the bargain 
which lay at the very root of WKH 0DVWHU¶V HPSOR\PHQW IURP WKH DQWLTXLW\ ZKLFK ZH
examined in the Origin of the Species, remains the bottom line for a new approach in this 
new Millennium.    
 
The dread fear stalking any brave plans for a new approach is that of rejection: what if we 
cannot achieve consensus between Flag State and Port State on such an approach? It must 
be recalled, that UNCLOS delivers rights to the Port State upholding their sovereign 
jurisdiction ± in which case Plan B will remain the only approach which the Port State is 
likely to accept. Compromise necessitates some transnational consensus, which will uphold 
the clear statement rule but, ultimately, whatever system of law is applied by the State in its 
administration of justice, it is the sentencing of the offender which must enjoy consistency 
world-wide ± and that is where the model code for sentencing must be applied, whatever the 
character of the State which is prosecuting the Master.  
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In the final analysis, a new approach will require seismic shifts in the perception of the 
sovereign jurisdiction of justice. Nevertheless, a new approach is critical, in order to abate 
this emerging phenomenon of criminalisation of the Master, which, if unchecked, presents 
an ever-darker prospect of Hell for the Master whose safe navigation of the vessel is, 
ultimately, dependent upon the Grace of God. For that reason, the Master must be an 
optimist, and trust in a new approach being adopted. And perhaps, of all his necessary 
qualities, the quality of optimism must be paramount. As Mark Twain had it: 
 
That optimist of yours is always ready to turn hell's backyard into a play-
ground370. 
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